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In response to the global financial crisis, the G20 launched a series of far-reaching initia-
tives laying the foundations of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on three 
main elements: the configuration of the G20 as the forum for economic coordination (re-
placing the G7), the strengthening of the institutional pillars of the Bretton Woods system 
– the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund), the World Bank Group, and the World 
Trade Organization –, and the establishment of a new pillar of financial regulation and 
supervision, the Financial Stability Board.
The purpose of this work is to analyze the transformation of the Fund between 
2009 and 2011 in response to the global financial crisis. This analysis shows that there 
have been very substantial changes in all of its major fronts – governance and institutional 
culture, surveillance and lending policies, and resources – which represent the beginning 
of a metamorphosis in the operations and functions of the Fund that introduce new chal-
lenges and will determine its future role.
Chapter 1 addresses the main changes in the NIEO. Chapter 2 looks at the evolu-
tion of the Fund’s lending and resources policies, which insert the post 2009 reforms in 
their historical perspective. Chapter 3 deals with the insurance and financing mechanisms 
developed as a response to the global financial crisis, the so-called Global Financial Safe-
ty Nets, including the new insurance function of the Fund. Chapter 4 analyses the changes 
in IMF governance, and Chapter 5 the post-2009 IMF lending policy. The final notes wrap 
up the previous chapters and summarize the challenges ahead for the IMF.
Abstract1
1  This work translates and briefly updates the book published by the author in Spanish: La Metamorfosis del FMI 
(2009-2011), edited by Thomson Reuters-Civitas, Madrid (2012). Disclaimer: the Spanish version of the book 
was closed in December 2011 (with a few 2012 updates); while there is some new information with policy 
measures undertaken in 2012 and 2013, this English version is not fully updated. The absence of updates is 
particularly relevant in Chapter 1 of a more conjuncture nature. Disclaimer and apology: the translation proce-
dure is doubly contaminated: (i) from the use of internet automatic translators, resulting in a mixed writing style; 
and (ii) from the unpleasant and difficult cycle of re-reading oneself “lost in the translation” of working first, with 
most of the original references in English; and now, going back from the Spanish text into English. Acknowl-
edgements: to all the people that helped me with the Spanish version of the book: to my father, Manuel Moreno, 
for his continued support and help during the whole writing process. To Javier Casares, for his encouragement 
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Irina Balteanu, Miguel de las Casas, Víctor Echevarría, Aitor Erce, Laura Fernández, Isabel Garrido, Silvia Gutié-
rrez, Beatriz Urquizu (particularly, for her help with this English version) and, specially, Manuel Martínez and 
Xavier Serra, for the debates and the work on the Fund issues, which nurtures my own views. To Amaia Gurrea 
for her help with logistics. And above all, to my wife and daughters, for being there, and their continued support 
to develop this project. The analyses, opinions, and findings of this study represent the views of the author; they 
are not necessarily those of the Banco de España.
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Des mesures si simples, prises plus tôt, eussent-elles évité la grande crise? Poser 
cette question, c’est ignorer que les hommes n’acceptent le changement que dans la 
nécessité et ils ne voient la nécessité que dans la crise1 (Jean Monnet, 1976, p. 129)
The transformation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund), starting from the 
autumn of 2009, is part of a broader response driven by the G20 to face the global financial 
crisis. The global nature of the crisis demanded international responses that have been 
articulated around three main areas: a New International Economic Order (NIEO); macro-
economic policy measures, and reform of financial regulation and supervision. This chap-
ter analyzes the main elements of these policies to contextualize the IMF reform in the 
broader context in which it is developing.
We will first consider briefly the anatomy of the crisis, to approximate the elements 
of global contagion and imbalances that the international economic system has revealed, 
and second, the international economic policy responses. As we shall see, the G20 has 
given the Fund a central role in the response to the crisis, significantly strengthening its 
role in the NIEO and making it partaker in both: the macroeconomic policy responses 
– endowing it with greater financial muscle and more flexible lending −, and in the new 
schemes of regulation and supervision.
In this respect, the traditional interpretation of a crisis as an opportunity means 
– in the case of the IMF – a revival of its role in the NIEO. Indeed, until well into 2008, dis-
cussions on the Fund were centered on the risk of a loss of its institutional relevance. The 
volume of loans had fallen to historic lows, the effectiveness of its surveillance was under 
question, and the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America were showing disaffec-
tion with the Fund after the experiences with the crisis of the second half of the 1990s and 
early 2000s. The Fund initiated from 2005 a profound reform process to update its policies 
and governance structure, reforms that in 2009 were accelerated as a consequence of the 
crisis, “making a virtue of nece ssity”.
1.1  Anatomy of the global financial crisis
The main elements that have led to the global financial crisis are not new. In their seminal 
paper, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2008) conducted a historical analysis of fi-
nancial crises in the last two centuries,2 extended in their 2010 article to the link between 
financial crises and sovereign debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). In these studies they ob-
serve throughout history patterns that can also be identified in the global financial events 
started with the subprime crisis in the US:
— Global economic factors such as high commodity prices and low interest rates 
in the central country of the system play a key role in precipitating financial 
crises.
— Episodes of international crisis in the financial system are often preceded by 
periods of high international capital mobility.
— Crises affect several countries at once and not just one, therefore they have an 
international character.
1 The G20 and the rebirth of the IMF
1  Having adopted in advance such simple measures, would have prevented the great crisis? Posing this question 
is to ignore that men only accept change if resigned by the necessity, and only see the necessity in time of crisis.
2  They focus on crisis episodes from 1800, while documenting events dating back to the fourteenth century.
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— The rapid growth of private (and public) debt is often a recurrent antecedent of 
banking crises, and the rapid growth of public debt, in crises of sovereign debt. 
— High correlation between banking crises and sovereign debt crises. Usually 
(not always) the first precede (or are linked to) the second, both in emerging as 
well as in advanced economies.
The authors argue that crisis episodes are spaced in time so that the shortsighted-
ness of policy makers and investors favors a “this time is different” syndrome, triggering a 
climate of euphoria that precipitates and accentuates the crisis.3 
What has characterized this crisis has been its high intensity and rapid global 
spread, placing it next to the Great Depression of the 29 as its closest precedent, and this 
parallelism, has popularized the term Great Recession to refer to the current crisis. Fig-
ure 1.1 summarizes the anatomy of the global financial crisis by focusing on two aspects: 
(a) sequence and global contagion (left column), which allows to analyze the problems 
revealed and therefore the type of necessary policy answers, and (b) the policy responses 
both domestic (center column), and international (right column).
A  THE SEQUENCE OF THE CRISIS
There have been extensive discussions among academics and policy makers about the 
trigger of the crisis with two broad positions. On one side, those who argue that lax mon-
etary policy, especially in the US, is the necessary precedent that explains and produces 
financial imbalances, and, on the other, those who see the origin of the crisis in financial 
deregulation. In other words and at the risk of over simplifying, a debate which would place 
the origin of the crisis, either on the monetary policy led by Alan Greenspan at the US 
Federal Reserve (FED) and then exported to the world; or on the influence of Hayekian 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
ANATOMY OF THE CRISIS: SEQUENCE, CONTAGION AND GLOBAL RESPONSES FIGURE 1.1
Sequence 
• Liberalisation and jnancial innovation    
• Lax monetary policy 
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 Domestic answers  
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Banking Crises  
• Collapse in conjdence, drop in jnancial  
   and commercial kows  
• Great recession  
• Fiscal cyclical deteroration + private debt  
   becomes public 
Sovereign Debt Crises 
Risk of  
second
-round 
effects 
New  scheme of Global   
Governance (G20) 
 Regulatory and surveillance policies  
Coordination of  jnancial regulation 
and supervision, FSB, ESRB...  
Reform of jnancial regulation  
and  supervision  
 Macroeconomic policies 
1. Expansionary policiesDQGðQDQFLDOVHFWRUUHVFXHand insurance 
Fiscal impulse  and policies of liquidity 
injection, rescue and assurance of 
jnancial system  
Rescue of countries  
(IMF, Regional Funds) 
Global jnancial safety nets   
GFSN (insurance) 
2. Sustainability of jscal and monetary policies 
Monetary policy which takes into 
account the systemic risk 
Medium-term sustainable jscal policy  
International coordination of macro 
policies (Global Framework, MAP, 
EWE...)  
Volatility of capital kows.  
Asymmetry of IMS  
Global imbalances 
Global contagion  
(Financial markets and 
global economic kows )  
Global Answers 
3  A recent example they argue, is the belief that a high component of domestic sovereign debt is a new feature of 
the current system that acts as a buffer minimizing the risk of a debt crisis, under the assumption that the do-
mestic creditor may be treated as junior debt that may be reduced via inflation. But historical analysis shows that 
the probability of debt crisis has higher correlation with the debt level than with its composition. In fact, since 
1900 domestic debt is usually on average above 50%. 
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economics in the deregulation and limitation of the public sector’s role in the markets, the 
dominant academic and policy making orthodoxy in recent decades.
Catte et al. (2010) conducted a detailed analysis of the literature on the determi-
nants of the crisis, which can be summarized in the positions of Taylor (2007) and Ber-
nanke (2010). Taylor identifies the excessively low rates of the FED as the origin of the 
crisis, noting that if the standard Taylor’s4 rule had been followed between 2002 and 2005, 
the rates would have been higher and would have mitigated the housing boom. From his 
side, Bernanke noted that the links in the US between monetary expansion and rapid 
growth in housing prices are weak. In addition, with the information available at that time, 
there were reasons to fear a fall of the US in a deflationary trap similar to the Japanese 
case, thereby justifying an expansionary monetary policy. Ex post it may be argued that the 
risk of deflation was overvalued but ex ante no one could have predicted it. In conse-
quence, monetary policy played a modest role in the housing bubble and, in any case 
secondary to the financial deregulation policy.
Today there is some consensus that the origin and magnitude of the crisis can 
only be explained by a combination of multiple factors including both malfunctions in the 
financial system and macroeconomic imbalances. The debate is more on the degree of 
importance to be given to each one of them. To this respect, Bean (2009) points out that 
you can not single out a unique cause, and proposes a combination of several factors, 
including: the underestimation of risk during the Great Moderation,5 monetary laxity in US, 
international patterns of capital flows, and underdeveloped financial markets in emerging 
economies. 
Under a multi-causal approach and following the historical pattern described by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), there are a number of factors at the heart of the crisis: an in-
tense process of financial innovation that goes in advance of regulation; lax monetary 
policy in advanced economies, especially in the US, with generally low global interest 
rates; global imbalances fueled by excessive accumulation of reserves – especially in Chi-
na –, which contribute to the crisis artificially sustaining the US borrowing capacity; or 
appetite for safe assets, mainly satisfied by financial systems of advanced economies 
because of a lack of an appropriate development in the emerging markets financial sector. 
The combination of these processes drives successively to: increased investment (resi-
dential, productive and financial), high private and public debt, increase of leverage in the 
financial sector to meet the growing demand, underestimation of risk in the market, and a 
myopic investment wave, wich will build asset bubbles in stock and real estate markets. 
The first signs of asset bubbles go back to the year 2007 when subprime mort-
gages acquired visibility, although it may be said that until the fall of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 the severity and extent of the crisis was not revealed. From the autumn 
of 2008, the crisis quickly spread globally through the sudden stop of international capital 
flows, after recording historically high growth rates. The result is a banking crisis that ex-
tends through 2009. In its October 2009 Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2009), the 
Fund estimated overall losses of $ 2.8 billion in the asset value of the banking system, 
4  The Taylor rule of monetary policy determines the nominal interest rate of reference in function of four variables: 
nominal inflation measured by the GDP deflator, the real interest rate of long-run equilibrium, the deviation of 
actual inflation from the inflation target, and the deviation of GDP from its potential path. The rule calls for in-
crease in nominal (and real) interest rates when inflation increases and exceeds the central bank target, or when 
GDP exceeds its full employment level, and vice versa. In case of conflict, such as in situations of stagflation 
(inflation above target and GDP below potential), the rule ponders the weight to give to the goals of inflation re-
duction and output growth (Taylor, 1993).
5  The Great Moderation refers to the long period of macroeconomic stability, sustained growth and low and stable 
inflation registered in the most advanced countries from the early 1990s (since the mid-1980s in the US case), 
coincident with the integration of emerging economies into the global economy and the fruits of the structural 
reforms of the 1980s. Its long duration created a perception of permanence and as a consequence reduction in 
risk assessment (Bean, 2009).
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concentrated in the US (1 billion), United Kingdom (600,000 million) and the euro zone 
(800,000 million).
The sequence continues in 2010 with the transition from the financial crisis to a 
sovereign-debt crisis in line again with the Reinhart-Rogoff pattern, concentrated mainly in 
Europe, but with differences among countries. In general, fiscal policy had not played a role 
in triggering the crisis, which had its origin in private sector indebtedness. But it will have a 
central role in its second round with the sovereign debt crisis. Successive bailout policies 
and macroeconomic stimulus measures in the initial response to the crisis, along with the 
play of automatic stabilizers in a time of recession, begin to swell public deficits.
The onset of the sovereign debt crisis could be set at the Greek debt crisis in Oc-
tober 2009, (although there were other episodes in 2009: the Icelandic case and some 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe), when the new Greek government revised up-
wards its deficit. This revision generated growing market concerns about debt sustainabil-
ity in some countries of the euro area, in particular with respect to the peripheral countries 
with low productivity and growth. In May 2010, market pressures forced deep fiscal adjust-
ments in all the major countries of the euro zone. Throughout 2011, there were new rounds 
of fiscal tightening, the strengthening of the institutional framework for crisis prevention 
and resolution, primarily through the creation of a new rescue fund, the European Financial 
Stability Fund and its successor, the European Stability Mechanism; the funding of bailout 
programs for Greece, Ireland and Portugal in coordination with the IMF; the strengthening 
of the Growth and Stability Pact and new macroeconomic monitoring directed by the 
Commission; and the activation of a new financial supervision architecture, the Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism, from 2013.
B  GLOBAL CONTAGION: THREE RISK FACTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The rapid spread of the crisis reveals the severity of a number of imbalances that had been ac-
cumulating within the international economic system and will require a coordinated interna-
tional response. The discussions on the vulnerabilities of the system have been focused in three 
important risk factors: (1) the volatility of international capital movements, (2) the dependence 
on the dollar of the International Monetary System (IMS), (3) the global imbalances.6 
Factor 1 Volatility of international capital flows 
In the years prior to the crisis, capital flows had grown rapidly. Between 2002 and 2007 
private capital flows to emerging economies had risen from US$ 90,000 to 600,000 million. 
However, in the last quarter of 2008, after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September, there 
was an abrupt slowdown in capital flows, a phenomenon of sudden stop, with a freezing 
of the interbank market, the fall in trade finance, and a general deterioration of market 
confidence.7 
The March 2010 report of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) 
of the BIS, commissioned by the G20, explains the mechanisms of transmission from the 
subprime financial crisis in the US, to the dislocation of the global financial system; which 
can be summarized in the following steps (BIS, 2010):
— Drop in US dollars liquidity. The subprime crisis reduces the size and terms of 
the loans in US dollars as American banks start to implement a policy of delev-
6  Joaquín Muns refers to the two “original sins” of the Bretton Woods system: the lack of a clear outline on how it 
was to create international liquidity, and the absence of a scheme for monitoring international capital flows, be-
yond the weak and ambiguous role for the IMF (Muns, 2008).
7  See Broto, Erce and Diaz-Cassou (2011) for the measurement and determinants of the volatility of capital flows 
in emerging economies. Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004) for a discussion of the policy challenges posed 
by the sudden stop. 
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eraging and high quality requirements of collateral. This reduces liquidity in 
dollars that after the fall of Lehman in September 2008, will be exacerbated 
with the freezing of loans at a time of high uncertainty in which the accumula-
tion of toxic assets in the system make the banks reluctant to take risks from 
third parties and choose to increase their precautionary demand for liquidity. In 
October 2008, interbank swaps against dollars will be discontinued reaching a 
cost of 400 basis points. To a lesser extent, other reserve currencies such as 
the euro were also subject to similar pressures.
— Pressure on dollar demand in Europe. The shortage of dollars in the US mar-
ket has immediate effects on third countries with dollar funding needs espe-
cially in the European financial system. European banks had accumulated 
assets worth US$ 8 billion before the crisis, primarily in long-term assets fi-
nanced with short-term instruments (deposits) or foreign exchange swaps. 
Given the difficulties in selling their investment in an illiquid market (and the 
unwillingness to take losses), they will increase the demand for dollars in third 
markets outside the US, primarily in Asia taking advantage of the early market 
opening.8 
— The dollar shortage affects domestic liquidity and exchange rate stability in 
emerging economies. The increased pressure on the demand for dollars will 
also affect emerging economies in spite of its lower exposure in dollars, main-
ly because they had been relying on their domestic markets. Contagion oc-
curs in several ways: (i) increasing risk aversion leads to flights of capital and 
a fall in international bank lending to emerging countries and in portfolio in-
vestment (stock markets indices fall 60% in Eastern Europe). (ii) Companies 
usually funded in third markets are forced to return to the domestic market 
increasing pressure on domestic liquidity. (iii) The dollar shortage affects nor-
mal financing activities, short term trade credit rises from 25 to 300 basis 
points, contributing to a significant decline in international trade. As a result, 
there is a pressure to currency depreciation of emerging countries and major 
losses in currency derivatives markets that require interventions to support 
the exchange rate and contain its destabilizing effects. In addition, the eco-
nomic and fiscal impact hindered the capacity of governments to conduct 
countercyclical policies. 
Therefore, the result is a crisis that began in the US financial market, spreads rap-
idly through the international financial markets, largely by the exposure in dollars of ad-
vanced European economies, and the accumulation of toxic assets. 
The global impact of the crisis will affect mainly advanced economies, but ini-
tially, it also touched emerging and developing economies (EMDCs), which had a more 
balanced debt policy.9 Unlike the capital account crisis of the 1990s, the effect on EMDCs 
was not caused by vulnerabilities in their balance of payments but from contagion of 
failures in the financial markets of advanced economies. The initial effect on the capital 
markets was not equal in all emerging economies. Those with higher current account 
deficits (countries of Central and Eastern Europe and South Africa) and those with sur-
pluses weakened by the fall in international commodity prices (Argentina, Russia or 
8  European banks secured dollars obtained in Asia during the morning. An important aspect is that in the opening 
of the American market (European evening), American banks did not want to sell dollars until their own liquidity 
position was secured.
9  After the initial effects, emerging economies have shown great resilience to the crisis and have maintained a 
good economic growth since 2009. As noted by Ariztegui (2011), in the case of Latin America, thanks to the les-
sons learned from past crises, the region was more prepared to tackle the financial turmoil. 
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Venezuela)10 were more affected, as well as specific sectors with high exposure to the 
exchange rate.11
Factor 2 The IMS dependence on the US dollar
A second risk is the high dependence on the dollar of the International Monetary System 
(IMS). The weight of the dollar as an international reserve currency during the decade 
2000-2009 stands between 60 and 70% of global reserves, well above the weight of the 
US economy in the world GDP (24%), or the use of the dollar in financial markets including: 
daily transactions in the foreign exchange market (45%), cross-border deposits (57%), or 
cross-border bank loans (54%). The euro is at large distance the second reserve currency 
amounting about 27% of global reserves in 2009 (compared to 18% in 2000).
In 2009, dollar reserves accounted for about 10% of US GDP doubling the levels 
recorded in the mid-1980s. The IMF has estimated that even assuming moderate annual 
growth rates of 8.5% – consistent with a transition to maturity in emerging countries – dollar 
reserves would reach extremely high levels relative to its source of supply, higher than 
600% of US GDP in 2035 (IMF, 2010).
The central role of the dollar poses an asymmetry in the IMS similar to Triffin’s di-
lemma in the Bretton Woods system (Mateos y Lago et al., 2009), i.e., an economy (the US) 
could not create international liquidity except by borrowing from other countries, namely, 
creating and maintaining a balance of payments deficit. In the current system, the global 
demand for reserves is based on the twin US fiscal and external deficits. It produces, 
therefore, an asymmetry which gives to the US what has been called an “exorbitant privi-
lege” because it enjoys greater macroeconomic policy space giving the greater liquidity of 
its market via demand of reserves, and because the ability to borrow in its own currency 
represents capital gains when its currency depreciates, in so far as they hold assets de-
nominated in foreign currency against dollar liabilities. At the same time, the demand for 
reserves puts downward pressure on interest rates in the US in relation to their theoretical 
autarky level, encouraging a reduction of savings in the public and private sectors and in-
creasing the risk of unsustainable growth patterns.
These asymmetries introduce in the IMS a dual risk either by excess or shortage 
in dollar emission. On one hand, a deflationary risk, if not enough global reserve currency 
is provided. On the other hand, a risk of unsustainable debt in the center country if an ex-
cess of reserves is supplied. Thus, the growing demand for safe-reserve assets – US Treas-
ury bonds –, can only be met through a growing indebtedness of the US Treasury, which in 
turn undermines confidence in the underlying asset that sustains the reserve status of the 
dollar. Therefore, global inflation expectations and systemic risk is largely linked to the 
macroeconomic policy of the central economy, which has to balance fiscal and external 
balances, and provide a safe asset to the world.
Factor 3 Global imbalances
A third source of instability in the international economic system are the so called “global 
imbalances”, related primarily to the high current account and fiscal deficit of the US, and 
excess savings and reserve accumulation by Asian countries (China especially) and oil 
exporting economies, but also the high current account surplus in certain advanced econ-
10  In the last quarter of 2008, emerging economies register net capital outflows over 140,000 million dollars, after 
having recorded net inflows above the 100,000 million during the first three quarters. Similarly, in the bond 
markets, net redemptions of US$ 27,000 million were recorded in the last quarter (after net loans of 28,000 mil-
lion in the first three quarters) and bank lending to emerging countries also fell US$ 205,000 million in the fourth 
quarter (BIS, 2009). 
11  In Mexico, for example, pressures on the currency market lead to bankruptcy to important commercial compa-
nies (Comercial Mexicana), with high exposure in the currency market.
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omies like Germany or Japan. From 2002 on, after the crisis of the dot-com, there is a 
change in the financing of the growing US current account deficit. Traditionally funded by 
private capital flows (FDI and portfolio investment), it shifted to being supported by public 
flows originating in emerging economies with strong reserve accumulation and limited 
exchange rate flexibility.
These imbalances have played an important role in building up systemic risk, as they 
decisively contribute to maintain the flows of capital towards US and European banks, keep-
ing low interest rates and sustaining the dollar above its theoretical value or autarky equilib-
rium. On the other hand, to maintain the policy of outward growth with high current account 
surplus in a context of strong capital inflows, the emerging country has to accumulate re-
serves and to adopt contractionary monetary or fiscal policies, compressing domestic de-
mand and investment in the country, and resulting in an international deflationary bias.
While as a result of the crisis the size of global imbalances have been reduced, the 
steps are being timid and not advancing enough towards the ideal scenario, which would 
result in: a gradual adjustment of the US deficit, lower savings and lower surplus in China 
with a renminbi appreciated, rebalancing of growth in emerging economies towards do-
mestic demand, and lower global demand for reserves. Alongside there are risk scenarios 
resulting from an insufficient fiscal adjustment in the US – or conversely, excessive fiscal 
adjustment that limits global growth – or poor adjustment of the exchange the and saving 
rates, or the reform of financial markets in China, which also prevents the exchange rate 
adjustments in other emerging economies (Blanchard and Milesi Ferretti, 2009).
In short, a crisis that has its origin in the financial systems of advanced econo-
mies, ends having a global impact due to a reality of global financial markets and highly 
interconnected economies. Therefore, the answer must also be international and will re-
quire global institutional reforms.
1.2  The IMF at the center of international economic policy responses 
The crisis revealed that the international economic order designed at Bretton Woods had be-
come obsolete. The existing institutional framework did not allow to address the challenges 
posed by the crisis. In a context of global crisis, domestic solutions by advanced economies 
are not sufficient and a coordinated international effort has been required. It will correspond to 
the G20 to coordinate this international response, which has mainly focused on three key ar-
eas: (a) a New International Economic Order, (b) coordinated macroeconomic response, and 
(c) reform of financial regulation and supervision. The initiatives related to each one of these 
areas are summarized in Figure 1.2, highlighting those reforms affecting the IMF.
A  A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
The G20 has prompted significant changes in international economic relations config-
uring a NIEO. The first step was its constitution as the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation, replacing the G7, and establishing its configuration at the high-
est political level, represented by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
member countries. The G20 represents a rebalancing of power in decision making by 
adding the perspective of emerging economies and has promoted reforms in all three 
pillars of the Bretton Woods system,12 while adding a new pillar in charge of global 
12  The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 recognized the need for an international institution for trade (the later 
proposed International Trade Organization, ITO) to complement the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, but the agreement covering trade was not negotiated there. The negotiations on the ITO Charter were 
successfully completed in Havana in March 1948, but never enter in force because of the lack of Congres-
sional approval in the US. Instead a provisional protocol was signed in Geneva in 1947: “Protocol of Provisional 
Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)” became de facto the multilateral interna-
tional institution for trade. In 1994, it was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
International economic policy responses IMF
— Rebalancing of power in favor of emerging countries:
     from the G7 to the G20
— Reform of the three pillars of the Bretton Woods system:
     IMF, World Bank, WTO
— New  pillar: Financial Stability Board (FSB)
Change in the Governance of the IMF in favor of emerging countries 
(see Chapter 4).
— Macroeconomic Policies: Initially expansionary monetary
     and jscal policies and bailouts of the jnancial system.
     Since May 2010: increased emphasis on medium-term
     sustainability and consistency of macroeconomic policies.
— International coordination: G20 Framework for Strong,
     Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, mutual assessment
     process (MAP)
— Rescue programs and global jnancial safety nets: loans offered
     by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), especially through
     the IMF, are increased; parallel actions performed at bilateral
     and regional levels (SWAPS bilateral, regional funds)
Tripling of IMF resources, lending policy more kexible and creating 
a new insurance facility (Chapters 2, 3 and 5). 
The Fund acts as implicit secretariat in macro policy coordination 
and strengthens its international macroeconomic surveillance 
function (Chapter 1).  
 
— Coordination of global jnancial regulation and supervision:
     creation of the FSB + strengthening jnancial regulation
     and supervision at regional and national level
Strengthening IMF jnancial surveillance (Chapter 1). 
A. A new international economic order
B. The macroeconomic response to the crisis
C. Financial Regulation and Supervision Policy
THE POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS FIGURE 1.2 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER FIGURE 1.3
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[Seoul Consensus] 
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International Monetary Fund 
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  emerging and developing countries 
t Lending policy: 
   - Tripling the resources 
   - Flexibilization of loans  
   - New insurance function 
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World Bank 
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t Failed attempt of closing Doha 
(Reform of the three multilateral pillars of Bretton Woods)  
Intensity of the reform 
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 financial regulation and supervision. Figure 1.3 summarizes the key elements of the 
reform of the NIEO.13
From the G7 to the G20 
On November 15 2008 takes place in Washington DC the first Summit of Heads of State 
and Government of the G20. Until then, it was only set up as a meeting of Ministers of Fi-
nance and Central Bank Governors. A year later, the Summit in Pittsburgh 24, 25 Septem-
ber, 2009, formalized the transfer of power on the international coordination of economic 
policies from the G7 to the G20. This transfer is a recognition of the weight of emerging 
economies and, in particular, of the four countries identified as BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India 
and China.14 From entering the twenty-first century, emerging economies take over from 
the advanced ones in driving global growth, it was only a matter of time that they should 
also be at the center of economic policy coordination (see Figure 1.4).
There is a decline in the relative weight of the advanced economies in world GDP. 
With 2010 growth projections, advanced economies will account for less than half of world 
GDP in 2015 (48%, from 2/3 of world GDP in 1990). From 2000-2012 the growth rates of 
emerging and developing economies exceeded by 1.5 percentage points that of the ad-
vanced economies. Considering the four BRIC countries, their weight in the global econo-
my more than doubled between 1990 and 2012, reaching 26.5% of the global GDP.15
In relation to the institutional setting of the G20, it is important to highlight two 
aspects: first, (i) it lacks a permanent structure. The performance of the G20 is based on 
an informal structure based on ad-hoc working groups on specific topics and multiple 
second level political meetings (deputies and sherpas)16 to allow progress on the propos-
als. But as pointed out by Solbes and Westendorp (2010), the G20 is not the UN. It is an 
effective structure in making decisions but poses problems of legitimacy because not all 
countries are involved (albeit the G20 comprises 85% of global GDP and 62% of the world 
SOURCE: Carrasco, Molina and Orgaz (2011). 
THE GROWING WEIGHT OF EMERGING ECONOMIES FIGURE 1.4
66.6 66.6 63.0 
52.9 47.9 
12.2 13.9 16.4 
24.5 29.1 
21.2 19.5 20.7 22.7 23.1 
0 
 
20 
 
40 
 
60 
 
80 
 
100 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES   BRIC 
 REST OF EMERGING ECONOMIES 
  SHARE IN WORLD GDP  
1.9 
1.1 1.2 
0.6 
1.6 
2.2 
0.6 
1.0 
1.1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1980-1999 2000-2010 2011-2015 
ADVANCED ECONOMIES   BRIC  
 REST OF EMERGING ECONOMIES WORLD GROWTH  
  CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH  
percentage points%
13  This section contains elements developed in a former article by the author, Moreno (2010). 
14  The emergence of the G20 probably responds to the fact that it was an already existing forum combining ad-
vanced and emerging economies. Indeed, before the crisis, the NIEO governance was moving more towards a 
G8 plus, to include the BRIC.
15  For a detailed analysis of the weight of emerging economies in the international context see Carrasco, Molina, 
and Orgaz (2011).
16  Deputies are the alternates of Ministers; and Sherpas, the alternates of Heads of State and Government.
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population), with notable absence of the developing countries, in spite of the decision at 
the Seoul Summit to invite at least two developing countries to the summits. In addition, 
decisions are imposed top-down bypassing multilateral procedures.17 The French presi-
dency of the G20 in 2011 advanced the goal of providing a more formal structure to the 
G20, but finally it was decided to maintain a structure supported by the rotating presiden-
cies instead of a fixed secretariat.18 From 2016 presidencies will be regional starting with 
the Asiatic group, until then, the presidencies will correspond to Mexico (2012), Russia 
(2013), Australia (2014) and Turkey (2015).19
Second, (ii) the emergence of the G20 reflects that nation-states maintain their 
relevance in international relations, but at the same time, it also tends to encourage part-
nerships among countries to achieve enough muscle to guide global decisions. This is the 
case of the BRICS countries (initially Brazil, Russia, India and China, since 2009, with 
South Africa joining in 2011) that have strengthened their cooperation since 2009 through 
annual BRICS summits, and have consolidated a specific weight within the G20 maintain-
ing common positions in many topics (subject to variable geometries on issues like the 
currency war for example, where China and Brazil had different interests). In the case of 
the European Union, a number of internal procedures within committees and subcommit-
tees within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) attempt to coordinate 
common positions to be defended by the Commission and the European Central Bank and 
the five European countries attending the G20 meetings (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and 
the UK).20 
The reform of the Bretton Woods pillars
The G20 has also undertaken a reform of the three pillars that arose from Bretton Woods: 
the IMF, the World Bank (and regional development banks) and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). Chapters 2-5 deal with IMF reform, affecting the entire institution, from its 
governance structures and resources to tits surveillance and lending policies. 
Regarding the World Bank, a change in governance is also undertaken in the di-
rection of increasing the weight of the emerging and developing economies, and of in-
creasing its lending resources that has also been extended to the regional development 
banks. As reflected in Figure 1.5, overall, the multilateral development banks increase their 
capital by 85% (350,000 million) and nearly two times the volume of annual loans from 
37,000 to 71,000 million (G20, 2010a). In terms of lending instruments, efforts have con-
centrated in reinforcing direct budget support loans with no link to specific projects and 
greater countercyclical impact.21 
Furthermore, at the Seoul Summit in November 2010, the G20 consolidates a new 
strategy for development. The former development agenda had been focused on a ge-
neric support of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the promotion of specific 
measures such as improving the access to financial services for small and medium enter-
prises and the poorest (microcredit). In Seoul, a new strategy complementary to the MDGs 
was adopted, the “Seoul Consensus”, which sets out a number of priority areas in a multi-
17  Subacchi and Pickford (2011) propose greater transparency and an independent evaluation mechanism of the 
G20 commitments to enhance its legitimacy, but keeping the intergovernmental structure in order to maintain 
effectiveness in decision-making. 
18  The Australian Presidency in 2014 will most likely recover the discussion on how to improve the effectiveness 
of the G20.
19  The five groups of countries are: group 1, China, South Korea, Indonesia and Japan; group 2, Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK; group 3, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; group 4, India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey; and 
group 5, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Canada and USA.
20  Spain is not a formal member of the G20, but has participated as a permanent guest in all G20 meetings since 
the first Summit in 2008. 
21  For a detailed analysis of the World Bank response to the crisis see IEG (2011).
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annual action plan and six principles for policy development: focus on growth as a neces-
sary condition, absence of unique formulas (each country must develop its own strategy), 
prioritization of global and regional systemic issues, critical nature of the private sector 
involvement, tangible results, and additionality of the G20 efforts with those of the major 
international players in development policy (G20, 2010b).
The Consensus is a return to a development strategy based on growth as a nec-
essary condition, including through the promotion of public-private-partnerships, and in-
novative long term financing instruments. In the post-2015 agenda it will be important to 
harmonize this approach without losing site of a MDGs-type approach, more centered on 
reducing specific poverty indicators,22 since growth has proven not to be enough in the 
past. It will also be important its insertion into the different multilateral development efforts, 
especially those led by UN agencies, to avoid duplication. 
Finally, with regard to commercial policy, the G20 has been more preventive than 
active. The financial crisis led to a dramatic decline in global trade in 2009 (12%) as a result 
of the fall in aggregate demand. It was feared that the situation could worsen if countries 
had recourse to protectionist trade measures generating a chain reaction. The G20 pledged 
not to adopt such measures and instructed the WTO to monitor their application. Accord-
ing to the WTO protectionist tensions were contained, so that the measures taken since 
the beginning of the crisis affected only 1.5% of trade flows, and in 2010, the merchandise 
trading volume previous to the crisis was exceeded (WTO, 2010). However, in the active 
front, the G20 has not been able to give a definite boost to the Doha round languishing 
after 11 years of negotiations. The statement of Seoul in 2010 re-emphasized the impor-
tance of concluding the Doha Round with a more assertive language than that used in 
previous statements, with no tangible results. The Los Cabos communiqué in 2012 did not 
even mention it. 
The creation of a new pillar of financial regulation and supervision
As discussed in section “C” below, the G20 promotes a reform of global financial regula-
tion and supervision, with the activation of a new financial pillar in the NIEO. This pillar in-
stitutionally rests on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is created in April 2009 
(G20, 2009a). The FSB builds on the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), elevated to Council 
rank and extended to G20 non-FSF-members, plus Spain. 
SOURCE: G20 (2010a).
Development bank 
Capital increase 
(percentage)
Pre-crisis annual lending 
2000-2008
(US$ millions)
2012-2020
projected lending 
(US$ millions)
African Development Bank 180% 1,800 6,000
Asian Development Bank 196% 5,800 10,000
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 50% 5,300 11,000
Inter American Development Bank 70% 6,700 12,000
World Bank Group
    International Bank for Reconstruction  and Development 45% 12,100 15,000
    International Finance Corporation US$ 200 million 5,400 17,000
TOTAL 85% 37,000 71,000
DEVELOPMENT BANKS LENDING PORTFOLIO FIGURE 1.5 
22  The MDGs establish targets in terms of: poverty reduction, universal education, gender equality, reducing child 
mortality and improving maternal health, and environmental sustainability. 
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B  MACROECONOMIC POLICIES: COORDINATION OR LAISSEZ-FAIRE?
Extrapolating lessons from the Great Depression of 29, some consensus was installed that 
the exit of the crisis required expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. In successive 
summits releases from November 2008 until November 2010, the G20 reiterated the need 
to maintain fiscal and monetary boost. This impulse is not only national but it is also sup-
ported by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), especially the IMF. In December 2008, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn points to the necessity of macroeconomic impulse to exit the 
crisis and the willingness of the IMF to assist countries in need (Strauss-Kahn, 2008).
However, after the Toronto Summit in June 2010, and following the debt crisis in 
the EU in May 2010, growing emphasis is placed on coordinating medium-term exit strat-
egies to the macroeconomic policies. In 2011 and 2012 the focus is on fiscal policies with 
the fiscal message refined further, and different adjustment speeds are recommended de-
pending on the country, taking into account both the fiscal situation and its systemic im-
portance. Starting in 2013, greater emphasis is placed on coordinating the exit from ex-
pansionary monetary policies.
During this process, doubts arise about the degree of coordination of macroeco-
nomic policies in the G20, and to what extent, more than a coordinated effort, there has 
been an exercise in accommodating economic policies to the interest of member countries 
from their national perspective. The following sections examine these aspects considering: 
the national responses to the crisis and the challenges for monetary and fiscal policies, 
and the new mechanism of international coordination through the Mutual Assessment Pro-
cess (MAP).
National responses to the crisis
As of 2007, the advanced economies respond to the crisis with massive expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies. Central banks in advanced economies responded with a 
policy of massive liquidity injection in their domestic systems. Interest rates were lowered 
to levels close to zero, the loan deadlines to the private sector were extended and, in some 
cases, the types of collateral accepted or the number of counterparties in liquidity provi-
sion operations were enlarged, as did the Federal Reserve board (FED) and the Bank of 
England.
As the crisis intensified in late 2008, the central banks of the major advanced 
economies had depleted their conventional arsenal and resorted to other types of uncon-
ventional operations in favor of specific segments of financial markets or to provide direct 
support to financial institutions, resulting in a significant increase and changes in the com-
position of their balance sheets. Figure 1.6 shows the main actions taken by central banks.
The FED was especially active in the purchase of specific assets of the private 
sector (mainly commercial paper and securitizations, for an amount equivalent to 2.5% of 
GDP), and the purchase of other assets, such as debt and securitization from mortgage 
agencies with public support (amounting around 8.8% of GDP). The Bank of England also 
made some direct purchases of private financial assets, but in a very insignificant amount. 
Finally, both central banks – as also did the Swedish and Swiss central banks – supported 
directly some specific institutions, Bear Stearns and AIG in the case of the US, Northern 
Rock in the case of the UK.
In the first quarter of 2009, the FED conducted a first round of outright purchases of 
Treasuries (US$ 300,000 million, approximately 2.1% of GDP), as did the Bank of England 
(200,000 million pounds, 13.7% of GDP). The Bank of Japan accelerates the program of pur-
chases already being applied. In October 2010, the FED announced a second round of quan-
titative easing (QE2) with a planned purchase of 600,000 million dollars in US Treasury bonds 
in 2011, maintaining the stimulus injected; a third QE3 in September 2012, with open-ended 
purchases of US$ 40 billion a month of mortgage-backed securities; and in December 2012 
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additional injections up to US$ 45 billion in purchases of treasury securities a month, and 
keeping low interest rates until unemployment falls below 6.5% and inflation remains low. 
The ECB had ruled out initially this option, however, in May 2010, facing financial 
stress arising from the fiscal problems in the euro area, decided to intervene in the public and 
private debt markets to ensure a proper functioning and facilitate the transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy (Banco de España, 2010). This support is maintained and intensified 
throughout 2011 with accumulated purchases of government bonds by the ECB exceeding 
€ 210,000 million. In addition to the support by central banks, most of the advanced econo-
mies, and some of the major emerging economies have articulated fiscal stimulus packages 
and bailout programs to sustain their national financial systems, including measures such as: 
the establishment of guarantees, capital injections or recapitalization, asset purchases (in-
cluding so-called TARP),23 government loans, or nationalization of banks. 
The IMF (IMF-G20, 2010) has estimated that by the end of 2009, for all advanced 
economies of the G20, the resources made available to the financial system were on aver-
age 6.2% of GDP, rising to 17% if the guarantees granted to financial system operations 
are included. However, most of this support pledged at the beginning of the crisis was not 
used. Effective support is concentrated in advanced economies, and it is estimated to 
have been around 3.5% of GDP (2.2% for the entire G20), with about 0.8 points already 
recovered in late 2009 (primarily through capital repurchases and charges on the financial 
sector). Therefore, the net fiscal cost in advanced economies is estimated at around 2.8% 
of GDP (about 900,000 million), albeit with large differences among countries.24 
In short, governments articulate a wide and expensive range of monetary and fis-
cal instruments in response to the crisis, which are still in force. However, Laeven and Va-
lencia (2010) note that the initial expansionary figures between 2007 and 2009, are not 
especially significant in historical terms. They compare the actual effort with episodes of 
systemic banking crises between 1970 and 200925 and conclude that the responses have 
been equivalent to those of previous financial crises.
They note that on average, direct liquidity support is at a 5.5% of deposits and 
liabilities in the system, below the historical average (10%), a difference accounted by the 
larger size of the financial system. But monetary expansion has been 6 times the average 
SOURCE: Banco de España (2010).
Central bank Markets intervened (jnancing purchases or outright purchases)
Federal Reserve
Commercial paper, securitized assets, mortgage-backed securities and government sponsored 
enterprises, treasury bonds purchases, support to specijc institutions (Bear Stearns, AIG)
Bank of England 
Commercial paper, corporate debt, treasury bonds purchases, support to specijB institutions 
(Northern Rock, RboS, HBOS)
European Central Bank Corporate debt, covered bonds (including mortgage covered bonds), treasury bonds purchases 
Bank of Japan Commercial paper, corporate debt, shares held by banks, treasury bonds purchases
Bank of Sweden Support to specijc institutions (Kaupthing Bank, Carnegie Investment Bank)
Swiss National Bank Corporate debt, support to specijc institutions (UBS)
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES FIGURE 1.6 
23  TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program.
24  Most of the fiscal cost of the bailout is concentrated in six countries: UK (6.1% of GDP), Germany (4.9%), the 
US (4.8%), Canada (4.4%), Russia (3.1%) and France (1.1%).
25  A country is considered in systemic crisis if significant instability (high losses, bankruptcies or flight of depos-
its), and public interventions in the banking system are present. These interventions are considered significant 
if there are at least 3 of the following 6 types of interventions: liquidity injection of at least 5%; a cost of banks 
consolidation of at least 3% of GDP; nationalization of significant banks; significant expansion of guarantee 
schemes; buying of bank assets worth at least 5% GDP, and deposit freezing. 
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of previous episodes (which stood at 1%, in terms of the ratio monetary base to GDP), due 
to the fact that previous crises have been concentrated on emerging and developing econ-
omies with less scope for expansionary monetary policy.
On the fiscal cost, the average increase of the public debt of 24% is well above 
the historical average (16%), however the direct fiscal support to banks of 5% of GDP is 
lower (10% on average in earlier crisis). These numbers are a reflection of the concentra-
tion of the current crisis in the advanced economies, with greater scope for expansionary 
fiscal policies through automatic stabilizers, and/or in parallel, to carry out expansionary 
monetary policies and setting up schemes of guarantees and bank bailouts.
The challenges for monetary and fiscal policies
After the powerful expansive impulse in response to the crisis, monetary policy faces a 
double challenge: on the one hand (i) the exit strategy or deleveraging of non conventional 
instruments that have deteriorated central banks balance sheets, and on the other, (ii) in-
corporating more or less explicitly in the design of monetary policy the goal of macro-fi-
nancial stability along with price stability, and/or growth.
(i) In relation with the non conventional instruments, some operational changes 
such as expanding the types of collateral or the number of usable counter-
parts probably can be maintained to the extent that they allow a more flexible 
instrument for liquidity provision. However, in relation to the assets, the goal 
should be to transfer them – at least partly – to the fiscal authorities or to asset 
management companies. The main challenge for policymakers is the delever-
aging of public assets because of the effect they may have in long-term inter-
est rates and future management of monetary policy (Banco de España 2010). 
 The political debate has been particularly intense in relation with the exit of 
programs of public debt purchases. In the US, the Congress has questioned 
the actions by the FED and the successive rounds of quantitative easing. In 
Europe there has been a particularly acrimonious discussion, including resig-
nations within the ECB Council and demands by Germany to stop ECB pur-
chases as part of the compromise on the reform of the European financial 
and institutional architecture.26
(ii) Moreover, the crisis leads to revisiting the pre-crisis orthodoxy of a monetary 
policy mainly concerned with the objective of price stability,27 leaving to the 
regulatory and oversight policies the objective of financial stability. However, 
the crisis has shown that price stability in the short term is not a sufficient con-
dition for long term financial stability, in fact, as suggested by Issing (2003), 
there may be situations of inconsistency between these two objectives.
There is an open debate on the opportunity to recover a monetary policy with 
multiple objectives, including inflation, economic activity and macro-financial stability.28 A 
monetary policy that – in coordination with the regulatory and supervisory policies – takes 
into account the leverage and overall systemic risk in the financial system to counter po-
26  The Council of 25 October 2011 approves recapitalizations of 9 percent for the banking system, increasing the 
financial capacity of the European Financial Stability Fund through the ability to leverage and act as insurer to 
investors in government debt, and the cancellation of 50% of Greek debt. 
27  While in practice the monetary policies before the crisis pursue different objectives in different countries, such 
as growth or exchange rate stability, the pattern that marks the orthodoxy in the design of monetary policy 
before the outbreak of the crisis is determined by the inflationary objective. Berganza and Broto (2011) analyze 
monetary policy in 37 emerging economies and show that a flexible inflation target, that is, with punctual inter-
ventions on the exchange rate, can be effective in reducing exchange rate volatility. 
28  For a discussion of the challenges of financial stability see Caruana (2010).
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tential systemic crises. The political and academic challenge is to design a policy able to 
balance the trade-offs that occur between the different objectives.29 The IMF contributes 
to this debate through its reports on challenges and best practices for monetary policy.30 
From 2013, the debate focuses more on the exit strategies from the unconventional mon-
etary policy, once the recovery from the crisis is ensured.31 
Regarding fiscal policy, April and May 2010 represent a turning point because of 
the Greek debt crisis. The pressure on European debt markets forces a policy change to 
advocate medium-term fiscal sustainability. In just two weeks the IMF is going from recom-
mendations of an orderly fiscal exit to demand immediate fiscal adjustment in some coun-
tries, especially in Europe. In June, the Toronto G20 emphasizes the design of fiscal con-
solidation strategies, with a new consensus for setting different adjustment rates depending 
on the country’s fiscal instability. In particular, a target of halving the deficit by 2013 and a 
reducing trend for the debt to GDP ratio by 2016, with the exception of Japan. 
These objectives will largely be met. Nonetheless, from 2011, after the second round 
of the recession with the contagion of the debt crisis in Europe, the IMF introduced a new 
twist to its fiscal adjustment recommendations. While, it maintained a medium-term fiscal 
consolidation objective, the Fund advocates for short-term fiscal stimulus to sustain growth, 
both in surplus countries, and in those deficit countries supporting global demand, mainly the 
US. In other words, a fiscal policy that faces the challenge of reconciling multiple simultaneous 
objectives: countercyclical role, fiscal sustainability in the medium term, sustain the welfare 
state, promote growth, or take into account the objective of financial stability. This will require 
a complex design of fiscal policy and as pointed out by Vegara (2010), gaining fiscal margin 
in good times.
In 2013 the G20 has discussed the new medium term fiscal targets. While initially 
there has been some discussion around a 90% debt/GDP ratio, in line with the contested 
Reinhart-Rogoff (2010b) proposal that economic growth declines above this threshold, the 
uncertainty about the recovery will likely delay any medium-term targets. Most probably, 
G20 countries will be left with margin to decide on their own paths, with the EU being the 
more pro fiscal consolidation region. 
New framework for international coordination of macroeconomic policies: the MAP
A major challenge for macroeconomic policy has to do with global imbalances and the 
asymmetries of the IMS, which favor the maintenance of low interest rates. There is some 
scholarly consensus that the costs of the crisis would have been lower under an alternative 
scenario of a more balanced growth pattern, less dependent on the US. This could have 
been achieved through a combination of more restrictive monetary and supervisory poli-
cies in the US, with their contractive effect on global growth being offset by structural re-
forms to enhance the growth potential in Europe and Japan, and with rebalancing policies 
towards domestic growth and exchange rate flexibility, in Asia (Catte et al., 2010).
In this sense, although initially as a result of the crisis the size of the imbalances 
has been reduced, it is not clear that we are moving towards the ideal scenario with grad-
ual correction of the US external deficit and rebalancing growth in China (and emerging 
economies in general), towards domestic demand, a more appreciated renminbi and a 
reduced global demand for reserves (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). The challenge 
29  For example, higher interest rates may curb the occurrence of bubbles in the financial system, however, they 
may conflict with the goal of growth, by reducing the path of growth and job creation, but also with the inflation 
target, because linking interest rates to financial stability alter inflation expectations of the market agents. 
30  As a basic report on the IMF’s analysis see IMF (2010a). Friedman (2007), pointed out the excessive compla-
cency in the economic community and the remaining challenges for monetary and fiscal policy management. 
31  For a detailed analysis of monetary policy challenges and the challenge of exit strategies see, respectively, 
Hernando, Llopis and Valles (2012), and Rajan (2013).
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for the G20 – and largely for the G2 (US-China) – is to reconcile the internal with the external 
effects of macroeconomic policies that at the end are primarily determined by domestic 
considerations.32
International policy coordination can be approximated from the viewpoint of game 
theory. Coordination is facing a problem of non cooperative Nash equilibrium where coun-
tries do not cooperate either because of the disparity of national interests, or because of 
different diagnosis of the economic situation, and thereby on the effects of the policies.33 
The result is a Stakelberg-type behavior, in which the dominant country applies its macro-
economic policy and the rest acts as followers accommodating their policies.
In 2006, the IMF had already tried to approach the problem of global imbalances 
through multilateral consultations.34 These consultations sought to become a sort of ad 
hoc “Gs” meetings depending on the type of problem to be faced. It was intended to seek 
consensus on the analysis of global imbalances involving the main actors (Saudi Arabia, 
China, US, Japan and euro area) to find coordinated solutions. This process yielded few 
results, and multilateral consultations were discontinued after a single report (IMF, 2007).
The crisis has driven the establishment of a new framework for macroeconomic 
policy coordination within the G20,35 the Framework for Strong Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth, activated at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 (G20, 2009b). This Framework aims to 
coordinate macroeconomic policies for the common goal of growth and correction of 
global imbalances. This is an exercise that allows a joint analysis of the economic policies 
of the countries that will complement those made by international organizations such as 
the IMF, OECD, the World Bank, but with the added value of being a peer analysis, adding 
pressure to try to influence national policies.
The IMF plays a central role in the Framework by developing the analytical back-
ground for the subsequent decision of the G20, and acting as technical secretariat. In 
particular, the IMF elaborates the main reference document of the MAP, which is drawn 
from the assessment by the country of its own policies in response to a template. This 
report values  the global economic outlook and the consistency of economic policies of the 
countries with an emphasis on their effects on the rest of the world and suggesting alterna-
tive policy scenarios to avoid policy inconsistencies. 
However, the effectiveness of this new coordination mechanism is yet to be deter-
mined. In the first two years after the fall of Lehman, macroeconomic policy coordination 
within the G20 has been simple, consisting of little more than a laissez-faire in which each 
country has implemented the policies it deemed necessary, from a general consensus that 
Keynesian impetus was needed to avoid the mistakes of the Great Depression of 29.36 
32  For an analysis of the internal political constraints that explain the position of the leading countries in relation to 
exchange rates see Steinberg (2010).
33  Fisher (1987) studied the case of expansionary fiscal policy coordination in the 1980s. While the benefits of coor-
dination are clear – a coordinated expansion avoids problems of current account deficit generated in a country 
when it is the only one undertaking the fiscal stimulus – in practice, cooperative equilibrium is difficult for various 
reasons: different modeling among countries makes it difficult to reach agreement on the outcome of coordina-
tion, differences in economic policy objectives, or asymmetric policy impact depending on the size of the 
countries under coordination. 
34  The Fund has participated in the international coordination of macroeconomic policies since its inception. Co-
ordination was given increasing attention after the breakdown of Bretton Woods in the 1970s, during the 1980s 
resulted in the Louvre and the Plaza Agreements, and continued in the early 1990s with the discussion of target 
zones for exchange rates (Ceña and Hernandez, 1995).
35  In 2010, the EU also initiated new procedures to strengthen the monitoring of fiscal policies of member coun-
tries under the Stability Pact, including new rules for the excessive deficit procedure, and new guidelines on 
budgetary frameworks of the member countries.
36  In fact, initially there was little coordination. This was the case for example of the Netherlands unilaterally in-
creasing to 100,000 Euros the coverage to depositors – adopted later at European level – with the risk of bank 
runs from third countries. The same is true of the initial US concern to provide liquidity to its own financial 
system when the dollar shortage was global, though the FED in a second phase established a series of bilat-
eral swaps.
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The problem begins to emerge at the time of coordinating exit strategies. As we 
saw, the Toronto Summit in June 2010 began to show dissension among major economies 
on the diagnosis of the problems, the scope and pace to be followed in fiscal consolidation 
strategies, or lack of consensus on a tax on the financial system to finance the bailout 
costs.37 At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, the debate focused on monetary policy 
and exchange rates, ignited with the second round of quantitative easing announced by 
the FED in October. This is a remake of the debate on global imbalances, which in Seoul is 
labeled in terms of “currency wars”.38 
Given the political difficulties to reach an agreement within the Seoul Framework, 
in 2010 the can is kicked forward by creating a working group to work in 2011 on the meth-
odology of the MAP. The Cannes Summit endorses the work carried out by this group in 
two stages, in the first one, indicators are agreed to identify members with large imbal-
ances (finally China, France, Germany, India, Japan, US and United Kingdom) and, in the 
second, the causes and its main features are analyzed. 
In general terms, the reports find that inadequate saving rates are the main cause 
of the imbalances establishing a six point medium-term action plan to strengthen the foun-
dations of sustainable growth: (i) commitment to fiscal consolidation, (ii) commitment to 
increase private demand in countries with current account surpluses (mostly emerging) 
and to change the engine of growth from public to private demand in those with current 
account deficit (advanced countries), ( iii) structural reforms to enhance growth and job 
creation, (iv) reforms to strengthen financial systems at national and global levels; (v) open 
trade and investment, and (vi) to promote development. The guidelines are to be reviewed 
in 2013.
The Framework has not demonstrated a clear effectiveness in economic policy 
coordination within the G20. Imperfect coordination symptoms have appeared and there is 
risk of reversion to national responses with consequent negative externalities.39 However, 
looking ahead to its future effectiveness there are a number of elements to be optimistic: 
(i) Shared analysis and recommendations. The failure in Seoul to agree on the 
exchange rate coordination, activated the Seoul Action Plan, whose main 
element was the strengthening of the MAP in 2011 establishing a framework 
to determine what constitutes a large imbalance and how it should be cor-
rected, and to make country recommendations;
(ii) An independent observer, the IMF, evaluates policies and prepares the ana-
lytical reports to the frame; 
(iii) The process engages all relevant global actors (the G7 din not include emerg-
ing countries) and at the highest level because it involves the heads of state 
and government of the G20;
(iv) There have been signs that, faced with serious problems as with the Greek 
debt crisis, immediate action has been taken, agreeing targets for fiscal con-
solidation, deficit reduction and debt stabilization by 2013 (Toronto Summit). 
Moreover, peer pressure, though slightly, has given some positive signs, as in 
the case of China, who came to the two summits of 2010 allowing a slight 
appreciation of the renminbi as a sign of goodwill. 
37  The cost of the bailout of the financial system has introduced an intense debate on the mechanisms for the 
banks to pay the cost of its own rescue. The G20 summit in Toronto in June 2010 highlighted the impossibility 
of reaching an international agreement on the subject (countries like Canada or Australia refused to tax their 
financial sectors not affected by the crisis). The result has been uncoordinated actions in which each country is 
setting its own taxes (with coordinated efforts within the euro area). The emphasis of coordination in the G20 
has been focused on reducing costs and on the reforms to prevent future crises.
38  Term popularized by Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega.
39  See Fernández Ordoñez, 2010.
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The framework is a starting point to build up in time reinforced international eco-
nomic coordination. Although supported by soft sanction mechanisms, as the explicit 
mention of infractions or the requirement to explain policies, they probably represent a 
necessary first step in a gradual process of increasing global surveillance.40 The Frame-
work at least provides a forum to discuss the topics it has probably avoided worse unco-
ordinated outcomes, had it not being there. 
It should be noted that in parallel to the development of MAP, the Fund has 
strengthened its surveillance since 2009 in two main directions: the integration between 
multilateral and bilateral surveillance, and the strengthening of financial supervision. Both 
trends have been confirmed in the triennial surveillance review of 2011. Beyond its role 
within the Framework, the Fund should continue to exercise and improve its own inde-
pendent surveillance role.41
C  THE PENDULUM OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
The financial sector reform has been central to the agenda of the G20 since the first Summit in 
2008 in Washington, with a specific action plan for the financial sector, subsequently enriched 
in the different summits. In 2009 in London, a particularly important step is taken with the crea-
tion of the FSB as the main forum for coordinating regulation and global financial supervision, 
configured as a new pillar of the NIEO.42 The FSN completes an institutional framework for re-
forming the global financial system joining other central institutions, namely, the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).43 
The international coordination efforts in the context of globalized financial markets 
acquire particular importance, where the effectiveness of policies depends heavily on a 
broad application to avoid arbitration of financial institutions and markets between differ-
ent jurisdictions. Following, the main reforms will be discussed distinguishing between: the 
revision of the regulatory schemes; reforms in the financial surveillance and supervision. 
Both aspects are necessary, because in the origin of the crisis there were both deficiencies 
of rules (regulatory task), and shortcomings in their implementation (supervisory task). 
Expansion of financial regulation44
On financial regulation, the G20 Summit in London in April 2009, issued a Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System (G20, 2009b), with initiatives in three broad areas: (i) 
regulation perimeter, (ii) prudential regulation, and (iii) macro-prudential regulation.45
(i) In relation to the perimeter, the crisis has revealed that not all institutions with 
potential systemic effects were under regulation (shadow banking), or their 
regulation was insufficient. The pre-crisis regulation did not calibrate well the 
importance of systemic risk arising from the activity of a large group of non-
bank intermediaries – which, on the other hand, were instrumental to financial 
innovation – trusting that the regulated banks as their clients would watch 
over their discipline. In practice there has been no such control of the market, 
and in addition, a regulatory arbitrage was taking place so that many of the 
financial derivatives associated with the securitization process have allowed 
regulated banks to engage in unregulated trading. 
40  For a detailed analysis of the Framework see Estrada (2012).
41  The next section develops changes in financial surveillance of the IMF. 
42  Fernández y Estella (2011) raise the possibility of further increasing the rank of the new pillar creating a World 
Monetary and Financial Organization twin to the WTO. 
43  See Viñals et al. (2010) for an analysis of the main challenges facing the financial sector. 
44  This section includes passages and ideas of other articles by the author: Moreno (2009) and Moreno (2010).
45  See Garcia-Andres (2009) and Saurina (2009) for an analysis of the regulatory challenges uncovered by the 
crisis. 
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(ii) Some deficiencies have also been uncovered in prudential regulation of cer-
tain risks at the center of the crisis, such as those associated with off-bal-
ance sheet products, or the risks of tail events. These aspects have driven to 
the establishment of new prudential measures, including initiatives such as 
the generation of liquidity buffers, or requirements related to off-balance 
sheet exposures and capital protection against the cycle.46 The result has 
been the adoption of new prudential standards. 
(iii) Traditionally, regulation has focused on the soundness of individual institu-
tions, but the crisis has shown that the sum of the risk of individual entities is 
not equivalent to the systemic risk, so that an independent regulation and 
supervision of each entity is not enough to control for the interconnections 
among entities and the whole system’s risk. The G20 has incorporated 
mechanisms of macro-prudential regulation and supervision (the new “it” 
policy for financial sector authorities), so as to take into account, on the one 
hand, the potential systemic risk that may cause the entity (beyond its finan-
cial and accounting position) and, second, the pressure points and macroe-
conomic transmission channels between countries building up in the system 
(associated, for example with: excess liquidity, sector imbalances, exchange 
rate risks or declines in asset prices). 
Alongside the regulatory task, the G20 has also promoted specific market disci-
pline measures. Among them, the call for a review of accounting standards in the case of 
off-balance sheet activities to move towards a unified framework of international standards.
From 2010, the initial fruits of the work commissioned by the G20 to the FSB, the 
BIS and the BCBS are being collected. The main one is the adoption of Basel III accord on 
banking regulation. The new rules will improve the transparency and consistency world-
wide and set up more stringent liquidity and quality of capital requirements, raising mini-
mum capital from 2% to 4.5%. It also establishes an additional 2.5% cushion of capital 
reserve and liquidity standards (both short and long term) to curb excessive leverage in the 
system. These measures will be phased in from 2013-2018. 
In 2011, the FSB adopts a specific framework for financial institutions of systemic 
importance, or SIFIs (identified as “too big to fail”) which includes measures such as more 
intensive supervision, a new standard for national resolution schemes reducing the likeli-
hood and impact of its bankruptcy, cooperation arrangements between supervisors to 
transnational institutions, or an extra buffer of capital reserves of 1.5% on the basis of a 
risk-weighted assessment of assets.47 
The FSB and the BCBS have also developed new rules on risk management 
and supervision including the standardization of OTC derivatives contracts and guide-
lines on executive compensation, public information and market discipline, or less reli-
ance on risk rating agencies. Other initiatives include measures to strengthen the regu-
latory framework for rating agencies or hedge funds, or the development of principles 
for remuneration schemes, so as to better adapt them to the time horizon of risks as-
sumed. National supervisors will evaluate remuneration policies as part of the overall 
strength of the entity. 
46  In these areas, the regulatory experience of the Bank of Spain has gathered special attention, in particular, 
dynamic provisioning, and the requirement for financial institutions to strengthen the balance sheet for struc-
tured investment vehicles (SIVs). For an analysis of the Spanish experience and its application to new macro 
prudential regulatory instruments, see Alberola, Trucharte and Vega (2011).
47  The debate on SIFIs has been particularly complex in the FSB because the different responses designed in 
Europe and the US For a comparative analysis of these strategies see Goldstein and Véron, 2011. For a sum-
mary of the main regulatory measures promoted by the G20 see Roldán (2011).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
In short, there has been a pendulum swing from deregulation towards greater fi-
nancial regulation. As anticipated by Raghuram Rajan in 2005, the challenge is to create 
incentives for more efficient operation of markets and avoid the kind of behavior – excessive 
risk taking and abuse of information asymmetry – that generated the crisis, and at the same 
time to create buffers to mitigate the effects of future crises that inevitably will come.48 
There is also a challenge linked to the risk of an over-regulation that may introduce 
inefficiencies in terms of limiting credit growth needed to support the economic recovery 
itself, or to introduce regulatory arbitrage behavior by the market, to escape regulation.49 
Excessive regulation can also hinder the implementation and thus the credibility and le-
gitimacy of the measures. Therefore, for regulators, the problem is – based on a cost-
benefit analysis –, generate the right incentives to improve market discipline and minimize 
the unintended consequences in terms of restrictions on the activities of financial institu-
tions.50 Finally, the regulation must necessarily be complemented with strong and effective 
supervision, allowing for effective implementation of the new regulations.51 
A new framework for financial supervision and surveillance52
Global financial markets are subject to a broad surveillance framework including national, 
regional, and global actors. Figure 1.7 summarizes this network with the actors at different 
48  In 2005, the then chief economist at the IMF, Raghuram Rajan, in a study that has subsequently been recog-
nized as one of the first founded anticipations of the crisis, warned of the accumulation of risks in the financial 
system (and the inevitability of crises in general) and recommended regulations that improve the incentives of 
financial managers (Rajan, 2005). From the perspective of behavioral economics, Conthe (2007) gives several 
examples of irrational behavior in financial agents. 
49  The regulation by itself may generate incentives for new tools to circumvent the regulatory perimeter. It is a race 
between the regulator and financial agents in which the former tends to lag behind. Repullo (2009) warns of the 
overregulation risks.
50  The theoretical framework for cost-benefit analysis is not new. Market failures can be analyzed through eco-
nomic theory tools as: principal and agent, externalities or erratic behavior (mood swings), but scholars should 
work on refining the models for financial markets after the lessons learned from the crisis. 
51  In this sense, Varela and Varela (2008) put more emphasis on inadequate supervision rather than regulatory 
failures as the origin of the crisis.
52  This section includes passages and ideas expressed in a joint article by the author, Field and Moreno 2010, 
where Figure 1.7 was also published.
SOURCE: Field and Moreno (2010).
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levels. The starting point and the most important one, is the national supervision (the larg-
er balloon in Figure 1.7). The domestic supervisor is the first responsible, and the only one 
with the ability to ensure micro-prudential supervision of their institutions and to impose 
penalties for non-compliance (this will change in the case of Europe when the euro-area 
single supervisor is established).
However, the scope of national authorities is limited because national supervisors 
do not have the tools and information necessary to monitor the performance of financial 
groups when they act well beyond their borders. In this case, monitoring is covered with 
another actor in the system, the college of supervisors, which bring together supervisors 
from countries where the institution operate. The global financial crisis is causing a revision 
of these supervisory actors through redefining and implementing new standards and best 
practices of international supervision. 
On the other side, national authorities do not have enough pressure elements 
(even less sanctioning instruments) to ensure overall macro-financial stability in highly in-
terconnected financial systems subject to contagion (using an analogy, an Icelandic vol-
cano can cloud the European [financial markets] sky). This calls for transnational financial 
supervision and surveillance. Since 2009, there have been many initiatives to strengthen 
financial supervision, both globally and regionally.53 The G20 has prompted a new financial 
surveillance based on two central institutions: the FSB, and the IMF. 
Other international organizations have also led surveillance policies in their re-
spective areas. This is the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with respect to 
compliance with international commitments on trade in financial services, or the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) in relation to the assessment process and compliance with stand-
ards on money laundering and terrorist financing. Within the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS), the International Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) and the 
Markets Committee have incorporated into their regular tasks the monitoring of bailout 
programs. We will discuss the main elements of the FSB and IMF supervision. 
The FSB was established as the reference institution for international coordination 
of financial regulation, but it has also assumed the following main functions in the area of 
global financial supervision: 
(i) Surveillance of the international financial sector. Assessment and monitoring 
of vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system, to identify and imple-
ment measures to address them. To this end an ad hoc steering committee 
has been established. This surveillance includes a joint exercise with the IMF, 
the so called Early Warning Exercise (EWE). 
(ii) Coordination of cross-border financial supervision. The FSB coordinates the 
efforts of supervision of cross-border financial groups on three fronts:
— Colleges of supervisors. The FSB promotes the establishment of col-
leges of supervisors for cross-border groups. Notwithstanding that 
53  To highlight, in Europe, the articulation of a European System of Financial Supervisors that revolves around two 
new groups of institutions: on the one side, in the field of macro-prudential supervision, the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (ESRB) with identification functions and prioritization of macro-prudential risks, and, where 
appropriate, recommendations for action. On the other side, a number of authorities that oversee the coordina-
tion of regulatory and supervisory micro-prudential practices in various financial markets: the European Bank-
ing Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority. These three authorities, with higher rank and competences, have replaced the former Com-
mittees in each of the three sectors. Further, in 2012, Europe launches a banking union with a Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM). And, in the United States, with a complex web of bank and insurance regulators at the 
state and federal levels, a Council of Regulators has been established, chaired by the Treasury to monitor 
systemic risks, and the Federal Reserve endowed with supervisory functions of systemic risk institutions. See 
Field and Perez (2009) for a more detailed analysis of the reforms in Europe, and Gonzalez-Mota and Marques 
(2010) in the US.
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each college has to be adapted to the group, sector principles (bank-
ing, insurance) are being developed to ensure consistency among col-
leges. 
— National monitoring. Work is under way to compile the lessons and critical 
success factors and best practices from the different national supervisory 
models and identifying the areas where it might be advisable to increase 
the intensity and effectiveness of the supervision.
— Crisis management. Developing action principles in situations of stress 
and financial system crisis. The FSB has promoted the establishment of 
crisis management groups, which bring together representatives of the 
supervisory authorities, central banks, ministries and authorities of the inter-
national financial groups. 
(iii) Country Exams. These exercises are periodic reviews of compliance with the 
international standards of regulation and supervision and analysis of the 
country’s financial system. They are performed by a team of experts and their 
findings are discussed in the FSB. These exercises probably present prob-
lems of duplication with the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
developed by the IMF (in fact its own review is based on the findings of the 
FSAP) and will require better coordination between them.
At the IMF, since 2009, the surveillance has been deeply reviewed to better take 
account of economic and financial interconnections. A number of new reports and reforms 
were undertaken in response to the crisis, that were later confirmed in the Fund’s 2011 
triennial surveillance review. The restructuring of surveillance has undertaken two main 
directions: integration between multilateral and bilateral surveillance, and the strengthen-
ing of financial surveillance (see Figure 1.8).
On the surveillance of the financial sector, the IMF’s experience is very recent, it 
does not begin to take on a more formal character until the latter half of the 1990s as a result 
of the Asian crisis54. At that time it was decided to strengthen the financial sector coverage 
of the reports made under Article IV55 of each country and two new reports were intro-
duced on the Fund’s surveillance instruments: the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) and the GFSR. The FSAP is a bilateral surveillance tool created in 1999 in conjunc-
tion with the World Bank in order to analyze in detail the financial sectors of each country 
and assess their risks. The GFSR is created in the field of multilateral surveillance in 2002 
to discuss global financial markets, complementing the WEO,56 by analyzing the financial 
ramifications of macroeconomic imbalances.57 
In the last decade, the IMF has also strengthened its expertise and its departmen-
tal structure in the financial area. In 2001 the Capital Markets Department was created, 
which later, in 2006, merged with the Department of Monetary and Financial Affairs, into 
the new Department of Monetary and Capital Markets (MCM), raising its Director to the 
rank of Financial Counselor (parallel to that of the Economic Counselor).
However, the global financial crisis has revealed that this strengthening of financial 
surveillance has been inadequate, and the IMF has promoted the following major reforms 
in its bilateral financial surveillance:58 
54  Gola and Spadafora (2009) traced back the beginning of the surveillance of the financial system to the late 1980s 
with the research and technical assistance related to financial deregulation.
55  Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides for bilateral surveillance of its members. 
56  WEO: World Economic Outlook. 
57  The GFSR was born as a quarterly report in 2002, but it shortly became biannual after 2003, coinciding in time 
with the publication of the WEO in March / April and September / October.
58  See IMF (2010b) and IMF-World Bank (2009) for a more detailed analysis of changes in financial supervision, 
and IMF (2010c) for changes in the overall surveillance framework. 
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Since 2009, the fund has strengthened its surveillance mecha-
nisms moving from an analysis that was traditionally centered on a 
macroeconomic and balance of payments analysis of individual 
countries, into a more integrated approach in two main directions: 
the links between multilateral and bilateral surveillance, and the 
strengthening of financial surveillance. 
The figure represents these main tendencies reflected in a larger 
dark shaded area of the intersection between the circles of bilate-
ral, regional and multilateral surveillance (with the size of the cir-
cles representing the weight of the different layers, smaller in the 
case of regional surveillance, which has been streamlined from 
2013). 
The most relevant initiatives since 2009 include1: (i) Introduction 
and review of multilateral surveillance instruments such as: the 
Global Policy Agenda (the successor of the initial Consolidated 
Multilateral Surveillance Report), which integrates the key findings 
of the WEO, GFSR and Fiscal Monitor; the review of these two 
reports to address macro-financial linkages and cross-border is-
sues, and to adopt a more incisive language2; a report focused on 
fiscal policy (Fiscal Monitor); and a new early warning exercise 
(EWE3). (ii) Development of cluster consultations (of a group of 
countries) and new thematic reports on international economic 
and financial affairs, which emphasize cross-country analysis (e.g. 
reports on financial interconnections, transnational financial insti-
tutions, or compared labor markets). (iii) For systemic economies, 
an additional report on spillovers together with the Article IV re-
ports, which analyzes the impact of the domestic policies on its 
economic partners and regionally or globally (spillover reports)4. 
(iv) On financial surveillance: the strengthening of bilateral financial 
supervision in Article IV reports, and regular – at least every 5 
years – Financial Stability Assessments (FSA) for countries with 
systemic financial systems5. (v) And in 2013, the streamlining of 
the Regional Economic Outlook Reports (REOs), and specially, the 
approval of the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD). As a subs-
titute of a reform to the Articles of Agreement on Surveillance (for 
which there was no consensus), the ISD formalizes the new scope 
of IMF surveillance already undertaken since 2009, explicitly re-
cognizing Article IV consultations as vehicles for both bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance, and going beyond macroeconomic poli-
cies, by endorsing the analysis of spillovers and country’s econo-
mic and financial policies.
FIGURE 1.8THE REFORM OF IMF SURVEILLANCE (2009-2012)
1  For a more detailed analysis see Field and Moreno (2010) and Guzman 
(2010).
2  For example, the April 2007 GFSR warned of the excessive accumula-
tion of risks in the subprime mortgage market in the US, and the risks of 
contagion in global markets. However, the alert did not permeate, 
among other reasons, because the lack of strength in the message, lost 
in a lengthy and analytical report, rather than one of alerting and policy 
recommendations (Field and Moreno 2010). This contrast with the Sep-
tember 2011 GFSR warning of recapitalization needs in Europe that lead 
to the subsequent decision of the European Council in this regard.
3  The EWE complements the GFSR and WEO identifying tail risks and 
vulnerability scenarios. Beyond the analytical supplement, the advan-
tage of the EWE is the presentation in restricted format to Ministers and 
Governors in the spring and annual meetings of the IMF.
4  This exercise has started with five pilot reports for China, the US, Japan, 
UK and Euro Zone (IMF, 2010ñ).
5  The financial analysis has also been strengthened in the Regional Eco-
nomic Outlook (REO) reports.
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
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(i) Review of the FSAP program. The FSAP failed to effectively warn about the 
risks in the global financial system. It is symptomatic that the country where 
the crisis originated, the US, had not conducted a FSAP despite the insist-
ence of the Fund. In any case, it is not clear that it would have been effective. 
In countries with FSAP like the United Kingdom (UK) and Belgium, the sig-
nificant risks in their respective financial systems were not detected. Proba-
bly the FSAP reports were obsolete and of an overly mechanical nature, cen-
tered only in checking if the country complied with certain international 
standards.
 The IMF reacted fairly quickly to these deficiencies, reviewing the FSAP to 
make it more flexible, incorporating specific modules of financial stability, 
periodic updates, and focusing on country-specific weaknesses. On the oth-
er hand, the commitment to carry out FSAP reports for all countries with 
economies of systemic importance has been formalized (including all G20 
countries). The Fund is also making progress in updating the FSAP exercise 
and in integrating its findings in Articles IV and in multilateral surveillance, 
thereby better capturing the transnational linkages of financial systems.
(ii) Analytical framework and financial information. The crisis has also revealed 
the complexity of the interconnections of the international financial system 
and the speed of adjustment of the markets, in many cases, a step ahead of 
the supervisor. The IMF is working on improving and continuously updating 
its analytical tools.59
 Another important element is the access to relevant financial information to 
conduct effective oversight. This work is being done in conjunction with the 
FSB under the mandate of the G20. Both institutions produced a report on 
financial information gaps (data gaps) that concluded with twenty recommen-
dations, including the collection of data on the links between financial institu-
tions and the development of indicators of financial stability (IMF-FSB, 2009). 
This is a particularly sensitive area involving confidentiality of financial data 
and can only be conducted in full cooperation with the national authorities. 
In short, the G20 has fostered a new framework for global financial regulation and 
supervision, arguably building a new international pillar alongside the traditional three of 
the Bretton Woods system (IMF, World Bank and WTO). In this new pillar, the institutional 
framework would be based on two central institutions, the FSB and the IMF. The reforms 
are still under development and it will take some time to evaluate its effectiveness. Both 
institutions are facing major challenges including the necessary collaboration between the 
two to avoid duplications.60 
In this sense, the division of labor between the IMF and the FSB should be based 
on the different character of the two institutions. The FSB is a small institution with limited 
resources but great political leverage because of the presence of the key players in making 
economic policy decisions, the ministries and the central banks. It is an institution called 
to coordinate national supervisory schemes and develop inter-peer monitoring. The IMF 
has a large independent international civil service but less political leverage. Therefore, the 
Fund is best suited for independent evaluation functions, surveillance and technical sup-
port to countries.
59  In this area the Fund has launched new tools and methodologies on macro-financial linkages and sensitivity 
analysis (IMF, 2010a).
60  A clear risk is duplication may occur with the FSB’s country exams and the Fund FSAP exercise.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
El mundo de nuestros días no es el de los años cuarenta, cuando se planificó la or-
ganización económica a la que nos estamos refiriendo [Bretton Woods]. Toda clase 
de acontecimientos políticos, económicos y sociales han condicionado su evolución 
y las políticas de los organismos internacionales (Manuel Varela, 1996, p. 24).1
One of the Fund’s main responses to the global financial crisis has been the flexibilization 
of its lending policy. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, the new lending policy will provide a 
framework for crisis resolution with greater access to resources and less conditionality, 
and will create a new insurance function for the Fund. 
The details of the lending reform were not improvised; many of the changes had 
been previously discussed and, in fact, reflect a logical evolution of the Fund’s policy. The 
crisis will accelerate the lending policy reform and give it new direction in accordance with 
the actual necessities of member countries. In this regard, through its life, the Fund has 
proved resilient enough to adapt to the changing needs of the international economic en-
vironment, although in some cases with certain delay. In parallel, developments in lending 
policy could not be addressed without parallel progress in IMF resources, which constitute 
its budget constraint.
 This chapter deals with the main facilities of the IMF’s lending policy and with its 
resources, under the prism of the most relevant aspects that will affect the reform initiated 
in 2009. In order to frame this reform within a historical perspective,2 it is interesting to 
distinguish three major reform periods: (1) 1945-1963: the first steps, the Stand-By Ar-
rangements; (2) 1963-1995: the development of “a la carte” menu of financial facilities, and 
(3) 1995-2008: the capital account crisis and large-scale funding. Finally, it will be dis-
cussed how the adequacy of IMF resources has been ensured over the years, including the 
tripling of resources decided by the G20 in 2009, and the additional temporary loans en-
sured in 2012. 
2.1 1945-1963: the first steps: Stand-by Arrangements or SBAs 
The IMF granted its first loan to France on May 8, 1947 for US$ 25 million, seventeen 
months after the entry into force of the Articles of Agreement (December 27, 1945). Be-
tween 1947 and 1951 continuous discussions took place on the requirements for a country 
to be granted a loan when it exceeded five percent of its quota. It was during these years 
that the Board moved away from the concept of automatic lending and settled down the 
idea of progressive conditionality (Horsefield, 1969, p. 189, 276).3 
The approval of the “Rooth Plan”4 in February 13, 1952 is the starting point of the 
IMF’s lending facilities, of what from October began to be known as Stand-By Arrange-
ments or SBA (with an earlier loan to Belgium on 19 June of that year). The Plan formalizes 
2 Crisis Resolution: a history of adaptation to the needs of its members
1  The world today is not that of the 1940s, when the organization to which we refer [Bretton Woods] was planned. 
All kinds of political, economic and social developments have conditioned its development and the policies of 
international organizations (Manuel Varela, 1996, p. 24).
2  The focus of the analysis is the policy instrumented through the IMF General Resources Account that represents 
more than 95% of IMF loans. Nevertheless, there will also be reference to the concessional financing to develop-
ing countries. 
3  Reference works for a historical analysis of the IMF are the studies of the Fund’s chief historians, including J. Keith 
Horsefield (1969), Margaret G. de Vries (1986), and James M. Boughton (2001). Other classical references are 
Manuel Guitián (1992), Manuel Varela (1969 and (ed.) 1994), with emphasis on the relation with Spain. As a 
benchmark report on lending facilities see IMF (2000), which also includes a historical analysis. 
4 On behalf of Ivar Rooth, IMF Managing Director between 1951 and 1956.
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access to resources for a certain period (usually between 6 and 12 months), and ensuring, 
at the same time, its recovery with an agreement by the country to repurchase the loan 
over a maximum period of five years. In this way, the revolving nature of the Fund’s re-
sources was guaranteed (Horsefield, 1969, p. 324, 328-332).
The SBA, since its origin constitutes the backbone of the Fund’s lending instru-
ments and its main features will be present in the various facilities built up over the years. 
Its basic structure was shaped between the late 50s and the 60s, formalized with the 
1968 conditionality guidelines, and later revised in 1979 and 2002. Its basic structure: 
tranched loans, conditionality, and access limits, will remain virtually unchanged until the 
2009 reform. 
(i) Phasing and conditionality. The IMF offered loans in what has come to be 
known as the credit tranche policy. The country quota is divided into four 
equal tranches. The granting of the first credit tranche is made on highly 
concessional terms. From the second one on, a policy of “upper credit 
tranches” is applied, requiring assertion that the country could solve the bal-
ance of payments problems and therefore repay the loan. The first example 
of a conditional agreement dates from 1957, when Peru is required to aban-
don interventions in the foreign exchange market as a prerequisite to con-
tinue the purchases under the SBA. Later, the Paraguay agreement intro-
duced performance criteria, suspending access to the SBA in case of non 
compliance. Since 1964, the performance criteria would be the common 
practice (Boughton 2001, p. 557-558). 
 Thus a guaranteed scheme is developed, based on disbursements by tranch-
es, subject to conditions. In addition, a dual date setting system is estab-
lished for repurchases (buyback)5 with a “mandatory date” to repurchase in 
five years, and an “expectation date” for earlier repurchase if the balance of 
payments situation improves. As we shall see, the 2009 reform introduced 
the possibility of greater frontloaded disbursement, limiting the staggering of 
disbursements (in a staircase pattern), and eliminating the dual date setting 
with the repurchase obligation posted in a single date. In addition, new insur-
ance facilities are introduced eliminating ex post conditionality.
(ii) Access limits. The various facilities were subject to access limits fixed in 
proportion to the country quota. In principle, the SBA limit was established at 
100% of the quota, however, in practice, it could be overcome with the 
Board’s approval. Later, not only the limits were increased, but also the crea-
tion of new facilities with their own limits and compatible with the country 
holding an SBA at the same time, thereby opening ways for greater access. 
The result is that in the 1980s the IMF was implementing a complex system 
involving several types of limits (annual, triennial, accumulated and dual). In 
1992, as part of the IXth General Review of Quotas, the system was simplified 
to establish only two limits: one year limit of 68% of the country’s quota (in 
1994 it was raised to 100%), and a full or accumulated limit of 300% of the 
quota; while the Board maintains the capacity to approve programs with 
higher limits (IMF, 2003). These normal limits remain unchanged until the re-
form of the lending policy of 2009, which also introduced a facility, the Flex-
ible Credit Line (FCL), without a pre-established access limit.
5  IMF loans are implemented as loans in hard currencies against domestic currency. In the terminology of the Fund, 
“purchases” refer to the acquisition of hard currency by the country and repurchase to the recovery of the 
domestic currency. 
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In 1978, SBA agreements were incorporated as such in the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF in its Article XXX. B): “Stand-by arrangement means a decision of the Fund by 
which a member is assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Re-
sources Account in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period 
and up to a specified amount.”
As shown in Figure 2.1, the SBAs have been the dominant type of loan (in terms 
of resources provided) in IMF programs, except in some years dominated by the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF).6 As discussed in Chapter 5, since 2009, the resources committed 
through the new uncapped FCL will increasingly weight in total loans. 
2.2 1963-1995:7 developing a menu of financial facilities
After the core lending principles were established and formalized in the SBA, since 1963, 
and along more than 30 years, the IMF developed a comprehensive lending policy making 
it a central actor of the international economic system, and clearly demonstrating its flex-
ibility in adapting to the evolving financing needs of its member countries.
 Against the general approach of the SBA, which provides coverage in any gen-
eral situation of balance of payments difficulties, the many facilities developed since 1963 
are intended to cover particular balance of payments needs. Loans are associated with a 
specific source of external imbalance, usually on the current account side. In some cases 
they had a complementary nature to SBAs, thereby providing additional resources, in oth-
ers, they were substitutes.
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6  In the 1980s, because of the EFFs granted to: India (SDR 5,000 million) and Pakistan (900) in 1981; Peru (650) in 
1981; Mexico (3,400) in 1983; the Philippines (660), Mexico (3,700) and Venezuela (3,800) in 1989. And in the 
1990s, for those granted to: Argentina (4,000) in 1992; and Russia (13,000) in 1996. 
7  This is an extended time period which would allow for other classifications. The criterion used here is the activa-
tion during these years of many facilities which have in common their main focus on current account imbalances.
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These three decades witness a blooming in the lending policy. From the perspective 
of the post-2009 reform, it is interesting to note two aspects: (a) the specialization of facilities, 
including the financing to developing countries; (b) two major trends: excessive proliferation 
and the settlement of a structural approach to balance of payments. As we will see, these 
trends will be reviewed since the year 2000 and, especially, with the post-2009 reforms.
 A SPECIALIZATION AND LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES FACILITIES
From 1963, specific facilities are developed depending on the type of balance of payments 
problem. Figure 2.2 chronologically shows the facilities created between 1952 and 2011. 
Three main types of facilities could be distinguished depending on the imbalance they are 
designed for:8 (i) exogenous shocks; (ii) structural problems – including funding to low in-
come countries –; and (iii) emergency and ad hoc situations. 
Facilities to cover balance of payments shocks
Among the facilities activated since 1963, the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF), is 
the service – after the SBA – with the longest run, more than 46 years, among the Fund’s 
financial instruments.
The CFF was created in 1963 to meet temporary balance of payments difficulties as a 
result of an exogenous shock.9 It was a low-conditionality facility with rapid disbursement of 
resources, initially conceived to cover losses in merchandise export revenues, but in 1979 it 
was extended to other current account lines, such as tourism receipts and remittances, and 
later, in 1990, to cover all current account balance of payments concepts, excluding investment 
income. In 1981, the CFF broaden its scope to the import side with the addition of a component 
of cereals, mainly for humanitarian reasons. The country could use this component in case of 
sudden increases in the international price of cereals. In 1990-1991 a second import compo-
nent was temporarily added to cover increases in oil prices during the first Gulf War. 
The CFF was granted independently and as a substitute for other facilities such as 
the SBA with its own access limits between 10 and 55 percent. However, between 1988 
and 2000 a contingent component was activated to cover export income falls as conse-
quence of an exogenous shock in countries already under a program (during these years 
the tag “contingency” was added to the facility denomination, Compensatory and Contin-
gency Financing Facility CCFF). Therefore, the CCFF was allowed to be mixed with other 
Fund programs providing additional resources. 
As noted by Boughton (2001), this facility, by its very nature, has been controver-
sial since its inception. The temporary or structural character of a balance of payments 
crisis is a conceptual difference difficult to establish in practical terms, which has gener-
ated recurring controversy in the Board. The result is that, over time, CFF has undergone 
numerous modifications in access limits and conditions. Initially, relatively flexible, the con-
ditions begin to tighten, especially from the mid-1980s when it starts to permeate at the 
Board the theory that exogenous shocks in many cases contain structural balance pay-
ments difficulties. As a result, the CFF will become a very complex instrument subject to a 
varied casuistic of different components and access limits, relying even on subjective cri-
teria such as the condition of a successful cooperation with the Fund. As noted by 
Boughton (2001, p. 738), it degenerated into a facility of self-destructive complexity. 
In 2000, the conditions of access were hardened and the contingent component 
is removed, finally, in 2009 the CFF would be eliminated after almost a decade of disuse. 
8  Other relevant classification criteria, especially from the mid-1980s, is the distinction between facilities for low-
income countries (concessional) and the rest. For our discussion here, these ones are included in the group of 
facilities to meet structural requirements.
9  This section is based on IMF (1999) and IMF (2004), which provide a detailed analysis of the history and charac-
teristics of the CFF. 
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[Term] Facility/ Credit Line (Acronym) Contingencies covered
[1952- current]
Stand By Arrangement (SBA)
Countries facing balance of payments needs. Main IMF lending instrument by excellence.
[1963-2009] Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF)
[1988-2000] Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility  (CCFF)
It is designed to cover balance of payments difjculties resulting from a temporary decline (rise) in export (import) prices of countries, as a consequence of 
kuctuations in primary commodities prices attributed to factors beyond the control of countries. CFF provides funding between 10 and 55% of the quota in an 
independent program. In 1988 a component for contingencies was added to provide jnancial support in the event of an exogenous shock as a complementary
facility to those members who have already a Fund arrangement (this facility included the contingency term in its name).  
[1969-2000] Buffer Stock Financial Facility (BSFF) Conceived to jnance the members of the international agreements for primary commodities stabilization stocks.
[1974-1976] First and Second Oil Facilities Facilities to face petroleum price shocks in the 1970s. They were jnanced ad hoc by funds with specijc contributions of ofjcial creditors of third countries. 
[1974- current]  Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Established to provide assistance to countries experiencing balance of payments difjculties where it is required a structural adjustment program with changes in 
economic policies to boost growth and export base of the economy. It offers a longer repayment period (up to 10 years) and initially longer access limits (although
they become equivalent to SBA in 1979).
[1979-1981]  Supplementary Financial Facility (SFF) Designed at a time of high interest rates, it is adopted to provide additional low interest resources to low income countries which already have an ongoing IMF 
program (SBA o EFF). The jnancing conditions are those of the already existing program. It is also funded by ad hoc ofjcial resources. 
[1982-2011] Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance (ENDA)
[1995-2011] Emergency Post-Conkict Assistance (EPCA)
In 1982, Fund formalizes a rapid access in the presence of natural disaster which in practice had been applied under specijc circumstances since 1962 (Egypt 
received a loan because of an epidemic plague, having gold as collateral). It allowed a rapid access up to 25 % of the quota, although the Board could raise it. In 
1995, the emergency assistance is extended to post-conkHct situations to countries with institutional capacity, but not enough to develop a full program. In 2001, the 
interest rate was subsidized for less advanced economies. For these countries, the ENDA and the EPCA disappeared de facto in 2005 when they started to be 
jnanced by the ESF. Nowadays, they are marginal facilities for semi-developed countries which do not have an access to concessional jnancing (which can access 
the RCF). 
[1986, 1987-1999]  Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 
and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) 
In 1986 the SAF is created to respond to the balance of payments difjculties of low income countries (the eligibility criteria are based on the eligibility under the 
International Development Association, IDA, of World Bank). It incorporates a concessional element, which was jnanced through ofjcial contributions from third 
countries committed under a trust fund. One year later, the SAF is strengthened and reformulated.  
[1989-2000]  Debt and Debt Service Reduction (DDSR) IMF facility supporting the reduction of external debt for countries that have already an IMF program (with which the DDSR shares the same maturity). It allows a 
country the access to resources in order to make the agreement with commercial creditors easier. The later policy of IMF to reduce the debt would go much 
further with the initiatives of cancelling the debt. Firstly, in 1996 under the activation of the initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and later, in 2005, 
under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which includes canceling the country debt with multilateral creditors.  
[1993-1995] Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) Financial facility for the support of countries facing balance of payments problems caused by the transition from a planned  to a market economy.
 
[1995-2000] Currency Stabilization Funds (CSF) It provides additional jnancial assistance with precautionary character (up to 335% of the quota) in support of a stabilization policy of exchange rate for countries 
that already have a program with the IMF (SBA, EFF). 
MAIN FINANCIAL FACILITIES OF THE IMF: CHRONOLOGICAL APPEARANCE, 1952-2011 FIGURE 2.2 
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SOURCE: Based on IMF information. On shaded grey, facilities that still remain active.
[Term] Facility/ Credit Line (Acronym) Contingencies covered
[1997-2009] Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) Supplementary to SBA and EFF, it covers the capital account of balance of payments needs, which are exceptional, due to a crisis of conjdence in the 
international markets. It does not have predetermined access limit.
[1999] Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGF) A new facility that reorganized the facilities for low income countries to integrate them into a new joint multilateral framework with the World Bank. It evolves around 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which are developed for each country.
[1999-2000] Y2K A temporal facility to cope with possible information technology effects in the turn of the century (year 2000). It was never used.
[1999-2003] Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) First attempt to establish a precautionary facility to cover capital account exogenous shocks. It expired without ever being used. Presumption of access between 200
and 500% of the quota. 
[2005-2009] Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) It is created in the scope of the PRGF, to add a rapid and high access component for low income countries which are facing exogenous shocks and do not have a 
PRGF program (for those, the IMF simply increases its support). The ESF replaced the ENDA and the EPCA for low income countries which received these kinds of 
emergency aid loans through Trust Funds.  
[2008-2009] Short term Liquidity Facility (SLF) The initial response to the global jnancial crises. Disbursement of Fund resources can be up to 500% of the quota, with a three month maturity. It lasted from 
October 2008 to March 2009 when it was replaced by FCL.
[2009-current] General Resources Account (GRA) 
facilities (seejFTQD)
Flexible Credit Line (FCL): assurance for countries with very strong solid fundamentals subject to exogenous shocks.
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL): insurance for countries with moderate vulnerabilities to cope with exogenous shocks, a liquidity window is added in 2011. 
[2009-current] Facilities to low income countries 
(see jFTQD)
Extended Credit Facility (ECF): replaced the PRGF.
Stand-By Credit Facility (SCF): SBA- type line for low income countries that includes concessionality.
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF): facility for temporary exogenous shocks. 
[2011-current] Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI): replaced the ENDA and the EPCA. The emergency jnancial assistance of IMF is unijed in one facility to cover urgent balance of 
payments needs with general nature (including these aspects as natural disasters, post-conkict situations and commodity price shocks). Accessing is limited to 50% 
and 100% on cumulative terms. It is jnanced through the GRA.
 
MAIN FINANCIAL FACILITIES OF THE IMF: CHRONOLOGICAL APPEARANCE, 1952-2011 (cont´d)  FIGURE 2.2  
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Four years earlier, in 2005, the IMF had created a facility that replaced the functions of the 
CFF, the Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF), later also removed in the context of the reform 
of facilities for low-income countries (LICs, see Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5). The ESF covered 
the same type of contingency (an exogenous shock), but intended only for LICs, precisely 
the main consumers of the CFF, and more attractive, because it incorporates an element 
of concessionality (0.5% interest with maturity of 10 years). The CFF, provides a first prec-
edent of the insurance function of the Fund – albeit of limited scope in time and for a very 
specific casuistic of current account risks –, which will be fully developed from 2009. 
The group of  facilities to cover balance of payments exogenous shocks also in-
cludes the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), created in 1969 to assist countries in 
their contributions to stock funds under international agreements to stabilize commodity 
prices. The BSFF was the Fund’s contribution to international efforts to stabilize commod-
ity prices that were considered too volatile. The country could access this facility in case 
of balance of payments needs as a result of having to cover mandatory contributions to an 
international agreement previously accepted by the Fund.10 This facility disappears in 
2000, after having been in disuse for 15 years. The practice showed the limited success of 
buffer stock funds and their signaling problems, as a country resorting to the IMF for a 
stock fund contribution, would only reveal higher difficulties (IMF, 1999). 
Facilities to cover balance payments structural problems and financing for development
In 1974 the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was created to cover balance of payments difficulties 
that require structural adjustments, aimed at boosting economic growth and the country’s ex-
port base. It is therefore a facility with an approach diametrically opposed to the CFF (covering 
temporary shocks). The EFF is focused on countries with balance of payments problems of a 
structural nature, requiring a major adjustment period than the one provided by SBAs, offering 
assistance in the medium term with higher repayment periods, up to 10 years, and initially 
higher access limits. These limits will be made equivalent to those of SBAs in 1979. This service 
is still alive and is currently the second oldest facility of the Fund (after the SBAs). 
The EFF launches a structural approach to the balance of payments crisis that will 
be reflected in all Fund’s facilities. Thus, the different loans will incorporate a growing 
structural component in their conditionality. This approach will undergo a radical change in 
the review of the facilities in 2009.
 The facilities oriented to meet specific needs of developing countries could also 
be included within the scope of structural facilities.11 In the 1980s a series of facilities 
were designed specifically for these countries, also with a structural approach to the bal-
ance of payments. The central facilities of the Fund’s strategy for low-income countries 
between 1986 and 200812 were successively: the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF),13 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF).14 These programs will be financed through additional resources, 
outside the General Resources Account of the IMF. These are facilities with a large component 
of structural conditionality with a medium term program graded to ensure the long-term 
viability of the balance of payments and to promote sustainable growth in the country 
(see Figure 2.3).
10  The IMF recognized as international agreements that allow for access under the BSFF: cocoa, tin, sugar and cork.
11  In fact, the EFF was born oriented towards developing countries, but nevertheless, will be widely used by 
emerging economies, especially from the 1980s with the debt crisis, and lately by advanced European countries 
since the 2010 debt crisis.
12  In 2009 the IMF will also reform funding to low-income countries as we will see in Chapter 5.
13  The Board choose this name among others considered, such as Trust Fund II or Special Disbursement Facility. 
Finally the denomination «Structural Adjustment Facility» was adopted, which emphasized the condition that 
the country should adopt a comprehensive adjustment program (Boughton, 2001, p. 651).  
14  For a detailed analysis of IMF policies with developing countries see IMF (1998) and IEO (2004).
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FIGURE  2.3THE FRAMEWORK OF IMF SUPPORT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1986-2008)
Between 1986 and 2008, the IMF’s support to developing coun-
tries is articulated through two main ways: specific programs for 
low-income countries, and the initiatives of debt relief.
Financial facilities for low-income countries. In March 1986, the 
IMF started a specific policy for low-income countries, with the 
creation of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), which will be 
expanded and reformulated in December 1987 into the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), subsequently extended and 
converted into permanent service in 1996. The ESAF being more 
ambitious in relation to macroeconomic policy and structural re-
forms than its predecessor.
The ESAF is a financial facility intended for low-income countries as 
defined by the International Development Association (IDA) of the 
World Bank. It provides resources of up to 185% of the quota, inclu-
ding a grant element in interest rates (annual rates of 0.5%), and a 
repurchase period up to 10 years, therefore more favorable than the 
EFF. Concessionality is funded from a trust fund managed by the IMF 
and nurtured by loans and grants from member countries. 
In November 1999, the Fund reorganized its facilities for low-inco-
me countries and replaced them with the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF). The PRGF was the IMF’s response to the 
new multilateral framework to support developing countries in 
conjunction with the World Bank, which was structured around 
joint strategies embodied in the document called Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PRSP), aimed at ultimate objective of growth 
and poverty reduction. 
Each country designed – in collaboration with the World Bank and 
IMF – its own PRSP, around which they tried to coordinate the 
development efforts of multilateral institutions and bilateral do-
nors. The design of the PRSP by the country itself is linked to the 
consolidation within the Fund of the “ownership principle”, where-
by the success of a program largely relays on its appropriation by 
the country. This new strategy requires IMF programs to reinforce 
the consistency of macroeconomic policies with the elements of 
poverty reduction contained in the document. 
This new framework will strengthen the principle of specialization 
between the Fund and the World Bank, according to their compa-
rative advantage. This is a debate that has been recurrent in the 
first decade of implementation of the PRGF. Thus the Fund’s 
PRGF programs are oriented toward the areas of macroeconomic 
policy design and the necessary financial and structural reforms 
to carry them out, such as tax administration or economic institu-
tions reforms.
Debt relief initiatives (DDSR, HIPC and MDRI). In 1989, within the 
context of the Brady Plan to restructure the debt of developing 
countries, the IMF promotes the Debt and the Debt Service Re-
duction (DDSR) approach, which provides resources for countries 
with strong adjustment programs, and voluntary debt restructuring 
under market conditions. In 1996, the IMF and the World Bank 
trigger the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
that provides debt relief and concessional loans in order to cancel 
or reduce external debt for countries with unsustainable debt.
In 2005, to promote progress in achieving the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, the HIPC Initiative was supplemented with the Multila-
teral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which provides 100% relief of 
debt with multilateral institutions – the IMF, the IDA, the African De-
velopment Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank (since 
2007) – for countries that have completed the HIPC initiative1.
1  For a more detailed analysis of multilateral debt relief see Delgado, Mar-
tinez-Rolland and Ortiz (2005).
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Assistance facilities to address emergency situations and ad hoc facilities
Over the years, the Fund has also created a series of facilities for emergencies as well as 
for specific shocks (ad hoc facilities). 
The emergency assistance for natural disasters was activated in 1982, formalizing 
a fast track in case of natural disasters, which in practice had been applied in some cases 
since 1962. It allows quick access to 25% of the quota, a percentage that the Board may 
decide to rise. In 1995, emergency assistance is extended to post-war situations, if the 
country demonstrates institutional capacity and willingness to carry out incipient econom-
ic policies. These facilities allow quick access to resources with the expectation that the 
country will later undertake a conventional facility.
 On the other hand, the IMF has created ad hoc facilities to meet balance of pay-
ments needs related to a particular shock and with a limited duration in time. Among them: 
First and Second Oil Facilities, activated between 1974 and 1976 to deal with 
shocks in oil prices. This is a prime example of a rapid and temporary IMF response in the 
context of a global crisis, financed by trust funds endowed with official contributions from 
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third countries. In the same vein, as we have seen, the CFF incorporated an element of oil 
in 1990 during the Gulf War. 
In a context of high international interest rates in 1977 the Supplementary Financ-
ing Facility (SFF) was established to provide additional resources at low rates to low-in-
come countries that already had in place a program with the IMF (SBA or EFF). It is also 
financed with external resources. 
The Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) activated between 1993 and 1995 to 
support countries facing balance of payments problems as a result of the transition from a 
planned to a market economy. It was soon substituted with conventional facilities. 
Year 2000 Facility (Y2K), established between 1999 and 2000 to address the pos-
sible computer effects of the new century. It was never used. 
B  TWO MAJOR TRENDS: PROLIFERATION OF FACILITIES AND STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
Proliferation of facilities
As we have seen, between 1963 and 1995, there is an excessive proliferation of lending 
facilities. Taking into account the new facilities, or the renovation and expansion of exist-
ing ones, they are close to thirty, each one designed to meet different types of external 
imbalances. If we look at a chronological classification (Figure 2.1), we see that many of 
them are linked to the global economic cycle between the 1960s and the 1990s. Thus, 
during the oil crisis of the 1970s and the Gulf crisis of early 1990s, there are facilities to 
deal with oil shocks. The same applies to the late 1990s, with the activation of new fa-
cilities to allow fast access to large resources of the Fund, for countries facing capital 
account crises (EFM, SRF, CCL). In addition, the Fund is also active during these years 
with new facilities to meet the needs of low-income countries (SAF, ESAF, PRGF), estab-
lishing a role for the IMF in development. 
The succession of facilities is reflected in the type of country and regions to 
which the IMF lends. Since the 1980s, the advanced economies, which were the main 
borrowers during the previous three decades, are substituted by emerging countries as 
main users of Fund resources (see Figure 2.4). From 2010, however, the second round of 
the global financial crisis manifested in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe relocates ad-
vanced economies (European) as the first Fund borrowers.
 Therefore over the years, the Fund shows flexibility and capacity to give rapid 
response to the various crises that countries have been facing, and thus fulfilling its role as 
guarantor of international economic stability. As we will see in Chapter 5, the same flexibil-
ity will be played in the global financial crisis. 
However, the lending policy ended up in an excessive proliferation of facilities, with 
a very high casuistic, which will introduce costs in terms of arbitration among facilities and 
lack of transparency. When negotiating a program, countries and the Fund staff faced a 
wide menu of facilities with different access limits, conditionality and financing conditions, 
and with choices of combining  facilities (when complementary). This introduces a problem 
of arbitration among programs, where the country and/or the staff would argue on the kind 
of imbalance faced by the country, biased by the terms of the facility that offers better con-
ditions, either by duration, cost, volume of resources, or conditionality requirements. 
On the other hand, there is a problem of transparency because it makes it difficult 
for the market to identify the signals from each type of facility. The result is a tendency to 
associate IMF loans with a balance of payments crisis with a negative stigma on the eco-
nomic situation of the country, without differentiating the nature of the crisis, whether ex-
ogenous or endogenous, short term or structural. The lending policy thus loses its signal-
ing ability, limiting the role of Fund programs as catalyst of private resources. 
42
From the decade of the 1970s, there is a shift in loans from advan-
ced to emerging economies. As noted by Bougthon (2001, p. 17-
20) in advanced economies, demand begins to fall with the end of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1973, which allowed the exchange 
rate to absorb much of the balance of payments shocks. On the 
other hand, developing economies start to demand more resources 
FIGURE 2.4MAJOR REGIONAL TRENDS IN LOANS FROM THE IMF  1960-2005
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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS: 1960-2005 
1950-1959 (a) 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES   SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN   MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
3559.7 Mn SDR 
1960-1969 (b) 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES   SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOV. UNION   LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN 
  MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA   SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
14621.8 Mn SDR 
1970-1979 (c) 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES   SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOV. UNION    LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN 
  MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA   SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
19484.9 Mn SDR 
1980-1989 (d) 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES    SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOV. UNION    LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN 
  MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA    SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
79100.1 Mn SDR 
1990-1999 (e) 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES   SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOV. UNION   LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN 
  MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA   SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
146113.9 Mn SDR 
2000-2005 (f) 
 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES   SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
  EAST EUROPE AND FORMER SOV. UNION   LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN 
  MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA   SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
103282.5 Mn SDR 
SOURCE: Based on IMF data.
a Principal borrowers (% total): United Kingdom (62.2), France (11.1).
b Principal borrowers (% total): United Kingdom (40.4).
c Principal borrowers (% total): United Kingdom (20.8), Italy (7.4).
d Principal borrowers (% total): Mexico (11.4), Brazil (8.3), India (6.7). 
e Principal borrowers (% total): Russian Federation (16.2), Turkey (10.7), South Korea (10.6), Mexico (10.4), Indonesia (9.4), Brazil (8.2).
f Principal borrowers (% total): Brazil (38.3), Argentina (27.2), Turkey (18.9).
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FIGURE 2.4MAJOR REGIONAL TRENDS IN LOANS FROM THE IMF  1960-2005 (cont’d)
from the Fund in the context of slowing growth in advanced coun-
tries (their main market). In the 1980s, with the debt crisis in Latin 
America, emerging economies became the first IMF  borrowers. 
Among emerging countries, the loan volumes have been regio-
nally oriented following the succession of global crises: Latin 
America in the 1980s; Asia, Eastern Europe  and Russia in the 
1990s; and again Latin America in the early 21st century with the 
crisis in Argentina. From 2008, Europe (emerging and advan-
ced), becomes the major borrower after the global financial cri-
sis (see Chapter 4).
As we shall see, from the year 2000 we are witnessing a reverse trend in the direc-
tion of reducing the number of facilities. The flexibility of the Fund will not be translated in 
terms of activation of new facilities, but in terms of a scheme with few programs but more 
flexible application (i.e., not limited to a specific imbalance). In this scheme the lending 
policy will no longer rely in creating a new facility whenever a new non-anticipated balance 
of payments difficulty arises. 
Structural approach to the balance of payments
Over time, the IMF incorporates on its policy making the theory that current account diffi-
culties have a structural nature. This is reflected, not only in the creation of the EFF or the 
successive facilities aimed at low-income countries (ESF, ESAF, PRGF), but also in other 
facilities, which include growing structural conditionality since the 1980s. 
This evolution of conditionality responds to changes in the underlying theoretical 
basis. Traditionally the IMF had been implementing the monetary approach to the balance 
of payments adjustment, to which the Fund had significantly contributed with its own re-
search through the works of Jacques Polak,15 director of research between 1958 and 
1979. The monetary approach links the balance of payments imbalances to domestic 
credit expansion. From the 1980s there is a progressive paradigm shift with the addition of 
the theoretical underpinning of neoclassical economics. In particular, two central tenets: 
the monetarist approach to inflation of Friedman, and the introduction of market structural 
reforms, including liberalization and open markets and a commitment to the (more effi-
cient) private sector (Boughton, 2001, p. 25-27 and 559).
This shift will result in a new set of policies that will shape the IMF conditionality 
from the late 1980s and have become known as the Washington consensus, term coined 
by John Williamson (1990). The consensus includes the set of policies – different sets for 
different authors – that are considered necessary and sufficient conditions for growth. The 
core policies that have focused Fund recommendations have been: fiscal and monetary 
stabilization, liberalization of prices and interest rates, trade liberalization and privatization. 
In Chapter 4 we will see how, after the global financial crisis, the Fund is building a new 
consensus nearest to the new Keynesian economics. 
2.3 1995-2008: capital account crisis and large scale lending 
From the second half of the 1990s, the balance of payments crises are manifested on the 
capital account rather than on the current account. Under this new scenario, the IMF tools 
were considered outdated and non effective. As noted by Varela and Varela (2000), the 
1990’s gave way to a growing market role in the international economy, marked by in-
15  Polak wrote a seminal article on the monetary approach, (1957) «Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and 
Payments Problems». IMF Staff Papers, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 1-50.
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creasing globalization and high and rapid capital movements. In this context, crises are 
characterized by its suddenness, wide and rapid spread, as manifested in the succession 
of crises during the decade: European 1992, Mexican 1994, or Asian, Russian and Brazilian 
from the second half of the decade. 
Faced with a capital account type of crisis, it is necessary for the country to have 
quick access to a large amount of resources to restore the confidence of international mar-
kets. During these years, the IMF initially responded by granting large loans between 490 
and 690 percentage of the quota,16 well above the normal limits of conventional access 
(300 percent) and applying the exceptional circumstances clause. Furthermore, it estab-
lished in 1995 the Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM), which allowed for quick access 
to Fund resources with a shorter decision procedure of the Board of just two weeks.
However, the succession of exceptional access programs led to a situation that re-
quired changes. The IMF responded by (a) creating two new facilities specifically designed for 
the capital account, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and the Contingent Credit Lines 
(CCL); and (b) establishing a special framework to formalize access to resources beyond their 
normal limits. These changes constitute the embryo of the two major reforms later introduced 
in 2009: the insurance function of the IMF and the expansion of the access limits. 
Facilities for capital account difficulties: SRF and CCL
 On December 17, 1997, the IMF approved the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) in the 
middle of the Asian financial crisis. Two weeks earlier, on December 4 a record loan had 
been granted to South Korea, a SBA amounting to 1,938% of its quota, which is partially 
reconverted in the first SRF.
The SRF was designed to cover exceptional capital account difficulties. It offered 
short term access to a large amount of resources, to deal with sudden loss of confidence 
in the international markets. This access is additional to what the country was getting 
through another program (usually a SBA or an EFF). Repurchases were set between one 
year and 18 months, renewable one year, and the types were determined by the program to 
which it is attached, plus a spread based on its maturity. The SRF had no predetermined 
access limit; it was to be determined by the specific needs of the country and the Fund’s 
liquidity position. Therefore, the Fund sent a message to the markets of non-capped pos-
sibility of assistance. 
Later, in April 1999, the CCL was activated. Unlike the SRF – designed to deal with 
ongoing crisis – the CCL was conceived as an assurance to avoid the transmission to third 
countries that often occurs in capital account crises, because of the distrust installed in the 
markets. The CCL was intended to support those most vulnerable countries, signaling the 
willingness of the IMF to support them and thereby mitigate the possibility of contagion.
 Regarding access conditions, no general access limit was established, however 
there was a presumption that the loans would oscillate between 300% and 500% of quota. 
The funds would be awarded for one year and repurchases, between 12 and 18 months 
from the date of each disbursement. After much critique on the usefulness of the CCL with 
its original design, especially from emerging economies (the intended costumer), the facil-
ity was amended in 2000 in order to make it more attractive. It introduced an automatic 
access to the first tranche of the loan and interest rates below the SRF (the surcharge was 
limited to a maximum of 350, compared to 500 of the SRF). 
To access the CCL the country was required to have sound macroeconomic fun-
damentals according with certain qualifying criteria focused on four conditions: (1) no need 
for IMF resources, i.e. the need to use IMF financing is only due to contagion, and not to 
16  Including those granted to Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea between 1995 and 1997.
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domestic policies of the country, (2) positive evaluation of the country’s policies and 
progress in the observance of international standards, (3) constructive relations with pri-
vate creditors and progress in limiting external vulnerability, and (4) a satisfactory macro-
economic and financial program (IMF, 2004a).
Yet, the CCL generated significant problems in terms of negative stigma. On one 
hand, there were difficulties in distinguishing the CCL from other IMF facilities, with the 
risk that subscribing the line were interpreted as the existence of a problem (more than 
insurance against contagion); and thereby, causing the opposite to the intended effect, 
that is, triggering the capital account crisis it was trying to avoid. On the other hand, 
there was also a problem of negative signals depending on whether or not the eligibility 
criteria were met. In this regard, it was attempted to establish a list of countries eligible 
for the CCL and avoid the qualification process, but then appeared a negative stigma for 
countries excluded from the list.17 The line also posed a problem of uncertainty as to 
their availability, because the disbursement of resources required in any case the ap-
proval of the Board. 
The result was that the CCL became extinct in 2003, without ever being used. 
However, as noted by Bustelo (2000), the CCL introduced two new features with respect 
to traditional Fund facilities: they are to be subscribed without a context of crisis, and in-
tended for countries with strong fundamentals.18 As discussed in Chapter 5, these two 
new features are at the heart of the new insurance facility that activates the IMF from 2009, 
the Flexible Credit Line. The CCL and the mistakes learned by their lack of use, are the 
necessary precedent for the subsequent establishment of the FCL and with it, the estab-
lishment of a new role as insurer for the IMF. 
The exceptional access framework
In 1994 the IMF set normal annual access limits to loans in 100% of quota, and cumulative 
access in 300%, although the Board retained the power to grant loans for higher amounts. 
Given the high volume of resources required in the resolution of capital account crises of 
the late 1990s, the Fund provided loans those years by amounts exceeding normal limits. 
To this end, two routes were used: the exceptional circumstances clause19 or the new SRF 
(1997), which did not incorporate access limits. 
The result is that in the period 1995-2002, the IMF’s financial exposure was concen-
trated in a small number of programs with exceptional access. Eleven countries with capital 
account crisis on this period concentrated loans totaling SDR 124,800 million (see Figure 2.5). 
Given the lack of a clear definition of the “exceptional circumstances”, in Septem-
ber 2002, the IMF approved a new framework to formalize and provide more predictability 
on the conditions for the granting of loans exceeding normal limits. The new framework for 
exceptional access established four conditions:
(1) The country faces an exceptional capital account imbalance that cannot be 
covered with normal funding limits. 
(2) High likelihood of debt sustainability based on a rigorous analysis.
(3) The country has good prospects of regaining access to private capital mar-
kets in the period in which the loan is granted. 
(4) Reasonable prospects of success of the program both because its content 
and the political and institutional capacity to implement it.
17  Chapter 3 deals with the problems of stigma and signaling, including the CCL.
18  Díaz-Cassou, Fernández and Fernández de Lis (2006) analyzed the gap in the facilities of the IMF in the ab-
sence of signaling or insurance instruments once the CCL was canceled.
19  This clause had been born a decade earlier during the debt crisis in Latin America.
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The framework also provided improved procedures with greater involvement 
of the Board that must be consulted through informal and confidential meetings,20 and 
ex post evaluations before the year after completion of the program (IMF, 2004b). The 
framework will also be renovated in the 2009 reform, clarifying the criteria, and extend-
ing the exceptional access to any balance of payments difficulty, including precaution-
ary access.
2.4 Resources: reaching one trillion USD (and growing)
The reform of the lending policy in 2009 was accompanied by a tripling of the Fund re-
sources decided on the G20 summit in London in April of that year. The G20 endorsed the 
new lending policy by providing the necessary resources to carry it out. As we will see, the 
implementation of this increase will be more complex and will take place in various steps, 
initially with bilateral loans and issuance of SDRs, later with the New Arrangements to Bor-
row (NAB), and finally, increasing quotas. Japan and the European Union will be the first 
countries to advance resources.
Generally, the increase of the Fund resources is done by increasing the quotas of 
member countries that should be revised at least every five years. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
when analyzing the governance of the Fund, between 1950 and 2010 fourteen General Reviews 
of Quotas (GRQ) took place. In nine of them quota increases were between 30 and 50 per cent 
of the previous quota, and the last one in 2010, 100 percent (see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4).
 In these years, the total IMF quota is multiplied by more than 5,000 percent to 
reach SDR 477,000 million after the 2010 increase; which nonetheless has yet to be rati-
fied (expected for 2013/14). Alongside with quotas there will also be SDR 182,400 million 
available through the NAB, for an approximate total of 660,000 million SDR (about US$ 
1 trillion). In December 2011, the countries of the euro announced additional contribu-
tions of € 150,000 million (SDR 127,000 million) in form of bilateral loans, which will 
later be enlarged in 2012 with new commitments from most G20 countries totaling about 
US$ 460,000 million of additional bilateral resources, albeit of a temporary nature.
20  The meetings are restricted with the assistance of 24 directors. Numbered notes are distributed to each Direc-
tor to be taken back before the end of the meeting.
SOURCE: IMF (2004b).
Country Year Program SDR million % quota % GDP
Mexico 1995 SBA 12,100 688 4
Thailand 1997 SBA 2,900 505 2
Indonesia 1997 SBA 7,300 490 5
South Korea 1997 SBA/SRF 15,500 1,938 4
Russia 1998 SBA/SRF/CCFF 15,400 356 5
Brazil 1998 SBA/SRF 13,000 600 2
Turkey 2001 SBA/SRF 15,000 1,560 10
Argentina 2001 SBA/SRF 16,900 800 8
Brazil 2001 SBA/SRF 12,100 400 3
Turkey 2002 SBA 12,800 1,330 11
Uruguay 2002 SBA/SRF 1,800 571 9
Amount  
EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS PROGRAMS 1995-2002 FIGURE 2.5 
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 In general, the quota increases have provided the Fund with sufficient resources 
to offer the new policy instruments developed over time. However, there have been tem-
porary imbalances that have demanded to habilitate additional funding to meet specific 
needs. These bilateral contributions have their precedent in the ad hoc funding sources 
established in the 1960s (trust funds and loan agreements). Here, it is interesting to dis-
cuss on: (a) the adequacy of Fund resources; and (b) its main sources outside the quotas.21
A THE ADEQUACY OF IMF RESOURCES
Traditionally, the adequacy of IMF resources was analyzed in terms of the relationship with 
international economic variables such as trade flows or global GDP, as a proxy for the po-
tential needs of member countries in crisis. Since the 1990s, with the exponential growth of 
international capital flows, there was some consensus that IMF resources had fallen short 
to the new challenges of a global economy much more interconnected and in which the 
countries are subject to capital account crises. In 1990, with international capital flows es-
timated at US$ 171,000 million, the IMF had a lending capacity of US$ 36,000 million, while 
in 2008, the annual lending capacity of the IMF was US$ 200,000 million,22 compared to 
international flows of US$ 3 billion, i.e. the ratio resources/capital flows fell from 21 to 6 
percent (Mallaby, 2008). Indeed, as shown in Figure 2.6, in 2008 the IMF had decreased in 
size in relation to various indicators of the global economy (IMF, 2009c). 
Between the 1980s and mid-1990s, despite the successive quota increases in the 
GRQs VII to IX, the highest relative growth of the economy and world trade brings down 
the relative size of the Fund with respect to GDP and global trade. The quota increase in 
the XI Review had allowed to correct the weight loss of the Fund, but it will fall back there-
after in a context of global growth with no quota increases. In 2008, the relative size of the 
IMF with respect to GDP and world trade fell to record lows, the ad hoc quota increases of 
2006-2008 allowed only marginally to correct the situation (see Figure 2.6).
The weight loss of the IMF relative to international capital flows is much more 
significant. This ratio experiences a continued decline despite the successive quota in-
creases, because of the exponential growth of international capital movements from the 
1990s. Again, the ad hoc quota increases in 2006-2008 allowed only to marginally correct 
this situation.
 In 2010, considering the size of the IMF quota that would correspond with the dou-
bling of quotas approved by the Board in November,23 yet to be ratified (dashed lines of Figure 
2.6); the IMF would be at higher levels than in 1998 by reference to GDP and capital flows, 
and somewhat less in the case of trade, in this case due to improved recovery of trade flows 
with respect to capital flows and global growth during the crisis period 2008-2010.
In the debate on the resource adequacy, since early 2009 (IMF, 2009c) the Fund itself 
points to the need to increase its resources and remits to the valuations of various authors 
who consider the needs of the Fund from at least US$ 1 trillion (Johnson, 2008) to unlimited 
amounts as suggested by Calvo (2009), proposing a role of lender of last resort for the IMF. 
Finally, the G20 will choose to triple IMF resources in the April 2009 summit in London.
21  The discussion on quotas is dealt in Chapter 4 when dealing with governance due to the dual nature of quotas as 
both, determinant of IMF resources, and the country’s access to Fund resources; and the countries voting shares. 
22  The lending capacity of the IMF in a year is determined by: the resources approved in Financial Transactions 
Plan (FTP), plus the SDR holdings, less resources committed to outstanding loans (whether or not paid and 
net of reimbursements planned for the year ahead), less the precautionary balance (set at 20% share of the 
countries included in the FTP). The FTP is approved every three months and determines the resources from 
quotas the IMF can use to fund their loans. It includes contributions from countries that are deemed firm 
enough, mostly advanced and emerging economies, but also  developing economies. The quota resources 
from countries not included in the FTP (e.g. quotas from countries with IMF programs) are not considered 
lendable resources.
23  In November 2010 was approved the doubling of quotas, i.e., increase of SDR 238,400 million. See Chapter 4.
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 It should be noted that before the start of the crisis in 2007, the IMF had been at 
historic low levels of outstanding loans, totaling about SDR 10,000 million. The lending 
capacity of the IMF had been at record highs of SDR 128,000 million (about US$ 200,000 
million dollars) after Brazil and Argentina decided to repay all of its loans in late 2005. How-
ever, since end-2008 the Fund begins to address a growing demand for loans as a result 
of the crisis. Between 2008 and 2011 the Fund scales up its lending to around SDR 170,000 
million (about US$ 280,000 million),24 of which about 70,000 million granted under the new 
precautionary facility, the FCL (see Figure 2.7 and also Figure 5.5 in Chapter 5).
Actually, at the beginning of the global financial crisis, the IMF surpassed the lend-
ing capacity at its disposal in December 2007. The bilateral loans subscribed between 
2009 and 2010, especially the US$ 100,000 million provided by Japan and the US$ 57,000 
million from the EU, have allowed to maintain the Fund’s lending capacity over these years.
SOURCE: IMF. 
RELATIVE SIZE OF THE IMF MEASURED BY TOTAL QUOTA: 1978-2010  FIGURE 2.6
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24  There are also a number of programs that expire during this time period, amounting up to around US$ 50,000 million. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
B  THE MAIN SOURCES OF RESOURCES OUTSIDE THE QUOTAS: ENGINEERING THE TRIPLING [+] OF 
RESOURCES 2009-2010
At the London Summit in April 2009, the G20 supported a significant expansion of mul-
tilateral resources estimated at US$ 1.1 trillion distributed as follows: up to US$ 500,000 
million in bilateral contributions to the  IMF,25 an increase of US$ 100,000 million (over a 
three year period) in the volume of loans granted by multilateral development banks, a 
global effort to mobilize up to US$ 250,000 million to finance international trade (includ-
ing mobilization of US$ 50,000 million through the International Finance Corporation of 
the World Bank), and an extraordinary allocation of SDRs worth US$ 250,000 million26 
(Moreno, 2009). 
The contribution of US$ 500,000 million to the Fund, which eventually would reach 
nearly US$ 600,000 in contributions to the NAB, represented a tripling of the maximum avail-
able resources for loans that the Fund had reached in 2007 (US$ 200,000 million dollars in 
TFP, and the additional US$ 50,000 million available through the NAB/GAB arrangements). 
Following the Summit, the IMF Board and the NAB member countries entered a 
complex technical debate on how to formalize these new commitments. A sequential pro-
cess was improvised with overlapping periods: approval of bilateral loans and Note Pur-
chase Agreements (NPAs) between 2009 and 2010; approval of the expanded NAB in 2010 
and ratification in March 2011, and approval of the doubling of quotas in 2010 with ratifica-
tion expected in 2013/14. Countries will transfer their contributions from one to another 
source, from bilateral agreements to NAB and, from NAB to quota increases, as the cor-
responding ratifying processes requiring parliamentary approval in most member coun-
tries are formalized (see Figure 2.8). Further, in 2012, the G20 fostered a new bilateral 
round of temporary loans to the IMF for an addition of SDR 305 bn, raising the Fund’s total 
resources up to SDR 965 bn (aprox. US$ 1.5 tn).  
(índex1998=100)
IMF LOANS: 2008-2011  FIGURE 2.7
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25  Additionally there was a commitment to increase in six billion the Fund’s concessional financing. 
26  The use of SDRs is recovered after being sided for almost 30 years. The first issue of SDRs is distributed in 
1970-1972 (SDR 9,300 million) and the second at 1979-1981 (SDR 12,100 million). In 1997, the fourth amend-
ment established the SDR duplication (additional SDR 21,400 million), but it was not approved by the US 
Congress. This new emission amounts up to SDR 167,000 million (US$ 250,000 million).
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In short, given the difficulty in terms of time it takes to approve quota increases, 
the Fund articulated flexible and transitional mechanisms (bilateral loans/NPAs and NAB), 
to maintain the adequacy of its resources. This same type of solutions have been used by 
the IMF in the past and have their main precedent in the GAB arrangements in the 1960s, 
or the trust funds in the 1970/1980s (see Figure 2.9). 
Bilateral loans and NPAs
The growing demand for programs since the end 2008 creates an urgent need for IMF re-
sources. Throughout 2009 and 2010 a group of 21 countries, led by Japan  with a first 
contribution in February 2009,27 chose to sign either bilateral loans or purchases of IMF 
notes (Note Purchase Agreements or NPAs), for an approximate value of US$ 241,500 mil-
lion (see Figure 2.10). 
The 18 contributing advanced economies chose to do so through bilateral loans, 
which have their precedent in the contributions through trust funds to finance development. 
Although different in nature, the trust funds opened a line of bilateral funding to the IMF more 
flexible than the GAB and NAB, because they represent voluntary contributions from each 
country that do not require majorities to be activated. Unlike trust funds, bilateral loans are not 
grouped; they maintain their bilateral character and, instead of financing development, they 
are linked to conventional IMF loans under the General Resources Account.
Meanwhile, the three emerging economies opted for NPAs, so as to treat their 
contributions as investments within their reserves management policy.28 These two types 
of contributions have the advantage (unlike the NAB) that, once signed, they immediately 
become part of the lending capacity of the IMF, adding to the resources of the Financial 
Transactions Plan (TFP).29 The amount undisbursed of ongoing loans is part of the Fund’s 
one-year Forward Commitment Capacity (FCC). 
SOURCE: IRC-TFIMF (2013).
a Pending ratijcation of quota increase and second round of bilateral loans and NPAs.
USD SDR USD SDR USD SDR USD SDR USD SDR USD SDR
Owned resources
Quotas 326,059 217,373 326,059 217,373 326,148 217,432 356,034 237,356 357,175 238,116 714,348 476,232
Borrowed resources
Permanent funds
Original NAB 51,000 34,000 51,000 34,000 51,000 34,000
Enlarged NAB 544,871 363,247 554,996 369,997
After roll-back 273,557 182,371
Temporary funds
1st round (2009/10) 218,972 167,879 270,414 207,318
2nd round (2012/13)
TOTAL RESOURCES 377,059 251,373 596,031 397,354 647,562 431,708 900,904 600,603 912,170 795,046 1,448.905 965,936
Not including 2nd round of bilateral loans (i.e. more "permanent" quota and NAB resources) 987,905 658,603
NAB arrangements
Bilateral loans & NPAs
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013-2014 (a)
INCREASE OF IMF RESOURCES 2008-2013.
IMF. General resources account (GRA). Owned and borrowed resources.
 FIGURE 2.8 
All data in millions 
NAB rollbacks 
into quotas 
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NAB  
27  Historically, Japan has maintained a strong commitment to multilateralism that has placed it in the top positions 
for financial contribution to the multilateral financial institutions. Its early bilateral contributions to the IMF in the 
midst of the global financial crisis is one more example. 
28  The IMF had to approve an ad hoc framework in July 2009 for issuing NPAs to the official sector that was the 
preferred choice by emerging countries. 
29  See footnote 21.
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Arrangements to borrow (GAB/NAB). The General Arrangements 
to Borrow (GAB) were created in 1962 to strengthen the capacity 
of IMF loans. The IMF signed an agreement with 10 industrialized 
countries,1 which would form the G10. They opened credit lines in 
favor of the IMF in their own domestic currency to cover possible 
commitments of the IMF to a GAB’s member facing balance of 
payments difficulties, or to third countries under certain circum-
stances. In 1983, under the pressure of the Latin American debt 
crisis on IMF´s resources, the GAB resources were expanded from 
SDR 6,000 to 17,000 million and the financing of third countries 
was authorized in case the IMF own resources were insufficient. 
That year, Switzerland joined in GAB (providing SDR 1,020 mi-
llions) despite not being an IMF member (it joined in 1992);2 and 
Saudi Arabia contributed with an additional SDR 1,500 millions in 
a parallel bilateral agreement.
Later on, following the Mexican and Asian crisis in the 1990s, the 
G7 drove a new extension of resources. In 1998, the decision of 
establishing the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) was adop-
ted, providing additional SDR 34,000 millions (around US$ 50,000 
millions). Both the G10 countries, and other 15 countries joined 
bringing the total to 263 (IMF, 2010d). The contribution of each 
country is related to its economic strength and its IMF’s quota. 
The agreements to borrow could be activated sequentially (first 
the NAB and then the GAB) in circumstances of IMF illiquidity, 
when it needs to supplement its quota resources. Until the reform 
in 2011, its activation was very strict because it would require the 
approval of 80% of its members (unanimity in the case of the 
GAB), and because it was activated individually for each IMF loan 
for which additional resources are needed (this will be reviewed in 
2010, with activation periods of six months not limited to a specific 
loan or country).  In practice, the GAB only has been activated ten 
times – the last time in 1998 in relation to a loan to Russia – and 
before 2011, the NAB had only been activated once, in December 
of 1998, to finance a SBA to Brazil. 
Trust Funds. In 1975, the IMF started its concessional support 
through bilateral contributions managed through trust funds, with 
the subsidy account of US$ 190 millions, within the first Oil facility. 
In 1976, in a context of high interest rates, a new fund with SDR 
3,000 millions was activated, with contributions by 14 countries in 
order to grant credits to low income countries with a concessiona-
lity element. They financed first tranche (25% of quota) loans that 
only required demonstrating existence of balance of payments ne-
eds and reasonable effort to correct it. 
The problem was that, at the beginning of the 1980s, the IMF was 
approving loans to developing countries through two ways: con-
ventional programs with conditionality, and loans through the trust 
fund without conditionality. This opened a discussion about the 
consolidation of loans for low income countries around one con-
cessional facility, but with a conditionality that would turn out to be 
the birth of the SAF in 1986 (Boughton, 2001 p. 639-640).
The trust funds were extended successively with increasing re-
sources, number of  funds, and contributor countries, linked to 
specific facilities for low income countries, including for example 
funds associated with the ESF, with the PRGF, or the HIPC and 
the MDRI initiatives. In general, there are two accounts for each 
fund, a capital account, which finances the principal of the loans 
with no concessionality; and a subsidy account, which finances 
the interest rate’s concessionality.4 Between 1998 and 2008 the 
total committed resources reached the amount of SDR 17,700 
million and 4,700 millions, in the capital and subsidy accounts 
respectively. The majority of these contributions were made by 
27 advanced economies (94% in the case of capital accounts 
and 88% on the resources for subsidies), with additional contri-
butions by up to 58 emerging and developing countries. In these 
years, they funded up to 179 programs for low income countries 
(IMF, 2009b). 
In 2009, in line with the lending policy reform, the IMF initiated the 
restructuring of trust funds encompassing them under only one 
framework, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), 
which includes four capital accounts and five subsidy accounts. 
The IMF initiated a round of new contributions with the 2014 hori-
zon and the aim of raising SDR 10,800 and 1,500 millions, on loan 
and subsidy resources respectively.5 The IMF estimates loans’ 
demands for low income countries in the amount of SDR 11,400 
millions between 2009 and 2014 (IMF, 2010e). As of March 2013, 
the PRGT had raised SDR 9,800 millions in loan resources and 
SDR 200 in the subsidy account, to which it should be added 
additional SDR 2,4506 subsidy resources from the benefits of gold 
sales by the IMF. 
FIGURE 2.9ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SOURCES TO THE QUOTAS: ARRANGEMENTS TO BORROW AND TRUST FUNDS
1  Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, United States, and Sweden. 
2  Switzerland is associated with the G10 in 1964 but did not acquire full 
membership until 1983.
3  G10 countries plus: Saudi Arabia, Australia, Austria, Chile (since 2002), 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Hong Kong, South Korea, Kuwait, Luxem-
bourg, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, and Thailand. In 2010 14 new 
members will join (see next section on the expanded NAB).
4  In many cases, the central banks of the country contribute to the capital 
account and governments to subsidy account. 
5  With a menu of options, including new grants, funds from the sale of 
gold and using part of the funds accumulated in the PRGT. 
6  Of these, SDR 700 million are approved in 2012 and a second round of 
additional SDR 1,750 million are expected to be approved in 2013.
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Bilateral agreements have helped sustain the lending capacity of the IMF between 
2008 and 2010. As shown in Figure 2.11, from record highs in 2007, the lending capacity 
one year later falls because of the programs granted in the fall of 2008, especially to East-
ern European countries. However, in 2009 the lending capacity is recovered despite a 
strong increase in new loans of over SDR 100,000 million. This is due to the succession of 
bilateral agreements signed during 2009. In 2010 it falls back due to new large loans, most 
notably those given to Greece (May) and Ireland (December).
 From April 2011, the lending capacity has been sustained through the NAB once 
the Board approved its first activation worth SDR 211,000 million, and the subsequent 
renewal of the activation every six months since then.30 These activations have kept the 
IMF lending capacity around SDR 240,000 million in 2011 and 2012. On a more technical 
note, bilateral agreements were supposed to revert to the expanded NAB once it was 
ratified. However, they have remained temporarily open because of legal and liquidity 
problems arising from the temporal coordination between the cancellation procedure of 
bilateral loans (and all the programs they funded), and the parallel activation of the ex-
panded NAB.31 During these years the IMF is rebalancing the distribution of loans among 
the countries participating in the FTP32 by way of asking fewer resources via quota or NAB 
SOURCE: Based on IMF data.
NOTE: Third countries make additional commitments formalized after 2010 and/or through the NAB (US$ billions), including: Australia (5.7), Chile (1.6), Italy (10.8), 
Russia (10 NPA), South Korea (10), Switzerland (10), Singapore (1.5), and USA (100 for the NAB).
Country US$ billion Country € billion 
Japan  100 Germany 15
European Union 82.5 France 11
Canada 10 UK 11
Norway  4.5 Netherlands 5.31
TOTAL 197 Belgium 4.74
Spain 4
China 50 Sweden 2.47
Brazil  10 Austria 2.18
India 10 Denmark 1.95
TOTAL 70 Finland 1.3
Portugal 1.06
Czech Republic 1.03
Slovakia 0.440
Slovenia 0.28
Malta 0.120
Bilateral loans EU €61,880 million (aprox. US$ 82,500 million)
Note Purchase Agreements (NPAs)
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SUBSCRIBED BY THE IMF (2009-2010) FIGURE 2.10 
30  The new NAB became effective on March 11, 2011 (once ratified by member countries); and was activated for 
the first time on April 1 for a maximum amount of SDR 211,000 million. The activation process is a separate 
legal act adopted every six-month periods – if it is judged that the IMF needs extraordinary resources –.  
31  This temporary solution has generated much technical debate in the IMF and criticism to the staff for not anticipat-
ing the legal and liquidity problems when the Board expanded the NAB in April 2010, which were uncovered only 
six months later. This gives an idea of the degree of improvisation demanded so that the IMF could absorb in such 
a short period of time to triple its lending capacity. Other evidence is the two ECOFIN decisions to fix the European 
contribution, one in March 2009 at € 75,000 million, and another in September, for € 50,000 additional million. 
32  The countries included in the FTP approved November 1, 2010 include: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswa-
na, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Oman, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay.
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to the countries with bilateral agreements already in use. The Fund also assumes the com-
mitment that the sum of resources used via bilateral loans and the NAB shall not exceed 
the total commitment made  at the NAB by the country. 
The expanded NAB
In 2009, while certain countries were signing bilateral loans, the G20 urged parallel expan-
sion of the NAB, which was the preferred option for the G20 itself and especially by the US, 
where the Congress passed in June 2009 a contribution of up to 100,000 million to the IMF 
through the NAB. Members reach an extension agreement in November 2009 in the 
amount of US$ 530,000 million, multiplying almost by 10 the previous NAB and slightly 
surpassing the half-billion target set by the G20. The Board approved the expanded NAB 
in April 2010, and it was finally ratified by member countries in March 2011.
The enlarged NAB has total resources of about SDR 370,000 million33 (approxi-
mately US$ 588,500 million), however, this amount will be reduced from 2013/14, when a 
major part of the resources of the new NAB will be transferred to the quota increases (once 
this are ratified). Specifically, it is expected that the NAB will remain with total resources of 
SDR 182,400 million (IMF, 2011).  
This transfer has a very important formal connotation, because the Fund will recover 
its character of a quota-based institution. As it was emphasized by the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) at the Annual Meetings of the Fund in October 2010, the 
quota reform is essential to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund, which is and should 
be an institution based in quotas. At least temporarily, in the period 2011-2013/14, available 
resources (not necessarily used) via NAB, will exceed those obtainable by quotas. 
The NAB enlargement has taken place, both through the expansion of the contri-
butions of the 26 countries that were already members, and by the contributions of 14 new 
members.34 The contribution of each country bears a certain relation to its quota weight 
but not an exact one, because not all IMF members are NAB members, and the levels of 
commitment differ (especially in the case of Japan, with a 6.5% share in the IMF and a 
contribution to the NAB which is 18%).35 
SOURCE: Based on IMF data.
 IMF's 1-YEAR FORWARD COMMITMENT CAPACITY  FIGURE 2.11 
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33  Initially with SDR 367,400 million in March 2011, to which are added 2,500 million of Poland’s contribution, in-
corporated as a new NAB member in November 2011.
34  Former NAB members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Norway, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United 
States, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Thailand. New members from 2011: Brazil, China, Cyprus, 
India, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, and South Africa. Greece and Ireland 
have yet to adhere by end 2012.
35  The countries have the right to make a withdrawal from their contributions to NAB if they have balance of pay-
ments problems, allowing these contributions to be considered as reserves. 
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Classifying by groups of countries, contributions to the expanded NAB reflect the 
new balance of power in the NIEO. As shown in Figure 2.12, emerging economies gain 
outstanding weight at NAB, many of which are new entrants (BRIC countries, Mexico, the 
Philippines and South Africa). 
Before its enlargement, the presence of emerging economies in the NAB was 
marginal, with the exception of the contribution of Saudi Arabia (SDR 1,760 million), in line 
with its traditional strong presence in the IMF. The expanded NAB incorporates these 
economies with strong weight including a coordinated contribution among the four BRIC36 
countries, which together place their contribution at the level of the US and Japan. Emerg-
ing economies assume a new role as leading creditors to the IMF, compared to its tradi-
tional role as borrowers. 
In addition to expanding its resources, the NAB reform has introduced two new 
elements that make its operations more flexible: (i) possibility to finance any type of pro-
grams, including insurance facilities; and (ii) temporal activation for periods of six months, 
instead of the previous requirement of activation for each loan; this will allow a fast re-
sponse in a context of a crisis with contagion to more than one country, since it will not 
require authorizations for each program. This added flexibility is compensated by increas-
ing the qualified majority to approve activations from 80 to 85%; which gives veto power 
to the BRIC countries (besides the US, Japan and the EU).37 
While the activation of the NAB since April 2011 raised the IMF’s lending capac-
ity up to 250,000 million SDR in late 2011. The aggravation of the debt crisis in Europe 
in 2011 and 2012 has brought about the debate for the need of additional resources. In 
this context, in December 2011 the countries of the euro area took the initiative to an-
nounce additional European contributions of € 150,000 million (SDR 127,000 million) in 
the form of bilateral loans, which would be later supplemented with additional contribu-
tions from G20 countries announced at Los Cabos Summit in June 2012. In total, contri-
butions will amount up to approximately US$ 460,000 million of additional temporary 
bilateral resources for the Fund. 
SOURCE: Based on IMF data.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NAB AND THE EXPANDED NAB (Nov. 2011) FIGURE 2.12 
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36  China contributes US$ 50,000 million; Brazil, India and Russia, with US$ 14,000 million each. These three 
countries raised unexpectedly their initially planned contribution of US$ 10,000 million, thereby increasing their 
weight in the NAB.
37  The 85% threshold is also used to admit new members at any point in time (previously it was only possible with 
the occasion of the renewals of the NAB with an 80% vote. This procedure is used for the first time in November 
2011 with the incorporation of Poland.
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Through 2013 the Fund will work on the adequacy of IMF resources, in view of the 
XVth GRQs expected for January 2014. Chapter 5 discusses this issue, here it is important 
to signal two aspects: (i) the increase in regular resources, i.e. via quotas, is directly linked to 
corporate governance (and subject to majority vote of 85%), limiting this alternative, at 
least in the case of short term needs; (ii) the Fund has demonstrated speed and flexibility 
to articulate alternative ways of financing such as trust funds or bilateral loans (which re-
quire only a simple majority). The history of sustaining the Fund between 2009 and 2011 is 
a good example of this flexibility. Probably, it will be the second type of solution which will 
be articulated again in the future if resources are needed again. 
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Given any rule, however “fundamental” or “necessary” for science, there are al-
ways circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt 
its opposite. (Feyerabend, 1975, p.23).
Countries have faced during the crisis serious problems of illiquidity and the risk of sudden 
stop in the capital markets. As we saw in the first chapter, the revival of the credit market 
has required massive injections of liquidity into the system. The first source are the market 
operations of central banks, but this option is limited when the liquidity problems are in 
hard currencies, and the country has limited foreign reserves.
Given these risks, the first line of defense is a policy framework of sound macro-
economic, regulatory and supervisory policies to limit the magnitude of macroeconomic 
and financial sector imbalances. This stability can generate enough confidence in the 
country’s economy and give leeway against capital account shocks. Now, despite having 
good fundamentals, countries are not immune to exogenous shocks and the G20 has 
recognized the need for mechanisms to ensure the availability of foreign currency. The 
crisis has shown that the economic and financial globalization had taken place without the 
development of insurance instruments (safety nets) that enable countries to hedge against 
balance of payments liquidity risks. 
In this context, the question arises on how to strengthen the international monetary 
system with public insurance1 and the role to be played by the IMF. In general, a risk may be 
covered by two types of strategies: self-insurance or insurance from third parties. In a similar 
way, given the risk of foreign currency illiquidity, countries may choose to self-insure them-
selves through the accumulation of reserves, or the assurance with others through what is 
known as Global Financial Safety Nets (GFSN; Figure 3.1 shows various sources of these kind 
of resources). In recent years, GFSN have been boosted at different levels: bilateral (currency 
swaps, bilateral loans), regional (regional funds), or multilateral (IMF insurance function).
Specifically, the Fund has developed a new insurance function through the crea-
tion of two new facilities, the FCL and the PLL. Looking ahead, there are debates on the 
convenience that the Fund provides long-term insurance, and on how to improve the effi-
ciency of the whole GFSN through better coordination among the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral layers. In this sense, it is important to analyze the costs and benefits of differ-
ent GFSN and its respective comparative advantages. 
This chapter analyzes the main economic determinants behind these insurance 
strategies: section (3.1) deals with the accumulation of reserves; (3.2) with the bilateral and 
regional layers; (3.3) with the multilateral layer through the IMF; and (3.4) discusses the 
comparative advantages of this last alternative. 
3.1  Accumulation of reserves (self-insurance)
The intense process of accumulation of reserves in emerging economies has been a prom-
inent feature of the International Monetary System (IMS) since end of the 1990s. While this 
process has allowed certain countries to counteract the freezing of credit markets through 
the use of reserves, there is also concern about the inefficiencies that it can introduce on 
3 Globalization without protection: the Global Financial Safety Nets
1  As an alternative to public insurance, there is in theory the option of private sovereign insurance to cover the 
freezing of capital markets. However, in practice this is a very small and unprofitable market unable to meet the 
needs of large countries. It is limited to few and expensive assets such as options on the index VIX (Volatility on 
the S&P 500 options), options on the EMBI (Emerging Markets Bond Index), or GDP indexed bonds, which are 
generally non marketable (IMF, 2009a).
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the allocation of resources in both, accumulating countries, and the international eco-
nomic system as a whole. 
When analyzing the insurance function of the accumulation of reserves with the 
scope of the Fund’s role, it is interesting to consider several aspects: (a) the determinants 
and inefficiencies of the accumulation of reserves, and (b) the role that the IMF can play to 
address excessive accumulation.2 
A  THE GROWING ACCUMULATION OF RESERVES: DETERMINANTS AND DISTORTIONS 
Global demand for reserves has increased exponentially in the last 15 years. This growth 
is much higher than in other macroeconomic and financial variables, especially since 2000, 
when the pace of reserve accumulation accelerates, with an average annual growth of 
15.4%, surpassing the growth rates of GDP, trade, or international financial flows (more 
than duplicating it since 2008, see Figure 3.2). Foreign reserves have increased from 
US$ 1.5 billion in 1995 to US$ 9.7 billion in 2010, representing approximately 15.4% of 
world GDP (IRC-TFIMF, 2010).
The accumulation of reserves shows two main trends: first, it is concentrated in US 
dollars that represent between 60 and 70% of total reserves, which introduces problems of 
asymmetry in the IMS and concentration of risks in the central country (the US). Second, the 
accumulation is essentially a phenomenon of emerging economies. In relative terms, emerging 
economies accumulate reserves amounting on average 32% of their GDP, well above the ad-
vanced economies (12%). Accumulation is particularly intense in China and Middle East oil 
exporting countries (with accumulation above 50% of GDP, see Figure 3.3a), which account for 
about two thirds of the reserves accumulated between 2000 and 2009 versus 25% in emerg-
ing economies of Eastern Europe and Latin America. China alone (including Hong Kong), ac-
counts for about one third of global reserves, followed by Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and 
India, which together account for one additional quarter (Figure 3.3b, IRC-TFIMF, 2010).
SOURCE: Garrido, Moreno and Serra (2012). 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS FIGURE 3.1
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  crises: supervision 
  and new facilities 
  (FCL, PLL, HAPA) 
- Resolution of crises: 
  SBA, EFF 
- Bilateral swaps  
- Bilateral loans 
Vienna Initiative  
2  This section draws from the report of the task force on IMF issues of the ECB International Relations Committee 
in which the author has participated: “Strengthening the international monetary system: Reserves” (IRC-TFIMF, 
2010). 
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SOURCE: IRC-TFIMF (2010). 
NOTE: Data from WEO, WDI, IFS, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). 
COMPARATIVE GROWTH IN THE ACCUMULATION OF RESERVES FIGURE 3.2
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During the crisis, many countries have used their reserves to maintain liquidity in 
their financial systems, to smooth the effects on the exchange rate, or to offset the fall in 
exports and trade financing.3 Between the second quarter of 2008 and the first of 2009, 
global reserves fall by around 8%. This fall is nonetheless concentrated in a handful of coun-
tries: Russian reserves drop 38% during this period, Poland (25%), and India and South 
Korea (20% each one) (BIS, 2009). Therefore, the reserves have played on this initial stages 
the role of self-insurance. In fact, emerging economies have continued their accumulation 
strategies so that by the end of 2009 the level of reserves before the crisis was exceeded. 
Since 2009, Latin American countries, traditionally reluctant to the accumulation, have joined 
this strategy with public announcement of their intentions4 (IRC-TFIMF, 2010). 
Inefficiencies of excessive accumulation
As an insurance policy, reserve accumulation gives the country the advantage of immedi-
ate availability and autonomy, not having to rely on third parties to tackle a problem of 
sudden stop in capital markets. It only requires a decision by the monetary authorities to 
maintain liquidity. However, the accumulation poses problems in terms of sufficiency, to 
the extent that the country does not have sufficient reserves to meet its needs, but also in 
terms of the inefficiencies they can introduced in the IMS. As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
excessive concentration in dollars introduces the Triffin’s dilemma, generating systemic 
risks associated with the central country delivering the reserve currency, but there are also 
problems in terms of regional and domestic inefficiencies. Figure 3.4 summarizes the inef-
ficiencies associated with excessive accumulation of reserves.5 
The determinants of reserve accumulation 
Given the rapid pace of reserve accumulation in the past two years, the political and aca-
demic debate on the determinants of the accumulation has been intensified. On the one hand 
to establish which determinants produce greater inefficiencies in the international economic 
system and, on the other, to what extent GFSN can be alternatives to reserve accumulation. 
From the point of view of the accumulation of reserves as self-insurance policy we 
may differentiate between (i) precautionary demand for reserves, and (ii) non-precautionary 
(IRC-TFIMF, 2010). The GFSN may, in principle, be an alternative to the reserves in the case 
of the precautionary demand, but not in the accumulation motivated by other determinants: 
(i) The precautionary demand for reserves; it refers to the demand motivated by 
self insurance against sudden currency shortages, either because a sudden 
stop in capital inflows, or because domestic capital flight. This type of demand 
is associated with the acceleration in savings and the increase in reserve ac-
cumulation of Asian countries in the second half of the 1990s. Reserves gave a 
signal of confidence to foreign and domestic investors about the country’s abil-
ity to meet its balance of payments obligations without resorting to government 
funding, or being subject to IMF conditionality (Bernanke, 2005). 
(ii) Non precautionary demand for reserves. The demand for reserves may be 
determined by other factors, most notably the so-called mercantilist motive 
(IRC-TFIMF, 2010). 
— Mercantilist demand. The country demands reserves in order to maintain 
competitiveness via an undervalued exchange rate, as part of a policy of 
3  Reserves have been used for exposure to exchange rate risk in trade operations; the case of Comercial Mexi-
cana had a high international impact. 
4  For example in Mexico, Governor Agustin Carstens announced that they would continue accumulating reserves 
in 2011 despite having reached high historic record of US$ 123,000 million in 2010 (WSJ, 2011).
5  See Bini Smaghi 2010 for a detailed review of global inefficiencies.
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export-oriented growth. This motive underlies the link of exchange rates 
to the US dollar in Asia (Dooley et al., 2003). 
— Underdeveloped domestic financial markets. The country accumulates 
reserves and invests in advanced economies because of the impossibility 
of channeling savings into domestic financial markets. The US offers a 
much more developed financial system with comparative advantage in 
terms of deepness, liquidity, security, legal infrastructure, and integration 
in increasingly globalized financial systems (Knight et al., 2008).
— The threshold effect. The country accumulates reserves, not so much 
from a strategy of optimality, but in relative terms to other emerging econ-
omies to avoid appearing to the markets as being more vulnerable. South 
Korea has been an authoritative voice in denouncing this kind of situation, 
noting that despite the large size of its reserves, they have been forced to 
continue to accumulate, because markets take into account the compar-
ative levels of reserves rather than economic fundamentals. 
— Inter temporal savings. The country accumulates reserves as savings for 
future generations, in periods of high commodity prices and high current 
account surpluses.6 This is the kind of strategy that would follow the oil 
and commodities exporting countries.
SOURCE: Based on Dorrucci y McKay (2011) and IRC-TFIMF (2010). 
a Rodrick (2006) estimated in 1% of GDP the social cost of reserve accumulation. 
Global and regional inefjBiencies
Global imbalances. Reserve accumulation introduces negative externalities by distorting the direction 
of international capital and trade kows, global liquidity conditions, or the worldwide distribution of jnal 
demand. The reserves contribute to global imbalances by jnancing the current account dejcit and 
contributing artijBially to the maintenance of low interest rates in the U.S. (and elsewhere), and thus 
indirectly inkuencing the accumulation of excessive risks in the private sector. 
Trade diversion. When reserve accumulation is associated with the maintenance of undervalued 
exchange rates to maintain competitiveness, it has effects equivalent to protectionist policies (export 
subsidies or taxes on imports) and thus introduces inefjciencies in the international allocation of 
resources (trade diversion).
Lack of regional adjustment. The effects on the exchange rate of accumulation in a country induce 
imitation effect on the economies of the region, to maintain trade competitiveness (currency war), 
limiting the kexibility of their monetary policy and introducing inefjBiencies resulting from exchange rate 
misalignment.
Domestic inefjciencies
Quasi-ðscal costs. In the short term, reserve management requires sterilization by the central bank to 
maintain the independence of monetary policy, introducing quasi-jscal costs because the negative 
differential between the yield on reserves and sterilizing instruments (if the type on domestic debt 
exceeds that one on the assets in reserves). Moreover from a certain level, sterilization with instruments 
such as issuing bonds or the sale of government bonds by the central bank may require administrative 
and quantitative restrictions that may distort the bond market. There appears also an opportunity cost 
in terms of keeping national savings in securities of developed countries versus domestic investment 
projects with highest return.
Misallocation in domestic ðnancial markets... In the longer term, if reserve accumulation is linked to 
anchoring the exchange rate, it introduces distortions in interest rates and in relative prices that can 
prevent the development of a modern jnancial system and affect the growth pattern. The maintenance 
of an artijcially undervalued exchange rate means artijcially low interest rates -to prevent speculative 
capital inkows- generating an undervaluation of savings and excess demand for domestic credit, and 
thus potential investment excess and asset bubbles. The low rates also introduce distortions in income 
distribution hurting deposit holders.
… and markets for goods and services. An undervalued exchange rate introduces inter sector distortions 
reducing the relative price of tradable goods in detriment of the services sector with potential negative 
implications for employment and consumption (a). 
INEFFICIENCIES ARISING FROM EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF RESERVES FIGURE 3.4 
6  Most oil-exporting countries have established Sovereign Funds to manage oil revenues and investments, but still 
maintain some of the revenue in the form of reserves in their central banks (see Alberola and Serena, 2008).
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— Demand linked to financial stability. Reserves are accumulated as part of 
a policy of financial stabilization to avoid the harmful effects of strong 
capital inflows into the country in terms of potential credit booms and in-
vestment bubbles.
When assessing the impact of reserve accumulation on the IMS, there is a norma-
tive judgment on the effects of the different determinants. In general, we may conclude 
that precautionary motives, inter temporal savings, or the demand linked to financial sta-
bility, tend to underpin the stability of international capital flows and may be considered 
efficient in terms of inter-temporal allocation of resources, a short of “good cholesterol” to 
the IMS. However, the mercantilist and threshold effect demands, introduce distortions in 
international trade and international capital flows, i.e. “bad cholesterol”.
In practice it is difficult to distinguish what are the driving determinants of the ac-
cumulation and there is no conclusive empirical evidence on it.7 However, there seems to 
be some consensus that mercantilist determinants of exchange rate protection are central 
to the demand for reserves. In this sense, the criticism of reserve accumulation is directed 
mainly to Asian economies, especially China,8 which appear as the major economies that 
have pegged their exchange rates against the dollar, and are those that have been concen-
trating most of the reserves.
B  THE FUND’S POLICY ON RESERVE ACCUMULATION
Both the G20 and the IMF have enhanced the dialogue on the accumulation of reserves, 
its effects and possible alternatives. A first alternative is the activation of substitutive fi-
nancing mechanisms such as the GFSN, which will be dealt with in subsequent sections 
(bilateral, regional and global mechanisms). When evaluating these alternatives it will be 
necessary to assess, not only the extent to which they constitute a viable substitute to the 
accumulation of reserves, but also the cost in terms of the inefficiencies they can also in-
troduce in the IMS. Now, the GFSN can be an alternative to a precautionary accumulation 
of reserves, but it is less clear that they can be a substitute for non precautionary accumu-
lation. Beyond the GFSN other initiatives are being developed to mitigate the intensity in 
the accumulation, and its concentration on the US dollar. It is interesting to note the role 
that the IMF may play through two policies: its surveillance, and attempts to reform the 
IMS (Figure 3.5). 
Surveillance policy and accumulation of reserves
The IMF can contribute through its surveillance policy to promote strategies of accumula-
tion of reserves that minimize inefficiencies. Given the lack of sanctioning instruments, 
surveillance policy uses persuasion through its messages and the different surveillance 
instruments.
In relation to the message, there is a conflict between advanced economies (US 
and Europe), that emphasize the excessive accumulation of reserves, and emerging econ-
omies (specially China), which question the excessive reliance on the US dollar and global 
liquidity problems. Notwithstanding this broader scheme, the dominant IMF doctrine on 
reserve policy is marked by its pernicious effects on global imbalances and thus the impor-
7  Reliable estimates are missing because the difficulty of distinguishing the different types of determinants. Obst-
feld et al. (2008) observed that the mercantilist demand is not relevant when considering the high correlation 
between the depth of the financial system and trade. The demand would mainly be related to the depth of the 
financial system and would be of the precautionary type. It is however a broad definition of “precautionary” using 
aggregate M2 as a proxy (IRC-TFIMF, 2010).
8  China, concentrating more than a quarter of global reserves, is a special case. Besides potential domestic inef-
ficiencies, there is the additional risk to the IMS from the imbalances or shocks affecting China and its reserve 
policy. 
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tance of containing excessive accumulation. Following the G20 Summit in Seoul in No-
vember 2010, to the initiative of the US, the message has been to focus more on limiting 
external imbalances rather than in the exchange rate or the level of reserves.9 Thus, in 
2011, as we saw in Chapter 1, the G20 and IMF have developed a series of indicators to 
define what constitutes an excessive balance of payments (BoP) imbalance in the context 
of the MAP, and identified seven countries qualified as systemic to be monitored in more 
detail: Germany, China, USA, France, India, Japan and the UK.10 
Placing the emphasis on the external imbalances provides for a more objective 
debate and moves the message on policy recommendations from “responding to interna-
tional pressure on the exchange rate”, towards “responding to an imbalance of the na-
tional economy” (the external imbalance). The recommendation is also symmetrical, and 
affects both the deficit and the surplus countries. In the former, calling for a rebalancing of 
the external sector through domestic adjustment policies; in the latter, demanding a boost 
to domestic demand and greater exchange rate flexibility in order to allow greater autono-
my in monetary policy.11 
In parallel, in emerging countries with surpluses, greater transparency in reserve 
holdings is advocated as well as sufficiently deep financial systems, enabling them to 
channel resources to the domestic market, so that adjustments against exogenous shocks 
in the capital markets have lower domestic impact. Moreover, in the case of large econo-
mies like China, boosting domestic financial markets can reinforce the use of the renminbi, 
and reduce pressure on the excessive weight of the US dollar as the main reserve cur-
rency.
Regarding the instruments, the main channel is the bilateral surveillance through 
the recommendations contained in the Article IV reports of each country. But the IMF is 
also encouraging reports on spillover effects and on cross-country international economic 
and financial issues, which enrich the traditional multilateral surveillance reports of the 
WEO and GFSR. Such reports allow setting common parameters of analysis and, where 
appropriate, development of best international practices. 
The reports covering the dynamics of international capital flows are relevant to the 
management of reserve policies. The Fund is working on establishing principles on capital 
controls as a mean of defense against the volatility of capital flows and, as such, partially 
substitutes for reserve accumulation. Controls are treated, however, as a temporary and 
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
Problem Surveillance Other policies
Excessive reserve accumulation 
Content: focus on external imbalances and development 
of domestic jnancial markets
Tools: thematic reports, multi country analysis, capital 
kows and optimality of reserves levels; Framework for 
sustainable growth (G20)
Insurance facilities, FCL, PLL 
(section 3.3) (GFSN)
Excessive weight of the US dollar 
in the composition of reserves
Facilitating conditions for viability of other currencies as 
reserve currencies
Reform of the IMS
IMF policies   
IMF POLICIES RELATED TO RESERVE ACCUMULATION FIGURE 3.5 
 9  At the Seoul Summit, the USA proposed a compromise limiting the amount of external imbalances around 
+ / – 4% of GDP in 2013, which was not approved.
10  This exercise will be updated in 2013. Spain and the EU have been added to the list. 
11  From 2001, with the Argentina crisis and the failure of the dollar peg, the IMF has moved towards a new para-
digm with greater exchange rate flexibility. For a discussion on monitoring exchange rates in the Fund see Hi-
nojo and Martinez-Rolland (2010).
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second best solution compared with macroeconomic stability and adequate micro and 
macro-prudential financial system regulation (IMF, 2011a). Thus, as noted by López Roa 
(2007), the liberalization of capital flows implies volatility risks that demand from the au-
thorities the strengthening of the basic macroeconomic fundamentals. In 2012, the IMF 
has institutionalized a view in favor of an orderly liberalization of capital movements al-
though linking the benefits of liberalization to the degree of financial and institutional de-
velopment of the country, thereby moving away from recommending full liberalization as 
an appropriate goal for all countries at all times (IMF, 2012).12
Measuring the optimal level of reserves
With the increasing demand for reserves, different models have been developed attempt-
ing to identify the optimal levels of reserve accumulation. The first generation of indicators 
is based on coverage ratios using a particular indicator as a proxy of risk of external expo-
sure. Among these indicators are: three months of imports, 100% of short-term debt 
(Greenspan-Guidotti index) or a percentage of M2 (as a measure of domestic liabilities). 
However, these models, because of their simplicity, do not allow taking account of country 
risk given the multiple determinants of international capital flows in a global context (IRC-
TFIMF, 2010). 
The second generation indicators are based on models that maximize the wel-
fare of a representative citizen in an economy subject to a sudden stop in capital in-
flows and a fall in output and consumption. The reserves appear in the model as an 
insurance that mitigates the negative effects of an exogenous shock. In some models 
reserves are endogenous variables playing a role in crisis prevention, so that the prob-
ability of recession and sudden stop is a decreasing function of the reserve/short-term 
debt ratio. But the results are not conclusive: indicators yield different results on the 
optimal level of reserves relative to GDP in a range very wide between 8 and 30 percent. 
Estimates also depend on parameters such as the probability of crisis, the opportunity 
cost of reserves or the degree of risk aversion and therefore subject to controversy 
(Dorrucci and McKay, 2011).13 Ultimately, the debate over the optimal level of reserves 
for precautionary reasons is inconclusive and in practice economic policy makers rely 
on various combinations of indicators. Most emerging economies far exceed traditional 
indicators.
In 2011, the IMF has developed a new method to assess the optimal level of re-
serve accumulation in emerging economies, which provides a measure of the risk of bal-
ance of payments from the different possible shocks (including exports, short-term debt, 
medium and long term debt, and money supply as a proxy for domestic liquid assets). To 
each of these factors is assigned a risk of illiquidity based on observations of outflows 
under BoP pressure situations. From this measurement, they evaluate the optimal level of 
reserves from a subjective assessment based on historical experience. The adequate cov-
erage is estimated in the range of 100-150% of the measure obtained.
The IMF indicator, as any other, is under controversy, although with the advantage 
of being “official”. It also has a potential problem of reverse signaling, i.e., potential nega-
tive market reactions if the country does not meet the IMF standard, or an IMF credibility 
risk, if markets do not take it into account. In this respect, the Fund itself acknowledges 
this measure as only a starting point, and each country will require a specific analysis for 
assessing its optimal level of reserves.
12  This view has been subject to intense discussions on the Board and the opposition of some emerging countries, 
particularly Brazil, a strong advocate of capital controls to counteract balance of payments risk and potentially 
as a long term development strategy. 
13  Dorrucci and McKay (2011, box 3, p. 48) review the literature on indicators measuring the optimality of reserve 
accumulation.
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Attempts of reform the International Monetary System (IMS)
The IMF has recovered the debate on the reform of IMS, which was also one of the priori-
ties of the French presidency of the G20 in 2011.14 With respect to the US dollar role, the 
debate revolves around two main alternatives:15 (i) a system like the actual one based on 
(more) national currencies but reducing the weight of the dollar, or (ii) an increased role for 
the SDR (IRC-TFIMF, 2010). 
(i)  A (more) multi polar system. The analysis of this alternative may be ap-
proached from two perspectives, the opportunity and the possibility of en-
couraging a system less dependent on the dollar. In relation to the opportu-
nity, the question is the costs and benefits of an alternative to the current 
system. In principle, greater diversification of reserve currencies would have 
advantages in terms of lower interest rate distortions in the US and the sus-
tainability of its growth pattern, and therefore lower overall system’s expo-
sure to shocks from the central country. There would also be a more com-
petitive reserves market with the potential to reduce the costs of holding 
reserve assets. However, a more multi polar system also introduces greater 
costs in terms of volatility and risk of exchange rate misalignment between 
the major reserve currencies or higher transaction costs in the management 
of reserves. Countries issuing reserve currencies would face further appre-
ciation pressures with the increasing international weight of their currencies 
what would require adjustments in their domestic economies. Thus the ben-
efits of the alternative to the dollar’s dominance are unclear. 
 Regarding the possibility, the experience shows that movements towards 
less dependence on the dollar occur only gradually as a result of market 
forces or exceptionally by institutional developments (as in the case of the 
euro in the European Union). Much of the weight of the dollar as a reserve 
asset is a reflection of its central role as the main international cash currency 
and unit of account in financial and commercial transactions, and also to the 
exchange rate policy of Asian emerging economies anchored to the dollar. 
Eichengreen (2009) argues that over time we can expect a natural movement 
towards a more multi polar system as the dollar is losing its strength under 
the negative expectations generated about its growing twin deficits.16 A 
weaker dollar will mean losses for holders of dollars that would seek better 
alternatives. 
 Exception made of the uncertainty introduced by the Euro Area crisis, ag-
gravated since 2010, the most plausible long-term scenario will be to evolve 
towards greater diversification, as the main reserve holders choose to diver-
sify their portfolios to other currencies than the dollar.
(ii) A greater role for the SDR. The crisis has reopen an old debate on the use of 
the SDR, but rather than recovering the discussions on supranational cur-
rency initiatives (of the Keynes bancor-type), it has focused on a more prag-
matic debate on the alternatives to gradually increase the attractiveness of 
the SDR as a reserve asset. This being said, there have been some voices on 
long-term proposals to potentiate a supranational currency, mainly by the 
Chinese monetary authorities (Xiaochuan, 2009).
14  For an analysis of the evolution and challenges of the IMS see Toribio (2010). 
15  World Bank President Robert Zoellick (2010), stated in an opinion piece in the Financial Times in November 
2010, the possibility of recovering a sort of gold standard as a monetary asset of reference on which to anchor 
inflation expectations and currency values, albeit with poor resonance.
16  For a detailed analysis of his thesis on the transition of a dollar-dominated IMS to a multipolar system, see 
Eichengreen (2010).
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 In January 2011, the Fund (IMF, 2011b) presented an extensive menu of op-
tions to enhance the use of SDRs including: use by the private sector, creat-
ing SDR-denominated bonds, use as a reference for SDR international eco-
nomic data (such as trade), expanding the SDR basket (to include the 
renminbi), SDR allocations to countries with sound policies in case of exog-
enous shock (which overlaps with insurance facilities), or recover the substi-
tution account.17 The response by the Board was very cold, the Directors 
highlighted the technical and political difficulties against the theoretical ben-
efits (IMF, 2011c). 
 In practice, there is resistance to any advance of the SDR because it repre-
sents a new role to the IMF as global liquidity provider, thereby conflicting 
with the objectives and implementation of the monetary policy in major econ-
omies. So far the G20 has just promoted a special issue of SDR 250,000 
million in 2009 – more linked to liquidity needs than to reinforcing the SDR –,18 
and the goal of expanding in the medium term the SDR basket to include the 
renminbi. Looking ahead is not likely to go far beyond this line and in any 
case one would only expect new issuances in the case of re-emergence of 
liquidity needs. Boughton (2011) describes it very well using as metaphor of 
the SDR takeoff “the flight of the dodo”, i.e. an extinct bird that could not fly 
and a symbol in Anglo-Saxon culture of something obsolete or out of place. 
3.2  Bilateral and regional safety nets
A second mean of insurance within GFSNs are bilateral and regional agreements. Both 
types of instruments have been considerably strengthened in recent years, most notably 
the swap agreements between central banks and, in the case of regional agreements, the 
new mechanisms created in the European Union in response to the sovereign debt crisis. 
These types of mechanisms are born from strong economic and financial links between 
countries, and therefore from high contagion risks that justifies a joint action. 
A  BILATERAL NETS: SWAPS 
The shortage of foreign currencies has boosted different bilateral instruments, most nota-
bly, bilateral swaps between central banks. With the swaps, central banks exchange re-
sources in their respective currencies with a repurchase agreement within the period of the 
operation and a predetermined interest rate. Other instruments include cross-border col-
lateral agreements19 or loans between countries. This is the case for example of the Nordic 
countries in the rescue to Iceland in 2008, with bilateral loans from the governments of 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway in the amount of € 1,775 million. These packages 
usually are part of a joint program with the IMF. 
The US FED has played a key role in the crisis responding to the lack of international 
liquidity in dollars. It established swap lines without ceiling with central banks of major ad-
vanced economies and a number of lines between US$ 15,000 and 30,000 million with ten 
17  The substitution account has already been discussed in the 1970s and 1980s. This account would work as a 
fund in which members invest on SDRs, and countries with financing needs could withdraw from the SDR ac-
count in exchange for their currencies. Participation on the account would be based on countries IMF quota. 
The SDR could be used in official market in exchange for other currencies (dollars, euros). This time around it 
has also been ruled out because of the difficulties of distributing the exchange rate risk of an account that has 
liabilities (contributions) in SDRs, and assets in foreign currencies.
18  The injection of SDR 250,000 million decided in the London Summit of the G20 has been widely questioned by 
central banks, especially in Europe. 
19  The collateral agreements allow a private bank using collateral admitted by its central bank to obtain liquidity 
from a third central bank. However, there has been little development of these instruments because central 
banks have preferred to maintain their exposures to other central banks and not to enter into transactions se-
cured by collateral of private banks in third countries.
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other central banks including four emerging economies (Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Sin-
gapore). In 2009, the main users were the ECB (up to US$ 290,000 million), the Bank of Japan 
(120,000) and the Bank of England (75,000). From 2010 these lines have been reopened sev-
eral times, including new swaps with the ECB during the Greek debt crisis in May 2010.20 
The ECB also opened swap lines with Nordic countries and Eastern Europe to 
meet euro liquidity problems although in much lower amounts (with Poland and Hungary 
were established for € 10,000 and 5,000 million, respectively). China also conducted simi-
lar transactions with third countries opening lines with Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Belarus (BIS, 2010). 
Automatism versus flexibility (constructive ambiguity)
Bilateral swap lines have helped to solve the liquidity problems of the system while giving 
confidence in the markets of some insurance function that guaranteed access to foreign 
currency, especially in emerging economies (Brazil, for example, maintained access to 
markets without having to use the swap line with the FED). While they have largely worked, 
a debate has arisen regarding the potential benefits of a certain automatism in setting 
them. The automatism would remove uncertainty problems in recipient countries, regard-
ing the available quantities and the moment they will be received. Contenders argue that 
automatism also introduces problems in terms of limiting the autonomy of monetary policy 
of the country and induces moral hazard behavior in the beneficiary countries of the swap. 
In practice, major central banks have chosen to maintain the current practice of ad hoc 
agreements when necessary, under what is called a practice of “constructive ambiguity”.
The Fund has entered into this discussion by proposing the establishment of mul-
ti-country swap lines (IMF, 2010f), in which the IMF unilaterally provides to countries with 
illiquidity risk parallel swap lines for a period of 3-6 months. These lines would be offer with 
an automatic character in contexts of global or regional systemic crises. The same reasons 
that ended cooling off IMF proposals to enhance the SDR have led to false start of these 
lines; they were not approved because they place the IMF at the center of decisions that 
directly affect monetary policy in major economies and a move in the direction of an IMF 
as a lender of last resort. 
As a substitute, after more than a year of discussions and taking profit of the mo-
mentum in the G20, in late 2011, the IMF approved a new liquidity window in the PLL.21 It 
provides short-term resources for a period of six months (renewable on an extraordinary 
basis) and an amount of 250% of the quota that could rise up to 500%. While these re-
sources may be limited compared with a central bank swap (with no ex ante cap), they do 
not require bilateral negotiations and provide certainty, if the country meets the qualification 
requirements of the PLL (see Chapter 5). It is therefore a good complement to the swaps.
B  REGIONAL FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS (RFAs)22 
Regional funds had uneven development in the different regions but, in recent years, have been 
enhanced as a result of the global crisis, especially in Europe. Figure 3.6 compares the charac-
teristics of the main regional funds: European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) replaced by the 
European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) in 2012, the Chiang Mai Multilateral Initiative – these 
two being the most advanced in their development and resources –, the Arab Monetary Fund, 
and the Latin American Reserve Fund (these two the oldest ones but with limited resources). 
20  Additionally, the FED has injected massive liquidity in the system with the successive quantitative easing (QE) 
packages (see Chapter 1).
21  Before the reform, the facility was called precautionary credit line (PCL) and will pass to include the term liquid-
ity in its definition: Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL).
22  This section draws on Garrido, Moreno, and Serra (2012), and IRC-TFIMF (2011), in which the author has par-
ticipated.
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The Regional Funds are primarily crisis resolution funds that are activated at the 
onset of a serious balance of payments problem and are subject to strong conditionality. 
The main exceptions are the initial tranche of 20% of the country’s contribution to the 
Multilateral Chiang Mai Initiative, with immediate and unconditional access, and the FLAR, 
activated only with a declaration of insufficiency of reserves by the country. They are how-
ever, two alternatives that allow access to limited amounts of resources (20% in Chiang 
Mai and in the case of FLAR, it is endowed with only about US$ 2,350 million of total re-
sources).
In July 2011, the European Council, in one of the successive responses trying to 
placate the effects of the debt crisis in Europe changed the initial design of the EFSF to 
SOURCE: Based on Garrido, Moreno and Serra (2012) and IRC-TFIMF (2011).
Instrument Origin and resources Main lending characteristics
The EFSF was created in 2010 by the European Council 
response to support the euro area countries in response
to the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The EFSF was set up
as limited public company with the capacity to issue bonds in 
an amount of  €440,000 million, guaranteed by 17 Member 
States of the euro zone (in proportion of their participation
in the capital of the BCE); complemented by the possible
co-jnancing by the IMF (with up to US$ 250,000 millions).
In 2012, it was replaced by European Stabilization 
Mechanism, a permanent institution with a lending capacity 
of €500,000 million. It issues bonds backed by a total 
subscribed capital of €700 million (of which 80 million
is paid in capital, and the rest callable capital).
Activation and access: Loans are activated in case of
balance of payments crisis or as a partial protection
of sovereign risk. It is a crisis resolution fund, but can
also have insurance function. It can also be used to
participate in recapitalization of jnancial institutions
or operate in primary or secondary sovereign markets. 
Conditionality and monitoring: strict conditionality
negotiated between European Commission, ECB and IMF
(the troika) and approved by the Eurogroup. The three
institutions monitor the compliance with the program.
Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation 
(CMIN)
(March 2010)
The CMIM is an extension of Chiang Mai Initiative of 2000 
(CMI), which from 2010 is multilateralised and extended to 
those countries which are members of ASEAN + 3 (China, 
Japan y Korea) and Hong Kong. It has US$ 120,000 million 
in resources built from members’ reserves (with China, Japan 
and South Korea contributing 80%).  
Activation and access: it requires the majority of votes
of members, and it is activated in situations of short term
liquidity problems. The country has the access to 250%
up to 500% (for ASEAN countries) of its contributions.
The jrst tranche of 20% is immediate, unconditional and
temporal (180 days); the rest is subject to a SBA program
with the IMF that the CMIN supplements.
Conditionality and monitoring: strict conditionality
(as a SBA program). The IMF and the AMRO (ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Ofjce) follow the program.
Arab Monetary Fund  
(1977) 
The fund is created by petroleum-producing Arab states to 
lend, at low rates, to Arab states with balance of payments 
needs, or to jnance reforms, which favor regional commercial 
and jnancial integration. It has a share capital of 2,800 
millions of dollars; the highest contributions come from Saudi 
Arabia (15%), Iraq and Algeria (13% respectively). It does not 
establish a link with jnancing by the IMF. 
Activation and access: activated at the request of
the member country with a lending period of up
to 7 years and access up to 475% of member’s quota.
Conditionality and monitoring: without conditionality
for loans up to 100% of the quota and subject to a
program of reforms for higher limits.
Fondo 
Latinoamericano
de Reservas,
FLAR (1988)
Its antecedent is Fondo Andino de Reservas (FAR) of 1978; 
which is enlarged in 1988 to non-Andean Latin-American 
countries (members are: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). It has a share capital 
of 2,350 millions of dollars. It provides guarantees or credits 
to central banks to support balance of payments problems.
It does not establish a link with jnancing by the IMF.
Activation and access: it is activated at the member´s
request once it declares that the country’s situation
of insufjcient reserves, together with a report with the
measures to address the balance of payments
disequilibrium, including a commitment that such
measures will not affect imports from the rest of FLAR
members. Access of up to 250% of the countries’
subscribed capital (260% in the case of Bolivia and
Ecuador) for a period of 3 years.
Conditionality and monitoring: without conditionality.
Other European funds are the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), created in 2010 for the EU-27
(with € 60,000 million in resources); and Balance of Payments (BoP) Assistance (since 1988), for the EU-10 countries 
outside the euro (€ 50,000 million in resources). They are also co-jnanced by the IMF and/or in coordination with other 
multilateral institutions (World Bank, BERD).  They cover balance of payments crisis and are subject to strict conditionality.
European
Financial Stability
Fund  (EFSF)
(2010-2013)
European
Stabilization 
Mechanism 
(ESM)  (2012)
MAIN REGIONAL FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS (RFAs)  FIGURE 3.6 
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allow also a precautionary use of resources,23 which is also maintained in its successor, the 
ESM. Further, in September 2012, the ECB launches the OMTs (Outright Monetary Trans-
actions), which by design introduces a strong precautionary component by conveying the 
message of intervention in the secondary sovereign bond markets when necessary, albeit 
conditioned to a program. However, given the priority in Europe to fiscal consolidation as 
the first and foremost way of adjustment to the debt crisis, in practice, it is likely to be 
limited the extent to which countries may have access. 
Therefore, regional funds represent more a complement to the Fund’s crisis reso-
lution facilities (SBA and EFF programs), than to the new insurance facilities, the FCL and 
the PLL (except in Europe). It can be argued that the very existence of the regional fund is 
a safety net, because the markets will anticipate that in case of imbalances the country will 
be rescued. But this is a function that also meets the IMF. However, the emergence of re-
gional funds with the global financial crisis has triggered a debate about its future develop-
ment and its interaction with the IMF. 
The IMF has opted for a pragmatic approach to strengthen collaboration with re-
gional agreements (instead of confronting them as a threat), from the perspective of the 
comparative advantages of the various institutions. Regional funds have, in principle, a 
better approach to country-specific risk in a regional context, better possibilities to coor-
dinate economic policies and peer pressure in the region, or greater effectiveness in mo-
bilizing private sector resources. The Fund, in turn, can mobilize more resources and have 
greater expertise in programs, based on 60 years of history from the first SBA. Moreover, 
the IMF can avoid concentrating risk in the region through a global dispersion of lending 
resources via membership quotas (IMF, 2010g).
In practice, we are witnessing a learning by doing process in IMF-regional coop-
eration where the joint programs between the IMF and Europe are setting a precedent. 
Indeed, between 2009 and 2012, Europe and the Fund have developed a number of joint 
programs among which those of Greece (€ 110,000 million in May 2010, and a second 
program of € 130,000 million in March 2012), Ireland (December 2010, € 85,000 million), 
and Portugal (May 2011, € 78,000 million).24 The IMF has contributed to these programs 
with the funding of around € 57,500 million (30,000 the first Greece program, 27% of the 
total; and 27,500 in the second, 21%), € 22,500 million (26.5%) and € 26,000 million (33%) 
respectively, that is, the European Union has financed most of the package.
Interestingly, the European Union even with the resources and means to address 
these programs on its own, has chosen to rely on the collaboration with the IMF to tackle 
its sovereign debt crisis. The economic, political and institutional (European Union deci-
sion-making process) difficulties in the management of the crisis, with many changes 
throughout 2010 and 2012, have actually amplified its effects.25 In this sense, the situation 
in Europe reminds other crises and the four critical points on the resolution of financial 
crises pointed out by Agustín Carstens from the Latin American experience, remain very 
valid: (i) the technical complexity of the necessary responses; (ii) the “ugly” policy dilem-
mas, such as the one related to tax policy: fiscal consolidation versus economic recovery; 
(iii) the need to maintain the reform momentum after the crisis to further reduce the vulner-
abilities that still exist, and (iv) the role of the IMF, with its expertise in solving sovereign 
crises (Carstens, 2004). 
23  The EFSF has undergone several changes throughout 2011, including the ability to use leverage to operate in 
the debt markets, or to provide insurance to private investors in debt markets. 
24  Other programs are those of Latvia (€ 4,800 million), Hungary (€ 25,500 million) and Romania (€ 18,000 million) 
that are co-financed through by European Balance Payments Assistance (BoP Assistance).
25  For an analysis of the inadequacies of the European institutional architecture see Malo de Molina (2011). Marti 
(2011) analyzes the position of Germany, which has resulted in the reform of the economic governance of the 
euro area. 
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The IMF agreements with Europe are a first experience of co-financing major pro-
grams and joint design and monitoring of the program26 by the so called troika, the Euro-
pean Commission, the ECB and the IMF. In general, program coordination and conditional-
ity has worked well, although there have been some mismatches in the timing and the 
interest rates granted by the Fund and the European Union. In any case, the joint programs 
represent a loss of the Fund’s autonomy because they have to be coordinated with exter-
nal institutions. This is a question which has generated some debate on how it may affect 
the institution. 
In this sense, the G20 has set at the Cannes Summit of November 2011 a series 
of principles for the Fund’s collaboration with regional agreements, including the mainte-
nance of preferred creditor status of the IMF and the respect for the rules and procedures 
of each of the parties. Other principles go in the direction of exploiting synergies and avoid 
duplication, including aspects such as: dialogue, early cooperation, compatible condition-
ality or supervision articulated in terms of the comparative advantages of each institution.
It is interesting to note that in the European Union, unlike other regions, there is a 
surveillance scheme and an institutional framework (Commission, Council, Parliament and 
the European Central Bank) ensuring sound supervision, as necessary precondition to fi-
nancing a rescue strategy in order to avoid moral hazard problems.27 In fact, since 2010 
the surveillance has been strengthened by reinforcing the Stability and Growth Pact, by 
establishing new instruments such as the European Semester, which establishes a proce-
dure for the monitoring and coordination of economic and fiscal policies, or the pact for the 
euro, with commitments of fiscal policy and structural reforms by the country. This is a 
more strict surveillance framework than that of the IMF, therefore Europe offers greater as-
surances in relation with the moral hazard, because it has a close monitoring of the country 
before it reaches the crisis. The European Union also has the institutional strength to follow 
the programs.28
3.3 The multilateral net: the IMF
Between 2009 and 2010 the IMF has quickly contributed to the new global structure of 
GFSN through the creation of two insurance facilities: in March 2009 the Flexible Credit 
Line or FCL and, in August 2010, the Precautionary Credit Line or PCL. Subsequently, the 
FCL will be extended to eliminate its initial implicit ceiling of 1,000% of quota; and in No-
vember 2011, the PCL is amended to add a cash component, and renamed as Precaution-
ary and Liquidity Line, or PLL. These instruments come to extend the previous precaution-
ary framework determined primarily by the precautionary SBAs, which in March 2009 are 
also reformed to allow high access and labeled as High Access Precautionary Arrange-
ments (HAPAs). 
Chapter 5 discusses the specifics of the various facilities (see Figure 5.4). How-
ever it is interesting to note here the special nature of the FCL. This is an insurance facility 
against exogenous shocks for countries with strong fundamentals, which differ from tradi-
tional programs (including precautionary SBA), because they do not incorporate a conven-
tional program with ex post conditionality. The country can sign it if meets the qualification 
criteria that measure economic strength, and can then access automatically to hard cur-
rency resources in case of a liquidity problem from international contagion. The PLL is also 
26  In the past, the IMF had co-financing experiences, but it has usually retained leadership in the design and 
monitoring of the program. 
27  Moral hazard refers to the incentive by the country to maintain a less sustainable economic policy with the ex-
pectation that can be bailed-out. This is developed in the next section.  
28  In the case of Chiang Mai in 2011, China has established a Macroeconomic Research Office that could follow 
the possible programs, but has a small infrastructure. In fact, Chiang Mai relies in the IMF for the design and 
monitoring of programs and the resources are conditioned upon the country having an IMF program (except the 
initial tranche of 20%). 
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based on eligibility criteria, but unlike the FCL, it does require the country to develop a 
program, and includes conventional conditionality although focused and not applicable in 
the first disbursement. The HAPAs incorporate conditionality and conventional programs. 
Therefore, the FCL has a substitutive character with respect to the accumulation 
of reserves for precautionary reasons, and to bilateral swaps between central banks. In 
addition, the FCL in principle has no ceiling of resources, so that the country can ensure 
high volumes of capital flows, generally above swap agreements, and depending on the 
country, also to the level of reserves. In relation to the degree of automaticity of access to 
resources, reserves provide greater autonomy to the country, as they do not depend on a 
third party. To the extent that the FCL can be a good substitute for reserves, it would help 
limit the harmful effects of excessive accumulation. 
Since late 2010, three countries have signed an FCL, Mexico, Poland and Colom-
bia. Anecdotal evidence suggests that FCL has had a positive effect on underwriting 
emerging countries. Figure 3.7 shows the cost of credit default swaps (CDS) in emerging 
economies. This is a chart that has been frequently used by the IMF in presentations to 
argue the benefits of FCL.
The subscription of FCL lines correlates with falls on costs. However, this behavior 
may also be due to a general improvement in market valuation of emerging economies for its 
better relative performance, or by the improvement of the IMF overall policy lending frame-
work. In this sense, from November 2008 until late 2009, SBA loans to emerging economies 
are worth US$ 85,000 million. Further, in April 2009, the G20 London Summit tripled IMF’s 
lending resources, eliminating any doubts about the adequacy of its resources.
In 2011 the IMF has conducted its first assessment of the FCL and PCL (IMF, 
2011e). The analysis cannot be very conclusive because only two years have passed since 
its inception, and only four countries have requested them. Overall, the review indicates a 
positive impact on the perception of the risk of a crisis in recipient countries, but also in 
those countries perceived by the markets as FCL-alike countries. The review highlights the 
importance of maintaining qualitative assessment of eligibility criteria parameters, and of 
addressing their potential stigma problems through greater transparency, as well as using 
the conclusions of recently completed Article IV and FSAP reports.
When assessing the new insurance facilities of the Fund, it is also convenient to 
consider the inefficiencies that they can introduce into the international economic system. 
SOURCES: IRC-TFIMF (2010), data from Datastream, SERMI, IMF. 
CHANGES IN THE COST OF CDS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 2007-2010 FIGURE 3.7
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Traditionally, the IMF lending policy has been assessed through the prism of two types of 
market failures: (a) country moral hazard, and (b) stigma.
A  MORAL HAZARD
The literature on moral hazard associated with IMF programs is particularly extensive. The 
analysis has been focused on two main types of moral hazard:
— Country Moral Hazard: it refers to the country that endorses the precautionary 
facility (the insured), which would have incentive to apply less sustainable eco-
nomic policies because it is covered by the IMF. The traditional mechanism for 
reducing these incentives is the conditionality on the successive disburse-
ments, so that the country does not receive further installments of the loan if it 
does not meet the conditions of macroeconomic stability and economic policy 
identified in the program. The insurance facilities are not subject to the con-
ventional ex post conditionality, it is enough for the country to meet qualifica-
tion criteria (or ex ante conditionality). Unlike conventional programs the dis-
bursements cannot be subordinated to the fulfillment of the program criteria. 
— International Investor Moral Hazard: it refers to the investor incentives to re-
duce their requirements on the quality of economic policies of the country, 
because of the possibility of IMF bailout. In this case, the solution is that the 
private sector be involved in the adjustment programs of the country, contrib-
uting fresh parallel financing to the IMF and, if necessary, at a loss. In this area 
fall instruments such as the IMF’s LIA policy29 (which requires good faith nego-
tiation with the private sector) or the Vienna Initiative, creating a forum for dia-
logue between multilateral institutions and private creditors to coordinate joint 
funding strategies. In the case of the insurance function, the same type of 
moral hazard is at play, and can be accentuated given the particularly high ac-
cess offered. 
— A third kind of moral hazard would be the one associated with IMF’s own be-
havior in its dual role in surveillance and as lender. This raises a potential prob-
lem of incentives in the surveillance policy in the sense of making an assess-
ment based on its interests as a lender. In this case, the risk can be minimized 
through mechanisms such as the separation between the surveillance and 
lending functions (Chinese walls), external evaluation of the programs of the 
Fund, or the temporal limitation of the Fund’s programs. 
Dreher (2004) performed a comprehensive analysis of the empirical literature and 
the evidence is not conclusive for any type of moral hazard. Most empirical studies on 
moral hazard try to observe the effects of IMF financing using various explanatory varia-
bles such as spreads on government bonds of the country, the maturity structure of loans 
or the benefits of financial sector stocks, all of them associated primarily to the investor 
moral hazard, or using the public deficit and the policy direction as a proxy of country 
moral hazard.
Regarding the private investors moral hazard, Dreher notes that, although for 
most of the explanatory variables, the studies conclude that IMF programs induce moral 
hazard in the investor, the results depend on the sample and are also inconclusive when 
the explanatory variable are the spreads on bonds (which are also the most numerous type 
of study). On the other hand, he notes that most of the studies have endogeneity problems 
29  LiA: lending into arrears. For a detailed analysis of the LiA policy, see Erce, Díaz-Cassou and Vazquez (2008), 
Erce and Diaz-Cassou (2010), and Valle (2005).
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because the private investor and country moral hazards may act in the opposite direction 
on the spreads of the country, so that both effects may be canceled.30
Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004) extend on the endogeneity argument of most of the 
literature on moral hazard, and propose a different approach: the analysis of the conditions 
that must be met in order to avoid moral hazard associated to Fund programs. They argue 
that the traditional mistake of research is focusing on the symptoms rather than the causes of 
moral hazard. The typical analysis examines whether the country receiving an IMF loan, ex-
periences or not an increase in capital flows and/or a reduction in the risk premium on loans, 
compared to that obtained in the absence of a Fund program. But those are precisely the 
effects sought by IMF programs under its catalytic role, increasing flows and falling rates. 
Therefore, the conventional literature cannot determine whether the effects of the IMF are a 
symptom of moral hazard, or simply an indication that the Fund is being efficient. The same 
is true of moral hazard country studies, looking at whether monetary or fiscal policies are 
more expansive after receiving a Fund program. Again, that is the goal of the IMF, allowing 
greater macroeconomic policy space to the country facing a balance of payments crisis.
To study the moral hazard Jeanne and Zettelmeyer proposed that is necessary to 
analyze whether the IMF program results in a cost to third parties either in creditor coun-
tries or in the debtor country and suggest what they call the “Mussa theorem”:31 
Mussa Theorem (Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2004): Under assumptions A1 and A2, 
the anticipation of IMF crisis lending increases the volume of capital flows to 
emerging market countries and reduces the cost of borrowing for these countries. 
In addition, the anticipation of crisis lending may decrease the domestic efforts to 
avoid a crisis. However, the IMF does not generate moral hazard stricto sensu. The 
expectation of IMF lending unambiguously increases the welfare of recipient coun-
tries at no cost to the rest of the world.
—  Assumption 1. The emerging market [host] country is run by benevolent policy-
maker who chooses k [capital] so as to maximize the welfare of the representa-
tive resident 
—  Assumption 2. The IMF lends at the actuarially fair interest rate.
In this way, the analysis moves now to the design of Fund programs, to be carried 
out on terms and under guarantees (compliance) such that reflect the risks assumed by the 
Fund. In the case of assumption 2, the focus will be to determine whether the Fund loans 
incorporate or not a subsidy, thereby incurring a cost in terms of welfare to the creditor 
countries. For this, it is important to analyze whether IMF rates are actuarially fair, i.e. the 
requirement of no moral hazard is that IMF interest rates are sufficiently high to cover the 
repayment risk assumed by the Fund, which may be – and in fact usually is – lower than 
the risk assumed by the private lender, precisely because the Fund positively affects the 
solvency of the country through the program and the conditionality imposed.32 
Therefore, the test for the IMF is to determine if the program rates are lower than 
the yield that it would get investing without risk, and whether or not, there are default prob-
lems in the programs. In this regard, they note that between 1973 and 2003, the rates 
charged to emerging economies, are equivalent to the ones the Fund would have received 
30  The likelihood to receive resources from the Fund, would induce on the one hand, a reduction of government 
bond spreads by way of private investor moral hazard, and on the other, an increase in spreads, by way of 
country moral hazard, to the extent that it would reduce the quality of the macroeconomic policies. Therefore, 
the total effect on the spread is indeterminate.
31  Mussa was director of the IMF research department between 1991 and 2001.
32  IMF interest rates can not be compared with those faced by the country in the markets (conventional literature 
approach), because the IMF does not assume the same risk as private creditors. 
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for loans to advanced economies in the same amounts and the same time periods.33 Re-
garding defaults, there have been only a few cases of late payment, in which case there is 
also a policy that tightens loan terms. It should be noted that the IMF has the advantage of 
having preferred creditor status (PCS) against any other debt. 
For insurance facilities, the same structure than the SBA yields have been applied 
(increasing rates depending on the quota limit). But when considering these facilities, we 
must keep in mind their volume (loans have been granted of up to 1,500 percent of quota), 
without conditionality and therefore a greater risk of default. So far the closest proxies are 
the large capital account loans in the second half of the 1990s. The programs with Argen-
tina, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey exceed 600% of quota (1,900 in the case of South 
Korea) all have been repaid on time. 
In the case of Assumption 1, it is necessary that the lender country government acts 
taking into account long-term interests of its citizens. The problem here is to determine whether 
the combined effect of the policies before and after Fund loans result in a redistribution effect 
on household incomes that affect the average citizen, in benefit of a small elite. However, this is 
an underdeveloped area in the literature, with some developments focused on the redistributive 
effects of conditionality.34 In the case the insurance facilities it would be relevant to analyze to 
what extent the guarantee provided by the IMF induces changes in economic policy with redis-
tributive effects. However, without ex post conditionality, these effects are limited.
B  THE SIGNALING FUNCTION: STIGMA35
The problem of stigma is part of the broader signaling role of the IMF. On the Fund’s lend-
ing policy, merely granting an SBA loan for example, involves several types of signaling 
effects that may work in opposite directions. It indicates that the country has problems, 
but also access to more resources, and that it is committed to stabilizing its economy 
through a program supported by the IMF.
For insurance facilities of the PLL or FCL type, the objective is to signal that the 
country has a strong economy but, in the context of a systemic crisis, may be subject to an 
exogenous shock. Now this goal poses significant challenges, including aspects such as: the 
need to differentiate these facilities from SBA conventional loans, the definition of the divide 
between FCL and PLL countries, or the need to safeguard the legitimacy of the IMF when 
granting insurance (because it is giving an implicit endorsement of the country’s policies).
As seen previously, these challenges were determinant in the non-use and extinc-
tion of the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), which were in force from 1999 to 2003. The CCL 
failed, among other reasons, because of the risk that an IMF program were interpreted as 
weakness rather than strength, and because of the negative signal that would introduce 
ending a CCL, or worse, to lose eligibility to it (IMF, 2009a).36 
The IMF (IMF, 2004c) distinguishes seven types of effects/issues to take into ac-
count regarding the Fund signaling. Figure 3.8 redefines and reclassifies these effects into 
four categories, focusing on the implications for a country of subscribing a program. In the 
design of any IMF policy (surveillance or lending), the IMF tries to find a balance between 
these signaling effects and the conflicts that arise among them. 
These same categories apply to insurance facilities, for which the objective is: (i) 
to support the country that has a solid foundation without interfering in national politics 
33  They estimate that there is a spread of 400 basis points in the loans to low-income countries. But in this case, the 
loans are concessional incorporating elements of debt relief financed by contributions from member countries.
34  Jeanne and Zettelmeyer indicate the works of Vreeland (2003).
35  The Webster’s dictionary defines it as, stigma: a mark of disgrace or infamy; a stain or reproach as on one’s 
reputation (Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1996).
36  Serrano and Soler (2005) propose a model in which signaling is linked to the characteristics of a particular 
country and its liquidity needs.
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(category of stigma); but (ii) without constituting an absolute guarantee to markets (seal of 
approval). (iii) Facilities must find, in addition, its own niche on the grid of the Fund’s fa-
cilities (standard SBA); and (iv) differentiated from each other (simpler signal, stigma). On 
the other hand, (v) the Fund should not jeopardize the guarantee it provides to the mar-
kets, which will value insurance facilities taking into account the Fund’s incentives when 
designing and granting them (positive and negative signals). 
The signaling-moral hazard dichotomy
Along with the dichotomies between the various signals produced by the IMF programs, 
there is also one between signaling and moral hazard. A clear example is the trade-off that 
occurs between stigma and country moral hazard through the conditionality: 
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on IMF 2004c.
Signal Problems that arise How does it affect precautionary facilities?
Stigma Economic crisis. The authorization of a program signals 
that the country has an economic problem, but also that 
it has access to more resources and is involved with the 
stabilization of its economy though a program 
guaranteed by the IMF.
The precautionary facilities FCL or PLL have to be able 
to establish their own signal: the country, which 
subscribes it, has a solid economy, although in a context 
of systemic, it may be subject to an exogenous shock by 
contagion.
Loss of autonomy and political stigma. The risk that 
the program with the IMF is identijed as interference in 
the country’s political economy and loss of ownership in 
the design of its own policy.
Problem which is minimized in precautionary programs 
as long as ex post conditionality is not added. 
The different IMF facilities have to differentiate from the 
standard par excellence of the IMF, which is determined 
by the SBA. New facilities have the risk of being 
interpreted as equivalents or introducing distrust if it is 
considered they are not enough (as it happened to 
CCL)
New precautionary facilities have to signal that: (i) they 
hold on a higher quality standard than the SBA, (ii) their 
purpose is precautionary facility and they are not a crisis 
resolution facility.
The trade of between negative and positive signals. 
The IMF tries to avoid giving negative signals about a 
country to prevent negative consequences they may 
have on international capital kows in the country; and 
not to undermine the candid dialogue with the 
authorities. On the other hand, as a public institution,  
the IMF could be viewed as having an incentive to send 
positive signals among its members. This latter risk is 
mitigated in the case of a loan to the country, because 
the IMF putting its money where its mouth is (albeit with 
a preferred creditor status).
The mistakes in predicting the global jnancial crisis has 
weighted the balance in favor of an IMF more ready to 
warn ageist the risks of its members’ countries. 
There is a negative signal problem that appears in the 
dividing line between the FCL and the PLL, and between 
the PLL and the HAPA. If they are viewed as a sort of 
major, national and minor league facilities; not achieving, 
or losing the qualijBation for the FCL, there is a risk of 
negative signal by exclusion, i.e., rating the country as a 
secondary league player.
On the other hand, the risk of positive signal appears if 
the IMF is perceived to have an incentive to maintain the 
positive qualijcation entailed by the FCL, much more 
given that it does not necessarily detract resources from 
the Fund (unless they are activated). Nonetheless, this 
risk is mitigated because even if they do not detract 
resources, the Fund has to set apart the resources 
committed which detract from them being used for other 
loans and decreasing its forward commitment capacity 
(FCC). 
Seal of approval. When approving a program with a 
country, the IMF aims at signaling to the markets that it 
approves the country´s economic policy contained in a 
program. But in parallel, this does not mean that the 
program is a seal of approval or bulletproof guarantee 
that the country will not have problems, nor as an on/off 
signal or rating about the country. The markets are still 
to assume their own risks depending on their own 
investment strategies. 
It is a particularly pronounced problem in the 
precautionary facilities. The FCL entails a high degree of 
seal of approval on the country´s fundamentals and 
macroeconomic policies (dejne by the ex ante 
qualijBation criteria), which are judged to deserve the 
conjdence/insurance by the IMF.   
SimplijBation of the signal Risk of converting the IMF program into on/off signals on 
the economy replacing a more multidimensional 
evaluation entailed in the program or in the surveillance 
exercise. 
The precautionary facilities have a strict component of 
simplijBation based on the compliance or not of an ex 
ante requirement. 
Positive and negative signals 
The standard of the SBA
PRECAUTIONARY FACILITIES AND SIGNALING FIGURE 3.8 
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— On the one hand, the country that subscribes the precautionary facility has 
an incentive to apply a less sustainable economic policy because it is cov-
ered by the IMF (moral hazard). Conditionality is the traditional mechanism 
to correct this behavior, subjecting disbursements to the good performance 
of the insured. In the insurance facilities, the absence of conventional 
ex post conditionality does not allow to delay the disbursement, linking it to 
whether the country meets the criteria,37 thus incurring in greater moral 
hazard.
— On the other hand, the signing of a program itself may be interpreted as signal-
ing that the country has an economic problem (stigma) and the higher the re-
quirements to a country in terms of compliance, the greater stigma.
Therefore, there is a trade-off: with increasing standards and selective application of 
conditionality to reduce moral hazard problems; the stigma for the country is heightened and 
vice-versa (lower standards and more universal compliance, greater moral hazard). Then de-
sign of the various precautionary facilities will have to take into account this trade-off. 
In addition to managing these dichotomies, the IMF should determine what kind 
of role it wants to play in the GFSN. Increased conditionality can drive demand away from 
the Fund’s precautionary facilities and preference for self-insurance through reserves, re-
ducing the substitutive character of the Fund facilities. 
All these issues are addressed in the design of the main components of the pro-
grams: activation; access limits (quantitative and temporal); conditionality (eligibility criteria, 
in the case of insurance facilities); and transparency, to identify clearly the objectives and 
characteristics of each facility. The design, however, is restricted by the inability to reach a 
first best solution. The goal is to minimize the trade-off between different market failures 
and, ultimately, it will require a judgment call on the importance to be given to each of them.
Chapter 5 proposes approaching the design features of the Fund’s facilities based 
on three principles: adequacy, sustainability and predictability. It is interesting to note here 
that insurance facilities rely on the following elements:
— To contain moral hazard: close monitoring of countries as a condition for the 
granting of the line (one of the eligibility criteria of the FCL and the PLL re-
quires integrity, quality and transparency of financial information) and a strict 
application of eligibility criteria, and monitoring (annual in FCL and semi- 
annual in the PLL).
— To avoid the problems of stigma, a transparent application of the facilities. 
The problems of stigma have been mitigated thanks to the granting of FCLs 
to Colombia, Mexico, and Poland (with an appropriate geographical balance) 
since 2009. They have not been used, and they have clearly distanced them-
selves from the many SBA programs granted in 2009 and 2010 to countries in 
crisis. However problems arise from lack of clarity in the distinction between 
FCL-PLL-HAPAs and the question remains whether the FCL will resist stigma 
issues in a non-crisis context (with less ongoing SBAs from which to be dis-
tinguished). 
3.4 The IMF’s comparative advantages as an insurer 
In the previous sections we have analyzed the characteristics of different insurance 
sources against BoP exogenous shocks. It is of interest to compare what is the relative 
role the IMF can play through its new facilities (FCL, PLL). Figure 3.9 summarizes the 
37  However the March 2009 reform allows ample front-loading of resources provided by the Fund.
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main advantages and disadvantages of the different insurance sources against exoge-
nous shocks, and Figure 3.10 establishes an ordinal comparison based on five criteria: 
(i) degree of insufficiency of resources, that is whether or not the specific GFSN might 
not deliver the necessary resources; (ii) uncertainty, or degree of availability of the 
source to the country; (iii) stigma, or a negative interpretation of the facility by the mar-
kets; (iv) country and investor moral hazard, or degree to which markets discount the 
rescue, and (v) inefficiency to the IMS, or to what extent the specific GFSN affects 
global imbalances. The closer the pentagon to the center, the better performance of the 
source/GFSN.
In general, FCL and PLL have three major advantages (i, ii, iii) and two major draw-
backs (iv, v) over all other sources: 
(i) Increased access to resources for most countries (except the large accumu-
lators of reserves): the PLL allows up to 1,000% of quota, and the FCL un-
capped access. As an example, the resources provided by the FCLs for 
Mexico (72,000 million, 1,500% of its quota) and Poland (29,000, 1,400%), 
exceeded the Fed’s swap to Mexico (30,000 million), and represented re-
spectively 60% and 30% of their reserves. In addition, the swaps access has 
more time limitations (3 to 6 months, although renewable) compared with the 
2 years of FCL and PLL. Regional agreements are currently equipped with 
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
Resources Advantages Drawbacks
Self-insurance: accumulation  
of reserves 
Autonomy 
No conditionality 
Minimum stigma and moral hazard 
Excessive accumulation risks nurturing IMS imbalances 
Risk of domestic inefjciencies 
Possible insufjcient resources 
Bilateral SWAPS Potential access to large volume of resources 
Low stigma and moral hazard (based on constructive 
ambiguity) 
Uncertainty over quantity and will to trigger by 
counterparty 
Risk of insufjcient resources
Regional Financial Arrangements 
(RFAs)
Proximity to country risk and regional risk-pooling
Potential for larger decision making power by country 
Risk of insufjcient resources, stigma and moral hazard 
Not all RFAs include precautionary facilities
Multilateral insurance provided 
by the IMF 
Minimum inefjciencies to the IMS Large resources and 
larger certainty on its triggering
Stigma and moral hazard 
Time uncertainty (how will precautionary facilities evolve?)  
COMPARING GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS FIGURE 3.9 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF IMF INSURANCE FIGURE 3.10
Uncertainty 
Stigma 
Moral hazard  MinimumZDJHLQHIĺFLHQF\ 
InVXIĺFLHnt resources 
 RESERVES  BILATERAL SWAPS 
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few resources except the European ESM, which however has not being used 
for precautionary purposes.38 
(ii) Greater certainty: the country can rely on IMF resources if it meets the 
qualification criteria, while bilateral swaps have greater uncertainty (de-
pendent on the counterparty), and regional agreements have a less devel-
oped insurance framework and lower resources. The certainty of the IMF 
depends on the adequacy of its resources, underpinned with a tripling 
decided at the G20 Summit in London in 2009; later reinforced with the 
duplication of quotas adopted in the November 2010 Summit in Seoul; 
and the additional temporary resources of around US$ 460,000 million 
decided in 2012 at Los Cabos Summit. The reserves do give to the coun-
try greater autonomy and certainty of provision than the facilities of the 
Fund.
(iii) Lower global inefficiency: especially in relation to excessive reserve ac-
cumulation and its negative effects on the sustainability of global imbal-
ances. Regional agreements would also suppose relative inefficiency re-
spect to FCL, to the extent that the regional funds accumulate excess 
reserves to cover its partners. Additionally, the IMF allows for global diver-
sification of risk assumed by the full membership of countries (compared 
to a regional one). 
(iv) Greater stigma: because of the negative interpretation by the market of the 
execution of a program with the Fund. This negative stigma is shared with 
regional agreements, and would be greater in the case of the PLL than in the 
FCL, since the eligibility criteria of the second are stricter. Reserves and 
swaps involve less stigma. 
(v) Greater country and investor moral hazard: lesser economic policy disci-
pline and greater assumption of risk by the investor to the extent that it is 
presumed an IMF bailout. This risk is also shared with regional agreements 
and, in principle, would be greater in the case of the PLL, considering that 
qualification criteria are less strict than the FCL (and thus, the distance be-
tween the applied policies and the risky ones are lower). The accumulation 
of reserves and swap incorporate less moral hazard, in the first case be-
cause the country uses its own resources, and, in the second, by being of a 
temporary character. 
In short, the FCL and PLL provide an insurance framework that complements the 
accumulation of reserves, bilateral agreements (swaps), and regional safety nets. They al-
low diversifying the risk of systemic crises through an institution with a global presence, 
providing a high level of resources in the medium term (at least two years and renewable), 
and limiting the inefficiencies of excessive reserve accumulation. 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that FCL and PLL can play a substitute role for 
reserve accumulation. Precautionary reserve accumulation in emerging countries al-
lows for an autonomy in the management of risk, that has no parallel on IMF facilities. 
Additionally, the Fund does not guarantee long-term certainty that depends on the re-
newal of the FCL or PLL (every two years). Furthermore, FCL and PLL are not substi-
tutes for reserve accumulation under mercantilist reasons (probably dominant in large 
accumulators). 
38  The OMTs (Outright Monetary Transactions) launched by the ECB in September 2012 acts as a very strong 
precautionary instrument, as it conveys the message of intervention in the secondary sovereign bond markets 
when necessary, albeit conditioned to a program.
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For now, the FCL has shown some effectiveness in countries with median reserve 
levels, such as Mexico and Poland. The future challenge is twofold: (i) reduce moral hazard 
and stigma problems of the FCL and the PLL, which depends on a strict application and 
monitoring of the eligibility criteria; and (ii) to give them some stability over time, facilitating 
its renewal, to ensure that the country may count on them as close substitute to precau-
tionary reserves (Chapter 5 develops this possibility). 
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The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which 
ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our 
minds (John Maynard Keynes, 1936, preface).
The representation of countries in the IMF should be determined by its relative economic 
weight in the global economy. However, in practice, due to historical inertia, the quotas 
assigned to the countries have not been adapted over time, so that the economies with 
higher growth over the last 30 years have seen a growing under-representation. The result 
has been that the IMF has remained under the direction of the large advanced economies 
of the G7.
From the late 1990s, in a context when the IMF was criticized for its rigidity in 
handling the Asian crisis, emerging countries begin to question the usefulness of the IMF 
to meet their national interests, and try to seek regional alternatives to cover the Fund’s 
functions. There is a certain disconnection with the IMF where they lack weight in the deci-
sion making. Increasingly at the beginning of the 21st century, emerging countries question 
the legitimacy of the IMF, its relevance as rescue institution – in 2005 Brazil and Argentina 
paid off their debts to the IMF –, or the asymmetry of its surveillance, more benevolent 
towards advanced economies. 
In the midst of this debate, as of 2006, the IMF began a profound reform in its 
governance, accelerated from 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. This reform 
– still underway – involves historical changes in quotas and country representation, after 
nearly 60 years of maintaining the status quo. The result is an institution with a greater bal-
ance between emerging and advanced economies in decision making. 
This chapter analyzes the changes in IMF governance. To understand the implica-
tions of these changes it is of interest to consider a dual decision-making structure of the 
Fund (Figure 4.1): the formal structure (blue squares) and the informal one (red circles), and 
the interrelations between them. 
Decision making is formally done through two main interacting structures. On the 
one hand, the Executive Board, the body where the member countries are represented, 
and where all the Fund policies must be approved. On the other hand, the management 
and staff, which are responsible for developing the Fund’s policies and monitoring its pro-
grams, which then must be endorsed by the Board. The management and staff have the 
power of initiative, they prepare the reference documents for Board discussion. The staff 
consists of about 2,400 independent international officers directed in their daily activities 
by the management, which is elected by the Board.
In parallel, there is an informal structure of influence on the policies, which are 
articulated either bilaterally, or via groups of countries such as different Gs configurations 
or the EU and BRIC coordinated positions. In the past, the main influence came from the 
G7 (and especially the US), but from 2008 it has largely been replaced by the G20. An-
other important aspect of the informal structure is the ideological and academic back-
ground of staff and management, given its high capacity to orientate the policies of the IMF 
with its power of initiative. 
Three main schools of the international relations theory may be distinguished to 
explain decision making in the Fund: (i) realism: decision making is articulated by the mem-
ber countries. In particular, the US (first) and the G7 have led the Fund destinations. (ii) 
Bureaucratic theories: it is the independent staff through technical and intellectual mastery 
over the institution, which determines the Fund’s policies guided by self-interest. (iii) Theories 
4 Governance: emergence of the emerging countries
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of delegation, based on principal-agent models, under which the countries (the principal) 
delegate power in the international organization and its staff (the agent), which enjoys wide 
latitude to take decisions. However, the principal maintains control mechanisms and the abil-
ity to change the direction of the policies of the Fund at a particular time (Momani, 2008). 
We follow here this third approach of the agency theory, considering it the closest 
to the IMF’s reality. In recent years, the IMF staff and management have designed the re-
forms, but these would have not been possible without the encouragement and guidance 
of the G20. In the next sections we analyze the most significant changes that have oc-
curred in the informal structure (4.1), mainly the change to the G20 as the new principal 
and the new institutional culture of the agent (management and staff); and in the formal 
structure, primarily changes in the (4.2) quotas and the (4.3) Executive Board.
4.1 Changes in the informal decision making structure
A A NEW PRINCIPAL: FROM THE G7 TO THE G20 
Traditionally, the IMF has been an institution guided by the strategic orientation of the G7 
and with a strong Anglo-Saxon influence both, because the high influence of the US Treas-
ury (and also that of the UK); and because of the institutional culture of the staff itself with 
an overwhelming majority of officers trained in American and British universities.
The US historical influence on the Fund’s policies has been analyzed by different 
authors. Mack (2009) reviews the literature finding a majority of authors who are dedicated 
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on Martinez-Diaz (2008). 
THE IMF DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE FIGURE 4.1
Independent staff   
(international ofðcials) 
International Monetary and Financial 
Committee 
(debate about reconverting into Council) 
Board of  Governors 
Management 
   -  Quotas: new formula, quota duplication.   
      Correction of historic misalignment between  
      efective and calculated quota; and the increase     
      in weight of emerging and developing countries. 
 
   - Board: transfer of two Eropean chairs.  
G 20  
(Ad hoc Working 
Groups about  IMF 
issues) 
Change in formal 
decision-making  
structure 
Delegates functions 
Executive Board 
Political orientation 
(de facto replaced by G20)  
Political guidelines 
Changes in informal decision-making 
structure 
Formal decision-making 
Heads the staff 
Consults 
Chairs the Board 
Advice 
Institutional culture: 
- Change of paradigm: from the 
  Washington consensus towards 
  new keynesian economics 
- Footprint of the Managing Director 
- External consultants 
  Representation of  
national authorities 
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to corroborate US power. In this group Hudson (2003), provides a historical analysis of 
USA imperialism in the twentieth century, including numerous examples to substantiate 
the claim that the IMF has been from the beginning a tool for the economic and strategic 
interests of the US. At the other end, Kenen (1989) takes a more multipolar approach in 
which the IMF tries to balance different interests besides those of the US. In a complex 
structure like the IMF different actors (countries, staff, and management) combine interests 
and it would be very simplistic to limit the Fund targets only to the US interests. In fact, 
from the mid-1970s, probably we can speak more of G7 than of US influence. In any case, 
there is general consensus, or at least a general perception that the US and the G7 have 
been major players in the strategic direction of the Fund.1
Precisely from this perception, in the late 1990s and linked to the IMF role in the 
Asian crisis, a debate opened on what came to be labeled as a New International Financial 
Architecture (NIFA).2 One of the elements in the NIFA was the reform of the governance of 
international institutions asking for greater weight of emerging economies. The Managing 
Director of the Fund at the time, Michel Camdessus (1998), proposed G8 meetings with 
heads of state and government of the countries with an Executive Director at the IMF. In 
this line, the G20 would be created in 1999, but only at the level of finance ministers and 
central bank governors. It was not until 2008, as a result of the global financial crisis, when 
the G20 summits were established at the highest political level with the heads of state and 
government. 
The perception of an IMF disconnected from the interests of emerging economies 
was accentuated by the mistakes in the management of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. 
In this regard, the report of the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (IEO) on the man-
agement of the crisis in South Korea, Brazil and Indonesia, revealed the many mistakes 
made by the Fund. There was excessive rigidity in the programs with the traditional recipes 
of rapid fiscal adjustment and high structural conditionality – which are reasonable in the 
long term, but not strictly necessary to remedy the short term needs of the crisis –  at a time 
when the key objective should have been regain market confidence. 
The IMF also made  errors of communication and transparency about the rational-
ity of the programs, and insufficient ownership by the authorities, which exacerbated the 
crisis of credibility (IEO, 2003). The result was a worsening of the crisis in many countries, 
moreover, the IMF has been in part made responsible of the outbreak of the crisis for their 
support to a premature liberalization of the capital flows without sufficient financial regula-
tion in Asian countries,  resulting in massive entries of short-term capital that were at the 
root of the crisis (Stiglitz, 2002). 
The dissatisfaction with the programs installed in Asian countries an increased 
reticence towards the IMF both among its political class and the public opinion, which still 
stands today. The result is that these countries cooled their relations with the Fund and 
began to seek alternative solutions to ensure against possible future crises, mainly through 
reserve accumulation or the activation of bilateral and regional agreements such as the 
Chiang Mai Initiative.
The aversion to the IMF extends in the early 21st century to Latin America, in this 
case, accentuated after the errors in managing the Argentina crisis in 2001. In the years before 
the crisis, the IMF erred in its assessment of the convertibility plan peso-dollar at parity, main-
taining its support when it was no longer sustainable, and also failed in monitoring the Argen-
1  Bradford (2009) emphasizes the importance of informal channels of US and European influence in the IMF, as a 
model for emerging economies if they want to settle their weight in the institution. 
2  The term International Financial Architecture was settled in 1998 by the then US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin 
(1998). For a discussion of the reform of the international financial architecture in historical perspective see 
Granell (2010). In a general analysis of the progress in the NIFA between 1998 y 2003, Casas et al. (2004), con-
clude that results had been very modest.
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tine fiscal objectives that ended in an unsustainable debt spiral (IEO, 2004). Argentina finally 
left the IMF program and managed a debt restructuring with debt haircuts of up to 75%, 
without having managed to recover normal access to international markets a decade later.
The Latin American countries also responded by distancing themselves from their 
relations with the IMF. In December 2005, Brazil and Argentina decided to cancel their 
debts to the IMF totaling US$ 15,500 and 9,600 million, respectively, anticipating pay-
ments due in 2007 and 2008. There were also attempts to create regional funds such as 
the Banco del Sur initiative led by Venezuela, still to come to fruition in 2013.
By 2005, the Fund is in a state of alienation from emerging economies, with reduced 
financial presence and the volume of loans at historic lows (just SDR 10,000 million in 2007). 
There was then a discussion on the loss of relevance of the IMF, reflected in the lack of lever-
age on emerging economies and low incidence in the surveillance of advanced countries. As 
we shall see in the next section, in this context, Rodrigo de Rato, former Managing Director, 
drives a medium-term strategy to give a greater role to emerging countries in the institution.
This momentum will increase from 2008 with the November G20 Summit,  mark-
ing the transition towards a New International Economic Order with the G20 as a new 
global forum for coordination of macroeconomic policies. Chapter 1 addresses the central 
role of the G20 in the NIEO, which as we saw responds to a new economic reality in which 
emerging countries are the new engine of global growth, and will surpass the advanced 
countries weight in world GDP.
Since 2009, the G20 has been determinant in the Fund’s strategic direction. It has 
the capacity to impose decisions on the Board because it represents chairs with a voting 
power of 83.6% (very close to the 85% qualified majority required for major decisions in 
the IMF). Moreover, from 2010 the G20 has created specific working groups in which re-
forms have been designed and later approved by the IMF. Two examples of the preponder-
ant role of the G20 have been: the tripling of resources determined in the London Summit 
and the governance reform (increase of 100% in quotas and Board reform) adopted by the 
G20 Ministers and Governors in October 2010 in Seoul. These two decisions were taken 
first by the G20 and then endorsed by the IMF Board. 
An additional element in this change has to do with the nationality of the Managing 
Director. Reflecting the dominance of the G7 on the IMF, traditionally, the heads of the IMF 
and World Bank were to be occupied by a European and an American national respec-
tively. This informal agreement is being revised so that the choice be based on the candi-
date’s suitability regardless of nationality. The succession of Dominique Strauss-Kahn in 
2011 was a first opportunity to test this type of approach. For the first time there has been 
an emerging country candidate, the Mexican Agustin Carstens, with a curriculum for the 
position very difficult to improve.3 In the end, the Europeans imposed their majority vote 
naming the French Christine Lagarde. Probably, the transition to the G20 as the principal 
will only be completed when an emergent country national leads the IMF.
The Fund has improved the balance in the management. In May 2010, Zhu Min, 
former deputy governor of China’s central bank, was appointed as special advisor to the 
management and later, in July 2011, deputy Managing Director. This appointment is a 
recognition of the role to be played by China in the IMF and brings to two the number of 
Deputy Managing Directors of emerging countries.4 
3  Agustin Carstens held positions as deputy Managing Director and Executive Director at the Fund, as well as Fi-
nance Minister and Governor of the Bank of Mexico. 
4  Previously, management was composed by a European, an American, a Japanese and a representative from an 
emerging country.  IMF management consists of the Managing Director, Christine Lagarde (French), a first dep-
uty managing director, David Lipton (American) and three deputies: Naoyuki Shinohara (Japanese), Min Zhu 
(Chinese) and Nemat Shafik (Egyptian-British, occupying a position that traditionally had taken a Latin American).
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B  INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: FROM THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, TOWARDS NEW KEYNESIAN 
ECONOMICS?
IMF policies are largely determined by management and staff. The various Managing Di-
rectors have marked its seal on the Fund, leading major institutional changes. It was for 
example the case of Michel Camdessus (1987-2000), who played a central role in boosting 
the Fund’s policies aimed at low income countries, or Rodrigo de Rato (2004-2007) with 
the IMF’s Medium Term Strategy to restore institutional legitimacy.5 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn began his tenure in the Fund in November 2007, and his 
term was marked by the institutional response to the global financial crisis. During these years 
the Fund has extensively revised its surveillance policy, strengthening multilateral financial 
surveillance (including support for more regulation) and boosting the overall coordination of 
macroeconomic policies; and it has experienced a turning point in its lending policies, marked 
by the easing of conditionality and a substantial increase in access limits. Notwithstanding 
the risk of simplification, Strauss-Kahn left a legacy of an IMF surveillance more adapted to 
the reality of economic globalization; a more flexible lending policy; and a transition in policy 
prescriptions from a neoclassical to a New Keynesian economics approach. 
The debate on the role of the IMF and its policy recommendations is not new and 
is part of the general debate between Keynesian and neoclassical economics. In the con-
text of the IMF’s intervention before the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s in Latin America, 
Smith (1984) described it in terms of the debate between advocates of market versus 
advocates of government intervention justified by market failures, that was answered by 
Solomon (1983). Both play a very similar debate to the current one. Smith questioned any 
IMF intervention, noting that with flexible exchange rates, they would reflect any exoge-
nous shock and create incentives in each country to adjust domestic policies. Solomon 
challenged arguing that the Latin American crisis of the 1980s did not originate in the re-
gion, but was the result of the recession and high interest rates in international markets. 
That was the case of Brazil which experienced export declines of 20% between 1980 and 
1982, after growing at 10% rates for a decade. IMF loans provided temporary cushion to 
stop a deflationary exogenous shock. 
This debate eventually was synthesized in what has become to be known as the 
«Washington Consensus», expression coined by Williamson (1990)6, that has led to much 
confusion because, as Williamson himself pointed out (2004), it seems to refer to the poli-
cies applied in the IMF and World Bank to developing countries. In practice, this is a label 
to identify the set of policies considered necessary for growth. The recommendations are 
not always the same,7 although the core policies that have focused academic analysis 
were: fiscal and monetary stabilization, liberalization of prices and interest rates, liberaliza-
tion of trade and capital flows, and privatization. 
As noted by Boughton (2004), the consensus dominates IMF policy in the 1990s 
and soaks the type of recommendations made by the Fund both officially and in the insti-
tutional culture of most of the staff, with important nuances depending on the specificities 
of each country. Boughton quotes the words of Stanley Fischer, the IMF’s First Managing 
5  The IMF’s Medium Term Strategy launched in September 2005, involved a comprehensive review of all policies 
including IMF surveillance and lending policies, as well as budgetary and governance questions. See Rato (2006) 
on the main elements and progress of the reform. 
6  Williamson first used the term in the Conference of the Institute for International Economics in Latin America in 
1989, and published it a year later (Williamson, 1990).
7  Williamson (1990) summarizes it in 10 policies to be applied in Latin America: fiscal discipline; reorientation of 
spending from subsidies to growth promoting social expenditures (primary health, education and infrastructure); 
tax reform (broader tax base and moderate marginal rates); positive and moderate real interest rates (determined 
by the market); competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization and elimination of quantitative barriers (protec-
tion via uniform tariffs); liberalization of capital inflows; privatization of public enterprises; market deregulation 
(except for consumer protection or safety reasons), and legal security of property rights.
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Director between 1994 and 2001, “the consensus is a brief description of a desirable basic 
political orientation” (Fisher 2003, p. 6). However, they are not rules written in stone, and 
the IMF has questioned some of its precepts. The most controversial one has been the 
liberalization of capital movements, which clearly was reviewed following the Asian crisis 
in the second half of the 1990s.
But beyond the liberalization of capital movements, the remaining provisions had 
remained at the core of the recommendations of the Fund until the explosion of the crisis 
in 2007. In this regard, the report of the IEO about the years before the crisis, identified a 
group thinking within IMF staff that considered unfounded the concerns about the financial 
markets, because their self-correcting capacity. This belief was fueled by the strength of 
the financial markets of advanced economies during the crises of the 1990s and early 20th 
century. Even the market signals denouncing imbalances, were discarded. The prime 
example was the initial interpretation of the inverted yield curve in the US in 2006. Instead 
of pointing to the risk of recession, the IMF played it down because most indicators pointed 
to a sustained growth, and blamed the low long-term rates to structural factors in the market 
demand for bonds (mainly the high demand of institutional investors). 
In summary, in 2007 there was an institutional culture in the management, the staff 
and the IMF line of research, guided by a general philosophy in favor of laissez-faire, and 
the self-correcting market forces. Therefore, the IMF was reluctant to public intervention 
strategies under arguments of market imperfections, and maintained a strict policy of no 
bailouts to avoid moral hazard problems (IEO, 2011).
However, the set of policies applied in response to the crisis – expansionary 
macroeconomic policies, bailouts and financial system regulation (see Chapter 1) – repre-
sent a break with this paradigm and the move to a new one, which is still in a definition 
process, but that is more in line with the New Keynesian economics. The new consensus 
calls for the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies  – in the short term and under cer-
tain circumstances – and the need to intervene to correct market failures, including bail-
outs and greater supervision and regulation of the financial system. At the G20 Summit 
in London in April 2009, Gordon Brown staged the break with the neoclassical doctrine 
announcing in the Summit press conference, «the old Washington consensus is over» 
(SkyNews, 2009).
 Dominique Strauss-Kahn and his two top aides, chief economist, Olivier Blan-
chard (who held the position since September 2008), and the Financial Adviser, José Viñals 
(since April 2009), were leading this changes. Blanchard is one of the main representatives 
of the new Keynesian school and therefore with special authority in this matter.8 For Viñals, 
weighs his experience at the Banco de España, which, with more or less success, has 
been an institution that has maintained high standards of regulation (dynamic provisioning) 
and oversight (on-site supervision) of the financial system in the years before the crisis 
– albeit not strong enough to overcome its own financial crisis in 2012 after the double dip 
recession and given the huge real estate overinvestment in Spain.  
In this process, the Fund has also accounted for the various regional specifici-
ties and political concerns. Here, the creation of groups of external consultants at the 
highest political level (including former prime ministers and ministers of finance) and with 
representation from academic and private sector. Five regional panels (Africa, America, 
Asia, Europe, Pacific, Middle East) allow the IMF to provide a greater political and re-
gional sensitivity.
 8  For example in monetary policy, Blanchard and Galí (2007) support its short – term effectiveness arguing a trade-off 
between inflation and employment in a context of adherent prices and frictions and inertia in the labor market 
adjustment. Although long-term monetary policy should be directed toward price stabilization, when the econ-
omy experiences an exogenous shock, monetary policy can be effective, especially in low growth and inflation 
situations (as it is the case in a crisis of confidence). 
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In short, as of 2009 the Fund is producing a new theoretical apparatus to define their 
policy prescriptions that affect the design of fiscal policy, – long term stability and a shift in 
spending towards sectors that enhance growth – ; a monetary policy reconciling the inflation-
ary targets, economic growth, and the stability of the financial system; and adequate regula-
tion and supervision of markets, with special emphasis on the financial system.9 
4.2 A new formal decision making structure: the quotas
Formally, the decisions are taken by the IMF Executive Board, which is composed of 24 
Directors representing 188 member countries through a system of “chairs” that bring to-
gether different countries.10 The Executive Board is based in Washington D.C. and has all 
week sessions (normally every Monday, Wednesday and Friday) to endorse the various 
Funds’ policies. The Executive Board performs its functions delegated by the Board of 
Governors, which is the highest governing body, and understands on decisions affecting 
the Articles of Agreement or the increase of Fund resources. The board of Governors 
members are usually finance ministers or central bank governors of the member countries 
and, in principle, only meet once a year at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World 
Bank (see Figure 4.1). 
This structure is completed by the International Monetary and Financial Commit-
tee (IMFC), which normally meets twice a year (in the spring and annual meetings). The 
Committee consists of the Ministers and Governors of the countries that hold a chair of the 
Board and provides strategic direction to its work. After the emergence of the G20 in 2008 
a double debate has intensified with respect to this Committee: (i) first, raising its status to 
Council, as provided in the Articles of Agreement, and therefore formally move from a con-
sultative to political guidance role. (ii) Second, aligning the composition of the IMFC with 
that of the G20 given that in fact, the G20 has taken over the role of the political leadership 
of the Fund. Neither of the two decisions have still been taken. It is a debate that it is re-
produced in parallel in relation with the composition of the Board (the IMFC mirror), which 
is addressed in section 4.3. 
Therefore, in practice, the day-to-day decisions are taken by the Executive Board. 
The representation of different countries in the Board and their voting power is determined 
by their weight in the IMF, determined by the quota. In theory, this quota should reflect the 
economic importance of the country in the global economy. However, as we shall see, as 
a consequence of historical inertia, neither the quotas nor the Directors have being adapt-
ed over time to the changing economic weights of the countries in the world. In particular, 
they do not reflect the relative weight of emerging economies. This situation became more 
evident from the 21st century, and acquired visibility with the global financial crisis and the 
emergence of the G20, much more adapted to the relative weight of advanced and emerg-
ing countries.
The Board misalignment with the relative economic weight of countries posed a 
serious problem of institutional legitimacy that has been faced since 2006. The IMF began 
a process of governance reform for the period 2006-2008 in order to align quota and 
economic weight, and to increase the weight of emerging countries. The reform package 
included a correction in quotas in 2006 of four especially under-represented emerging 
countries (China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey), and the establishment of a two years 
work program to reform the quota formula,  and to set a new quota increase to correct the 
under- representation of countries. 
 9  Among the IMF’s core documents that are shaping this new theoretical apparatus are: IMF 2010 h, i, j, and 2011d.
10  Normally the directors are elected for two years (from November 1 to October 31 every two even years). For-
mally they form part of the IMF and are independent of governments who appoint them, which in fact cannot 
dismiss them during his tenure.  
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Later, in 2010, the governance reform will intensify under the leadership of the 
G20, to approve a new quota increase of 100%, and a Board reform. These reforms have 
represented an historic shift in benefit of emerging economies. Here, we analyze the 
changes in quotas (section 4.3 deals with the Executive Board reform). Since 2006 the 
historic mismatch between quotas and countries’ economic weight is corrected in two 
ways: (A) the adoption of a new formula for the calculated quota (Qc) of each country, and 
(B) three rounds of quota increases – 2006, 2008 and 2010 – based on the new calculated 
quota. Thirdly, we will see (C) the results of these reforms. 
A NEW FORMULA FOR THE CALCULATED QUOTA (Qc) AFTER 60 YEARS OF STATUS QUO
The voting power of countries in the IMF is determined by the following formula:
Vi = Qei / 100,000 + BV
where:
— Vi is the vote of country i; 
— Qei  is the effective quota of country i valued at SDR, each country has one vote 
for every 100,000 SDRs;  
— BV are the basic votes. All countries have the same number of basic votes. The 
2008 reform of governance increased the number of BV (which had remained 
unchanged since 1944) from 250 to 750 by country. It also amends the Articles 
of Agreement so that the BV are fixed as percentage of 5.502% of the total 
voting power (instead of a fixed number).11 
Consequently, the voting power of a country in the Fund is primarily determined by 
its effective quota. The effective quota is that held by the country at any given point in time, 
and it is different from the calculated quota, i.e., the result of applying the quota formula. 
Historically there has been some inertia in the effective quotas because the suc-
cessive quota increases have generally been allocated taking into account the existing 
effective quota (instead of the calculated one). This is largely due to the countries resist-
ance to lose relative weight and the requirement of a qualified majority of 85% to deter-
mine any quota increases (further, requiring individual country’s consent in the case of 
quota reductions). The result has been that effective quotas have not adapted over time to 
the relative weight of the countries in the world economy. The first step has been to correct 
the formula, and the second, the allocation criteria.
60 years without substantial changes in the formula
As part of the package of governance reforms of 2006, the Board of Governors of the Fund 
had set a goal to change in two years the formula for calculating the quota. This question 
was especially complicated, taking into account that in the previous 60 years of the IMF 
existence no significant changes in the formula had been achieved, despite numerous at-
tempts, because the resistance of countries to lose weight in the institution. However, 
there was political consensus on the objectives: it was necessary to find a simple and 
transparent system for calculating the quota, and the new formula should better reflect the 
weight of countries in the global economy.
The 2006 calculated quota was based on five formulas and four variables: GDP, 
reserves, variability, and openness, as reflected in Figure 4.2. The five formulas include: the 
formula applied for the initial distribution of quotas among the IMF founding countries in 
11  This change has allowed to correct historical weight loss of the BV, that as a result of successive quota in-
creases have gone from representing 11.3% of the total voting power in 1945, raising up to 15.6% in 1958 and 
falling since to 2.1% in 2008 before the reform.
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1944 (later labeled the Bretton Woods formula), and four derived formulas from this original 
one reflecting changes introduced in 1963 and 1983. In 1963, attending to the greater in-
ternationalization of economies and in order to give more weight to the external sector, a 
multi-formula scheme is introduced with two databases for the calculation (one including 
imports and exports and the other income and current payments). The new formulas elim-
inated the reserves variable and doubled the trade and variability coefficients. In 1983, the 
formulas were revisited recovering the reserves variable, reducing the weight of the varia-
bility, and turning to a single database calculation. The five formulas had remained steady 
since the VIIIth GRQ in 1983 (IMF, 2006). Therefore, this system was in practice a close in-
herit of the 1944 founding quota distribution.  
In the late 1990s, the Fund conducted a debate on the complexity and opacity of 
the formulas, and the lack of correspondence with the weight of the economies in the 
world.12 In 1999, an expert group was commissioned to report on this question, the Coop-
er report13 (IMF, 2000a), proposing a simplification of the formula to two variables: GDP at 
market prices (as a proxy for the country’s ability to contribute to the Fund), and variability, 
measured from current income and net capital flows in the long term (as a proxy for the 
country’s external vulnerability). Between 2000 and 2003 the Board discussed several 
times on quotas without being able to agree other than general principles on transparency, 
modernization and simplification of the variables to 3 or 4 (from the existing ones). 
The 2008 reform 
In 2006 the discussion on quotas was reopened as part of the governance package with 
the, already classic, objectives of: transparency, simplification and more faithful reflection 
of the weight of the economies in the global economy. This time, the debate had the advan-
tage that the technical discussion between 2000 and 2003, had narrowed the debate, and 
there was some agreement that only a single linear formula was needed. The approach 
underlying the debate was political from the beginning, assuming that there would be win-
ners and losers of the new formula, and based on the consensus that emerging economies 
The Bretton Woods formula (1944) QBW= (0.01 Y + 0.025 R + 0.05 P + 0.2276 VC) (1 + C/ Y)
The four derived formulas (a)
(1963, 1983) (b)
Q 2 = (0.0065Y + 0.0205125R + 0.078P + 0.4052VC) (1 + C/Y)
Q 3 = (0.0045Y + 0.03896768R + 0.07P + 0.76976VC) (1 + C/Y)
Q 4 = 0.005Y + 0.042280464R + 0.044 (P + C) + 0.8352VC
Q 5 = 0.0045Y + 0.05281008R + 0.039 (P + C) + 1.0432VC
QC = Max [Q BW, average of the lowest two: Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5]
The calculated quota of a member (QC)  is the higher of: (i) the Bretton Woods calculation, or (ii)  the average of the lowest two of the remaining four 
calculations (Q2 a Q5)
  
THE CALCULATED QUOTA FORMULA (1944-2008) FIGURE 4.2 
SOURCE: IMF (2007a).
NOTE: QBW, Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5: Calculated quotas for each formula; Y (GDP variable): GDP at current market prices for a recent year; R (reserves): twelve-month 
average of gold, foreign exchange reserves, SDR holdings, and reserve positions in the IMF, for a recent year; P (current payments): annual average of current 
payments (goods, services, income, and transfers) for a recent jve-year period; C (current receipts): annual average of current receipts (goods, services, income, 
and transfers) for a recent jve-year period; and VC (variability of current receipts): dejned as one standard deviation from the centered jve-year moving average, for 
a recent 13-year period.
a For each of the four non-Bretton Woods formulas, quota calculations are multiplied by an adjustment factor so that the sum of the calculations across countries 
equals that derived from the Bretton Woods formula.
b Formulas introduced in 1963 and reformed in 1983. 
12  The set of formulas combine linear and nonlinear variables, data use different time criteria, and given the system 
of quota determination, the effective formula applied to each country may differ, so that the weight of the differ-
ent variables is not directly observable. For an analysis of the formulas and the distribution of quotas see Alber-
ich and Martinez (2000).
13  The group was chaired by Richard Cooper of Harvard University. 
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should increase their weight. There was also a clear willingness on the part of Management 
to take it forward in a time when the label attached to the IMF was the loss of relevance of 
the institution, following the strengthening of regional initiatives such as Chiang Mai Initia-
tive or the repayment of loans by Argentina and Brazil. De Rato (2006a) already anticipated 
it in May 2006 in a speech in Singapore, acknowledging the necessity to correct the under-
representation of Asian countries (22% of global GDP and only 17% in quotas). 
The discussions focused in the treatment of the GDP variable, which is the key 
variable to measure the weight of the country and its ability to contribute to the Fund. The 
central debate revolved around its definition as an average between GDP at market prices 
(mp), and their evaluation in terms of purchasing power parity (ppp). From a technical stand-
point GDP ppp has the advantage of greater stability of the domestic product with respect 
to changes in the exchange rate (Martinez, 2008 14). In practice, it is a calculation that is more 
favorable to emerging and developing economies. The political balance ended up in an es-
timation of GDP as a weighted average with 40% of GDP at ppp and 60% GDP at mp. 
In relation to the variability variable, the net capital flows were introduced along-
side with the current flows and there was a discussion about not considering the current 
flows in the case of monetary unions (with the intended exclusion of intra euro zone flows). 
The exclusion of the reserves variable, which benefits large emerging accumulators, was 
also discussed, given that it is not clearly linked neither to economic weight of the country, 
nor to its vulnerability. Some countries introduced the possibility of including variables 
beyond the strictly economic weight of the country, in the direction of democratizing the 
representation in the Fund, mainly to include a population variable by India (for clear rea-
sons). Finally, the classic variables remained: GDP, openness (combining the two previous 
ones: current outflows and inflows), variability, and reserves; and adjustments were made 
through their coefficients in the formula (see Figure 4.3). 
The GDP variable is given the highest weight in the formula (0.5), above the exter-
nal sector indicators (openness, 0.3 and variability, 0.15). Thus, compared to the previous 
situation, the economic weight of the country becomes the primary determinant of their 
voting power. Indeed, compared to the five previous formulas, the approximate weight of 
GDP (then measured at market prices) was 29 percent, compared with estimated percent-
ages of 50, 14 and 7 corresponding to openness, variability and reserves, respectively.15 
The new formula was approved as part of a package that includes as the second 
main element the quota increase of 2008 under the new formula, which will help close the 
gap between effective and calculated quota. While the new formula achieves the goal of 
increasing the weight of emerging economies, the debate on the formula remains open. In 
particular, emerging economies still require a higher weight to the GDP ppp. In fact, a pos-
sible redefinition of the formula was part of the discussion for the 2010 quota increase. At 
stake was a substantial increase in quota (eventually 100%) and all countries wanted to 
position with a larger calculated quota to improve their participation in the deal. 
Finally, the 2010 quota increase did not to touch the formula of 2008, among other 
reasons not to hinder the discussion on the distribution of the quota increase, in itself quite 
difficult (the formula was a negotiating red line for European countries). The compromise was 
achieved because as we will see, the 2010 quota increase took into account other distribution 
criteria in addition to the 2008 formula. Furthermore, a commitment was reached to review 
the formula by January 2013, and to advance the next GRQ to January 2014. 
The quota formula review of 2013 has concluded with no agreement on a new 
formula. The discussions are expected to progress in the second half of 2013/14 running 
14  For a discussion of the implications of the 2008 quota reform and its impact on Spain see Martinez (2008).
15  This is an approximation considering the nonlinearity of the formulas and the high correlation between variables 
(IMF, 2006).
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parallel to the quota increase of 2013 and once the new set of data for calculating the 
quota is available in mid 2013. Here, it can be expected some further progress in the direc-
tion of greater weight for the GDP variable, the discussions are focusing on eliminating the 
variability variable, and  establishing some caps in the openness variable. 
B FROM THE EFFECTIVE TO THE CALCULATED QUOTA AS THE MAIN ALLOCATION CRITERIA
No matter how good the design of the quota formula, its impact on the country’s weight in 
the Fund is not relevant if not transferred to its actual quota. The calculated quota deter-
mines the theoretical weight resulting from applying the formula. However, in practice, the 
actual weight, or effective quota, does not necessarily coincide with the calculated quota. 
In fact, the two quotas rarely coincide and the level of over- or under-representation of 
countries is measured by the difference between the two (country under-represented if 
calculated quota is greater than the effective one, and vice versa). 
The difference between the effective and calculated quota has remained over time 
because the successive quota increases have normally been allocated taking into account 
the effective quota at the time of the increase (instead of the calculated quota), thus main-
taining the existing status quo. In this respect, Figure 4.4 shows the different types of al-
locations of quota increases.
Quota increase can be distributed by any combination of these four types of 
quota increases. In order to reduce the misalignment between calculated and effective 
QC = (0.5*Y + 0.3*O + 0.15*V + 0.05*R)
k
Where 
QC : calculated quota share;
Y (GDP variable): a blend of GDP converted at market rates and ppp exchange rates averaged over a three year period. The weights of market-
based and ppp GDP are 0.60 and 0.40, respectively;
O (openness): the annual average of the sum of current payments and current receipts (goods, services, income, and transfers) for a jve year period;
V (variability): variability of current receipts and net capital kows (measured as a standard deviation from the centered three-year trend over a thirteen 
year period);
R (reserves): twelve month average over a year of ofjBH@l reserves (foreign exchange, SDR holdings, reserve position in the Fund, and monetary 
gold); and
k: a compression factor of 0.95. The compression factor is applied to the uncompressed calculated quota shares which are then rescaled to sum 
to 100. 
SOURCE: IMF (2008). 
  
THE 2008 FORMULA  FIGURE 4.3
SOURCE: Based on IMF information.
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RegTlar or ad hoc General Reviews of Quota (GRQ). 
ShoTld Ae held at least everX jve 
Xears and affect all memAers.
Ad hoc increases. Affect a coTMtrX or groTp of coTMtries. TheX maX Ae decided at 
anX time at the rePTest of the coTMtrX, and can Ae performed at the moment of a 
general reviDV or oTtside it. a) 
Allocation 
or distriATtion
criteria 
Equiproportional allocation. QTota 
increases are allocated in proportion 
to the existing PTota distriATtion at 
the time of the increase.
Selective allocation. Is performed according to the criteria determined AX the Board. 
In general, selective increases are Aased on calcTlated PTotas, and so it has Aeen 
since the VIII GRQ in . On other occasions, the Board has chosen to prioritize 
different criteria searching to Aenejt a groTp of coTMtries especiallX TMdeQrepresented,
as V@s also done in . A)
TYPES OF QUOTA INCREASES FIGURE 4.4 
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quota, quota increases should be either: general increases with a dominant selective 
allocation, and/or ad hoc increases that benefit under-represented countries (i.e. those 
for which calculated quota exceeds the effective one). However, historically in the Fund 
the primacy has been given to equiproportional quota increases, so that there has been 
an inertia to maintain the status quo of the representations of each country at their entry 
into the IMF, with minor alterations (see Figure 4.5). The result is that the economies for 
which the calculated quota has grown more – i.e., those with more dynamic growth and 
a greater presence abroad – have not increased their relative weight in the Fund in line 
with their greater economic weight in the global economy. This situation is significantly 
corrected from 2006. 
2006-2010: the correction of the historical misalignment between calculated and effective quota 
The governance reform of 2006-2008 included two rounds of ad hoc quota increases to 
the benefit of all infra represented countries. As a first step, to signal the willingness to 
reform, at the Annual Meetings in Singapore in 2006, an ad hoc quota increase of 1.8% 
(SDR 3,800 million) was agreed, allocated to four especially under-represented emerging 
countries: China, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey.16 A deadline was also set to decide on 
a new quota formula and to complete a second phase of quota increase by 2008. Before 
term, in April 2008, the Board completed the reform of the formula and a second ad hoc 
quota increase of 9.7% (SDR 20,500 million) for other 135 under-represented countries. 
Figure 4.6 shows the criteria used for the ad hoc increases in 2006 and 2008. 
The 2006-2008 reform is an important step in reforming the governance structure 
of the IMF that reduces the historical representation gap accumulated by emerging econo-
mies. However, emerging countries continued to demand further changes, especially in 
relation to the structure of the Board. As noted by Steinberg (2009), the reforms introduced 
between 2006 and 2008 were a step in the right direction, but not enough to bolster the 
institutional legitimacy of the IMF, presenting the crisis as an opportunity to continue re-
forms in the Fund and the global economic governance. 
Indeed, the global financial crisis has prompted a new round of governance re-
forms developed primarily from the G20 Pittsburgh Summit (September 2009). After a year 
of negotiating without results in the Fund’s Board, in October 2010, the G20 Ministers and 
Governors in Seoul reached a commitment,17 later formalized in the Board’s meeting of 
November 5, advancing the XIVth General Review of Quotas. This 2010 reform includes as 
main components: 
— A doubling of IMF quotas from SDR 238,400 million up to around SDR 476,800 
million (approximately US$ 755,700 million). Most of this increase will come from 
a rollover form the NAB, that had been reinforced after the G20 of April 2009.
— A redistribution of quotas combining a selective component (60%) and an ad hoc 
component (40%, see Figure 4.7).
— Configuring an Executive Board of 24 constituencies with the commitment of 
reducing two chairs held by advanced European countries.
— An adjustment commitment over time to avoid perpetuating the status quo of 
the quotas and the Board. Specifically, to conclude a new revision of the for-
mula by January 2013 and to advance the XVth GRQ to January 2014 (two 
years earlier than implied). There is also an agreement to review the Board 
composition every eight years. 
16  China moves from SDR 6,369.2 to 8,090.1 million; Mexico from SDR 2,585.8 to 3,152.8 million; South Korea 
from SDR 1,633.6 to 2,927.3 million; and Turkey from SDR 964.0 to 1,191.3 million.
17  The decision was discussed in an specific G20 working group on IMF quota and governance reform. 
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The table reflects the Fund’s GRQ. The successive Reviews until 
the XIIIth in 2008 did not allow for a substantial correction between 
calculated and effective quota because there was a predominance 
of equiproportional distribution of the quota increases. 
In general, in the successive enlargements until 2008, the equipro-
portional distribution of the quota increase has dominated; it has 
always been higher than the selective component. The exceptions 
have been the VI and VIII Reviews, in which the percentage of the 
selective increase was respectively equal and greater than the 
equiproportional increase.
Furthermore, although over the years there have also been a series 
of ad hoc increases, its scope has been limited and they have not 
allowed correcting significantly the misalignment. The agreements 
for ad hoc increases are traditionally harder to reach by the Board 
because they favor a small number of countries at the expense of 
reducing the relative weight of the rest. After some initial ad-
justments to correct what was considered an original infra repre-
sentation at the entry in the Fund of several countries, since 1969, 
ad hoc increases have been rare and have affected a small num-
ber of countries (mainly to increase the weight of Japan, Saudi 
Arabia and China, see Figure 4.6).  
In short, during the first 60 years of the IMF, successive quota en-
largements have tended to prioritize the allocation based on the 
existing quotas (rather than the calculated quota). The result is 
that the gap between country’s quotas and their position in the 
world economy, as measured by the calculated quota, has been 
increasing.
FIGURE  4.5IMF GENERAL REVIEWS OF QUOTAS (1950-2010)
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SOURCE: Martínez (2008), IMF.
a General Review outside of the quinquennial reviews. 
b IMF quota after the 2006 and 2008 ad hoc increases. 
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C RESULTS OF THE 2006-2010 REFORMS 
The three quota increases decided in 2006 (Singapore), 2008 (Washington) and 2010 
(Seoul)18 have as main results a gain in the weight of the emerging and developing coun-
tries  and a correction of under-representation, resulting in a new ranking of voting power 
in favor of emerging countries. 
The increased weight of emerging and developing countries (EMDCs)
The joint loss in quota share of advanced economies  – and symmetrically the gain of 
EMDCs19 – is particularly relevant in terms of the calculated quota. On this scale, the loss 
of advanced economies is 8.6%, meaning that sum of the calculated quota of advanced 
economies goes from 71.07% in 2006 to 62.47% after the new formula adopted in 2008. 
Year Criteria
1947-1969 Correction of the Bretton Woods Quotas. During these years, a series of ad hoc increases are conducted to correct initial 
Bretton Woods quotas of up to 23 countries for which quotas were considered to be too low. 
1970-2006 Five political adjustments. During this period there occurred jve specijc increases to correct misalignment of as many 
countries (a):
— Japan (1990) receives an ad hoc increase in 1990 that aligns its quota with Germany (France and UK quotas were also
     aligned). This increase was coordinated among the G7 countries so that the total group quota of these seven countries
     would not suffer modijcation.
— China (1980 and 2001) got a raise in 1980 to correct its original quota, at a time of change in its representation from
     Taiwan to Beijing. The quota raised again in 2001 after the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
— Saudi Arabia (1981) received a quota increase in 1981 linked to the desire to strengthen the IMF's liquidity position
     during the debt crisis before it could complete the VIII revision. Saudi Arabia moved to have a quota share of 3.5%
     in the IMF (from SDR 1,040 million to 2,100 million).
— Cambodia (1994) has a quota increase associated with the resumption of its relations with the Fund.
2006 and 2008 Correction of under-representation. In the context of the 2006-2008 governance reform, two ad hoc increases totaling 
11.5% of the total quota were undertaken, benejting the 135 under-represented countries, i.e. those for which calculated 
quota according to the 2008 formula was higher than the effective quota. This increase was undertaken in two phases:
— First, in 2006 (the Singapore reform): an increase of 1.8% quota (SDR 3,810 million) is decided benejting of four 
     highly under-represented emerging countries, i.e., those for which the effective quota was less than their weight in the
     global economy taking into account any of the variables involved in the formula (GDP, trade, reserves and variability):
     China (increased its share in SDR 1,720.9 million), South Korea (1,293.7), Mexico (567), and Turkey (227.3).
— Second, in 2008: an additional increase of 9.7% of the total quota for the benejt of the 135 under-represented
     countries at the IMF. This increase was distributed in proportion to the level of under-representation, with the following
     exceptions: 
     — Partial renounce of advanced economies: under-represented members of the G7 (US, Japan, Germany and Italy)
          partially renounced to the increase that they could have gotten. For these countries an adjustment is made in
          the same proportion to maintain the voting power of the US at the level it enjoyed after the jrst phase of the reform.
          Ireland and Luxembourg also renounced to part of the increase that they qualijDd for (limiting such increase to 50%).
     — Protection of emerging countries: there is a guarantee of a minimum increase of 40% of quota for highly misaligned
          emerging countries, measured by a 1.75 threshold in the ratio of the country´s share in the GDP ppp variable
          compared to its effective quota on effective quota. It also provides a safeguard for the four countries benejting from
          the jrst phase (China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey), with a minimum increase in the second phase of 15%.
AD HOC QUOTA INCREASES (1947-2008) FIGURE 4.6
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on IMF data.
a Of these jve revisions, only one coincided with a GRQ – the increased quota of Japan in 1990 – with the IXth GRQ.  
18  The increase in 2010 is still pending ratification, a process that requires parliamentary procedure in most IMF 
members. It is estimated that the ratification will be completed in 2013/14. 
19  There are no established criteria for classifying among advanced, emerging and developing economies. Here 
we use the IMF classification following Nielesen (2011), which includes as advanced countries: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA. For a detailed analysis of 
the different categorizations of countries by the IMF, World Bank and United Nations see Nielsen (2011). Data 
on quotas for each country from IMF (2010o).
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DISTRIBUTION OF THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL QUOTA REVIEW 1 FIGURE 4.7
In October, the G20 sets a 100% increase in IMF quota (SDR 
238,400 million) as part of the XIVth General Review. The initial 
60% is a selective increase (i.e., based on the calculated quota). 
The remaining 40% is an ad hoc distribution based on the GDP 
variable of the 2008 formula.2 Specifically, the ad hoc increase es-
tablishes a uniform proportionate reduction in the difference bet-
ween: the weight of the country according to the GDP variable and 
its effective quota after the selective increase. This increase is no-
netheless adjusted by the following corrections: 
—  Three limits: (1) for the advanced countries the reduction will be 
only 50% and only benefit those which are under-represented 
under the formula; (2) the maximum quota increase per country 
is 220% (this limit will prevent that China’s quota exceeds that 
of Japan); (3) the drop in relative weight by country is limited to 
30% and a maximum of 0.85 percentage points (this limit pro-
tects Saudi Arabia).
—  Triple protection: (1) countries cannot change from over- to 
under-representation under either the formula or the GDP varia-
ble; (2) the least developed countries maintain at least the post 
2008 reform quota,3 (3) protection of the gains from the selecti-
ve increase of countries under-represented under the formula, 
but not under the GDP variable. 
—  Transfers between countries: Certain adjustments are made to 
fit quotas from certain countries: France, Germany, Italy and the 
UK give a 0.05% share to Spain (which allows it to reach a 
2.0% share); Singapore gives 0.09 to Tonga (to protect the 
post-2008 level); 1.56 from the USA to Saudi Arabia (avoiding 
its sharp fall in quota); and the advanced countries of the G20 
concede 1.20% to cover the protection of LICs.
1 Source: Based on IMF (2010o, 2010p).
2  The GDP is a weighted average of the GDP measured at market prices 
(60%) and in purchasing power parity (ppp, 40%).
3  This includes PRGT eligible countries with a per capita income below US$ 
1,135 in 2008 (double in the case of small economies), plus Zimbabwe.
This is due to the increased weight of the new GDP variable and to its ppp component, 
which benefit emerging and developing countries. However, the shift in quota is not so 
obvious when observing effective quotas. In this case, the loss of quota share in ad-
vanced countries (excluding South Korea) is about 3.4%, that is, the sum of the effective 
quota of the advanced economies goes from 62.7% in 2006 to 59.3% after the reform 
approved in 2010. 
Now the G20 had set two objectives for the 2010 quota increase: (i) a transfer of 
at least 5% of effective quota to emerging and dynamic developing countries, and (ii) a 
transfer of 5% from under- to over-represented countries (G20, 2009).20 This objective is 
achieved from defining a subset of 32 countries taking into account the GDP ppp variable, 
the so-called dynamic emerging market countries. 21 The result for this subset of countries 
is an effective quota increase of 8 points, moving from 17.2% of the total quota in 2006 to 
25.2% in 2008. 22 Here again, the higher weight of the new GDP variable in the formula, and 
the use of this variable for the ad hoc increase in 2010 (to account for 40% of the distribu-
tion), will play in favor of emerging countries. 
20  The statement from the G20 Pittsburg language was very vague. The result was an intense debate within the 
G20 on the level and the target to be pursued. Emerging countries advocated the transfer from advanced to 
emerging and advanced economies, particularly Europeans, defended the criterion of representation. Finally it 
was decided to keep both criteria.
21  To measure the dynamism different criteria were discussed, such as, the contribution to global growth between 
2004 and 2008 (higher than 0.5% or than the average of emerging countries). Finally, it includes a comprehen-
sive list of 32 countries whose weight in the world GDP ppp divided by its effective quota  in the Fund after the 
2008 reform, exceeds the unity. The 32 countries are: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Botswana, 
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Po-
land, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam (IMF, 2010k).
22  Most of this increase is concentrated in eight countries that absorb 7.7 points of the increase: Brazil, China, 
India, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Thailand and Turkey.
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On the figures by country, as shown in Figure 4.8, the big winners in effective 
quota and voting power after the reform are a subgroup of dynamic emerging economies, 
including China, Brazil, South Korea, India, Mexico, Turkey, and Singapore; and some ad-
vanced economies that were especially under-represented, such as Spain or Ireland. On 
the other side of the coin, the losers are major advanced economies (Belgium, France, UK, 
Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany) and some emerging economies with high 
over-representation, especially Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
As a result of these changes in quotas, the Fund has a new ranking of the voting 
power in favor of emerging countries, and especially of the four BRIC countries, which rank on 
the top 10 with higher weight in the Board, together with G7 countries (except Canada).23 
Between 2006 and 2010 there is a rearrangement in the top 10 countries by IMF quota: India 
and Brazil enter the list, and Canada and Saudi Arabia leave it (see Figure 4.9). Similarly, Ven-
ezuela and Sweden fall from the top 20 quota ranking, and Turkey and South Korea enter the 
list (Turkey, a top 20 world economy by GDP, was only ranked 42 in IMF’s quota before the 
reform). The new quota ranking is better aligned with the top 20 economies in terms of GDP. 24 
The correction of misalignments
The adjustment of the formula and the quota increases have also allowed a very significant 
correction of the misalignment between effective and calculated quota. In aggregate 
23  It should be noted with respect to the European Union countries, that there is also a realignment between the 
top five economies (Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) in GDP and IMF quota terms, since the quota reform 
allows for a fall of the Netherlands and Belgium to the sixth and seventh quota places, two countries that had 
traditionally focused a large part of the European over-representation criticism.
24  The exceptions being Saudi Arabia and Belgium, with a presence in the IMF above their weight in the global 
economy because of their historical significance in the Fund and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, through a series 
of ad hoc offsets to avoid its falling quota in the IMF (see Figure 4.6).
Country
Increase
Q e
10  – Q e
06 Q e
10 Country
Decrease
Q e
10 – Q e
06 Q e
10
China 3.414 6.394 Saudi Arabia -1.172 2.096
South Korea 1.036 1.800 Belgium -0.810 1.345
Brazil 0.896 2.316 France -0.797 4.227
India 0.806 2.751 United Kingdom -0.797 4.227
Mexico 0.659 1.869 Canada -0.668 2.312
Spain 0.574 2.000 Netherlands -0.583 1.832
Turkey 0.526 0.977 Germany -0.500 5.586
Singapore 0.412 0.816 Venezuela -0.463 0.781
Ireland 0.332 0.724 Switzerland -0.408 1.210
Japan 0.236 6.464 Argentina -0.321 0.669
Poland 0.219 0.859 Nigeria -0.305 0.515
UAEmirates 0.199 0.485 Kuwait -0.240 0.406
Thailand 0.168 0.674 South Africa -0.234 0.640
Luxembourg 0.146 0.277 Ukraine -0.220 0.422
Greece 0.124 0.509 Iraq -0.207 0.349
15 countries with the highest quota increase
Percentages
15 countries with the highest quota decrease
CHANGES IN THE EFFECTIVE QUOTA: PRE-SINGAPORE (2006) VS. POST-SEOUL (2010) FIGURE 4.8
SOURCE: IMF (2010p). 
NOTE: Qe
10: effective quota in 2010 after the Seoul increase (it includes quota 2008 increase). Qe
06: effective quota in 2006 prior to the Singapore quota increase.
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terms, the absolute total misalignment (the sum of the differences in effective and calculated 
quotas in absolute terms) decreases from 32.85% in 2006, to 10.62%, after the amendment 
passed in Seoul. As seen in Figure 4.10, there is a big drop in the absolute levels of misalign-
ment. With the exceptions of China (still under-represented by 1.52%) and Saudi Arabia 
(over-represented in 0.76%), for other countries the difference between actual and calcu-
lated quota is reduced below 0.5%, when in 2006, up to 17 countries exceeded this limit.
Interestingly, despite the reforms, there are two groups of six countries, that remain 
– albeit at lower levels – on the lists of the ten countries with the highest infra (China, South 
Korea, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore) and over-representation (Saudi Arabia, Brazil, 
USA, France, India, Venezuela). This reflects the historical inertia problem in the misalignment. 
In this sense, in the future the successive revisions, starting with the XVth Review, the quota 
increases should aim to continue the progress in correcting misalignments 25.
4.3  New formal decision-making structure: a more balanced Executive Board 
between advanced and emerging countries
Beyond the voting power of each country, the decision-making process at the IMF is for-
malized in Executive Board meetings. Each director holds the sum of the voting power of 
SOURCE: IMF (2010p).
a Indonesia and Poland occupy respectively positions 18 and 20 in the world GDP; and positions 21 and 23 in effective quota.
b South Korea and Turkey occupied positions 13 and 17 on the 2006 GDP ranking, and only 28 and 42 in the effective quota ranking.
c France and the UK maintain equal quotas.
País Effective quota (%) GDP ranking (a) País Effective quota (%) GDP ranking (b)
USA 17.407 1 USA 17.380 1
Japan 6.464 3 Japan 6.228 2
China 6.394 2 Germany 6.086 3
Germany 5.586 4 France 5.024 6
France (c) 4.227 5 United Kingdom 5.024 5
United Kingdom (c) 4.227 6 Italy 3.301 7
Italy 3.161 7 Saudi Arabia 3.268 25
India 2.751 12 Canada 2.980 8
Russia 2.706 10 China 2.980 4
Brazil 2.316 8 Russia 2.782 11
Canada 2.312 9 Netherlands 2.415 16
Saudi Arabia 2.096 23 Belgium 2.155 18
Spain 2.000 11 India 1.945 12
Mexico 1.869 14 Switzerland 1.618 20
Netherlands 1.832 16 Australia 1.514 15
South Korea 1.800 15 Spain 1.426 9
Australia 1.379 13 Brazil 1.420 10
Belgium 1.345 21 Venezuela 1.244 35
Switzerland 1.210 19 Mexico 1.210 14
Turkey 0.977 17 Sweden 1.121 19
TOTAL 72.059 TOTAL 71.121
Top 20 countries by effective quota 2010 Top 20 countries by effective quota 2006
EFFECTIVE QUOTA RANKING: 2010 VS. 2006 FIGURE 4.9
25  The numbers are based on 2009 data. In 2013, the Fund updates this numbers with important changes in the 
effective quotas reflecting the different growth patterns after the global financial crisis. 
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all the countries they represent, without the possibility of issuing a dissent vote by country.26 
Therefore, the influence of a director exceeds the voting power of his country. They repre-
sent the other countries in their constituency, and are in charge of coordinating constitu-
ency positions before the Board, staff and management.27 In fact, the voting power of a 
country is more important because of the possibility to appoint an Executive Director, 
rather than the weight of the vote itself.
In practice, there is no voting in the deliberations of the Board.28 The decisions are 
expressed in the Board’s assessment −the so-called “summing up”, a sort of summary of 
the Board discussion− or the adoption of specific text proposed by the staff. This assess-
ment is usually reflected in a word code expressing the number of Directors that support 
the decision, whose voting power warrants the required majority.29 Thus, the decision 
arises as agreed by the Board, without nominally identifying the directors that have been 
more or less in favor of it. 
In the working routine of the Board, alliances and coordinated positions occur 
between different directors; either on a regular basis, such is the case of regular meetings 
by European directors or (less frequently) G7 countries; or on ad hoc meetings, to defend 
positions on a specific theme.30
Country Qe-Qc (%) Country Qe-Qc (%) Country Qe-Qc (%) Country Qe-Qc (%)
China -1.523 China -3.157 Saudi Arabia 0.759 Saudi Arabia 2.238
UK -0.436 Korea -1.748 France 0.438 USA 1.096
Singapore -0.379 Singapore -1.525 USA 0.420 Russia 1.080
Ireland -0.353 Ireland -1.268 India 0.348 France 0.895
South Korea -0.308 Luxembourg -1.238 Venezuela 0.297 Venezuela 0.817
UAE -0.282 Spain -0.811 Congo 0.189 India 0.658
Spain -0.236 Japan -0.783 Italy 0.169 Argentina 0.622
Russia -0.232 Germany -0.764 Zambia 0.166 Nigeria 0.461
Luxembourg -0.226 Malaysia -0.679 Brazil 0.163 South Africa 0.415
Turkey -0.171 Mexico -0.631 Zimbabwe 0.132 Brazil 0.351
Thailand -0.115 Netherlands -0.482 Ghana 0.105 Ukraine 0.341
Germany -0.092 Thailand -0.403 Kuwait 0.091 Australia 0.309
Poland -0.090 Turkey -0.300 Iran 0.090 Kuwait 0.291
Kazakhstan -0.085 Denmark -0.271 Pakistan 0.084 Pakistan 0.288
Greece -0.063 Austria -0.253 Iraq 0.082 Libya 0.283
2010 2006 2010 2006
15 more over-represented countries 15 most under-represented countries
SOURCE: IMF (2010p). 
NOTE: Qe: effective quota. Qc: calculated quota.
 
 
RANKING OF UNDER- AND OVER-REPRESENTATION: 2010 VS. 2006 FIGURE 4.10
26  If a country or several within the constituency does not agree with the decision of the director, the dissent can 
be brought up at the Board for the record, but the vote cast cannot be split. 
27  Regular meetings of the IMF include meetings every week, usually on Monday, Wednesday and Friday in morn-
ing and afternoon sessions. 
28  Voting rarely occurs and when it does happen, there are usually abstentions rather than negative votes. 
29  The most commonly used terms are as follows (in parentheses the meaning): a few (2 to 4 Directors), some (5 
or 6), several (6 to 9), many (10 to 15), the most part (15 or more), the Directors (supported by all or nearly all 
Directors with broad majority vote), a significant minority or a majority of the Board (indication of the voting 
power necessary to block or approve a decision), (IMF, 2009d). 
30  Directors belonging to the EU countries are grouped into a group called EURIMF having almost weekly meet-
ings at the IMF. For a detailed analysis of the structure and alliances and weight of individual directors see 
Woods and Lombardi (2006). 
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In short, in practical terms, in the exercise of the formal power in the Board, it is 
more important for a country to hold the position of Executive Director, than the percent-
age of voting power it has (notwithstanding that the two are connected).
However, the reorganization of the Board is politically more complex than a quota 
increase.31 Historically, there have been few rearrangements – less than quota increases – 
normally associated with the participation of new members, such as the increase in the 
number of chairs with the entry of Switzerland and Russia in 1992. But the structure has 
remained stable around a group of directors representing advanced economies and, more 
specifically, American and European directors (see Figure 4.11). The 2010 reform driven by 
the G20 also will rebalance the Board in favor of emerging economies.  
A THE REFORM OF 2010: ENDING THE EUROPEAN “ROLLING-PIN” 
Since 2000, as part of the discussion of the NIFA, the discussion on the composition of the 
Board intensifies, with special emphasis on the excessive weight of European directors. 
This debate parallels the one on quotas and, as we saw before, there were no tangible 
results up until 2006-2008, and especially until 2010. In 2008, the African constituencies 
were allocated an additional Alternate Director, facilitating the rotation in constituencies 
with more than twenty countries.
In the fall of 2010, under the South Korean G20 presidency, Europe yielded to in-
ternational pressure and committed to reduce by two the number of its directors at the 
Board. The debate starts in the summer of 2010 when the US makes effective a threat that 
informally had been announced since 2006: not to renew a Board with twenty four direc-
tors (the Articles only ensure twenty, the enlargement to twenty four has to be approved by 
the Board). In theory, the burden of the adjustment down to twenty directors would fall on 
the four constituencies with less weight at the time (Brazil, India, Argentina and Togo), but 
the US pressure, with the BRIC support, was directed to Europe. Finally, after a tour by 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the major European countries, the October 2010 ECOFIN 
agreed to give up two chairs of advanced European countries in 2012 in favor of emerging 
and developing countries. 
This commitment was formalized at the October meeting of Ministers and Gover-
nors of the G20 in which three additional decisions on the Board were taken: (i) a move to 
an all-elected Board (eliminating the right to own a chair of the top five countries by quota); 
(ii) a Board of twenty four directors, and (iii) to review the Board’s composition every eight 
years. The decision has been delayed until 2014, pending the US Congress approval of the 
whole IMF quota and governance package. 
In the fall of 2012, the Europeans have advanced part of their commitment, by 
shifting 1.62 chairs from advanced to emerging European countries, including: a merger of 
the Dutch and Belgian chairs, with Austria, Eastern Europe and Turkey holding the freed 
chair; a 50 per cent rotation between Switzerland and Poland (previously the former held 
the Director position permanently); and a rotating scheme with Baltic countries in the Nor-
dic constituency. 
Therefore, so far there has been an internal concession within Europe (from ad-
vanced to emerging Europe). The question remains whether there should be other regions 
benefiting in the Board. In this respect, beyond the general consideration that the IMF is an 
institution of countries and not regions, it is interesting to consider two divides that do 
have an influence on the Board’s decision making: the advanced/emerging countries di-
vide, and the regional structure. 
31  A clear example is Japan that failed to hold an Executive Director until 1970 given the political difficulties to 
increase its quota as a defeated country in the second world war.
FIGURE 4.11A HISTORY OF PREPONDERANCE OF THE G7 COUNTRIES ON THE BOARD
In the initial composition of the IMF Board, the relative weight fa-
vors to the victors of the Second World War and, especially, the US 
who held one third of the voting power of the institution with 39 
member countries. The countries with greater voting power were 
the US (31%), the UK (14%) Soviet Union (13%), China (6%), Fran-
ce (5%), and India (4.5%). However, over the 1950s and 1960s, a 
new balance takes place around the countries that form the G7 
group in 1976 (initially G6 in 1975: Germany, USA, France, Italy, 
Japan and United Kingdom, with Canada joining in 1976). 
Extending the Board. The 1960s and 1970s witness a broad internatio-
nalization of the IMF (Boughton, 2001). Member countries are doubled, 
from 69 in 1960 to 138 in 1978, coinciding with the independence of 
European colonies in Africa. Along with this increase in the number of 
countries, the number of seats in the Board moved up from the initial 
twelve to twenty in 1964. During these years a structure is set in which 
five of the G7 countries have their own chair, and the remaining two, 
Italy and Canada, share their constituencies with third countries, but 
maintaining permanently the figure of the director. In the 1990s, the IMF 
would acquire a global scale with the entry of 40 new countries, mainly 
former Soviet republics. By the end of the 20th century, the Fund is al-
ready global reaching 183 members – rising up to 188 in 2012, with 
South Sudan the latest country to join in 2012 –, with only a few small 
or isolated countries remaining for membership, most notably Cuba 
and North Korea (Boughton, 2001). During these years, the Board con-
solidates a structure of 24 directors, a number that has remained stable 
since 1992, when Switzerland entered the IMF with a new chair shared 
with third countries (with Poland as the main partner).
Protection in the Articles of Agreement. The Articles (Article XII 
Section 3.b) protect the five countries with the highest quota, by 
entitling them to appoint a director, with the remaining fifteen 
being elected from among the rest of the member countries. With 
the 2010 governance reform, the G20  has agreed to eliminate this 
exception by establishing an all-elected Board. In any case, in 
practice, the largest quota members will most likely keep single-
country constituencies.1 The qualitative weight of the largest 
members is further anchored with the requirement of a qualified 
majority of 85% for decisions affecting IMF policies or changes in 
the Articles, which gives a veto power to the US (all other countries 
must forge alliances to reach blocking minority).
The table reflects single-country constituencies. In addition to the 
top five countries by quota, three other, Saudi Arabia, China and 
Russia, get their own “seat” in the Fund in 1978, 1980 and 1992, 
after various processes of political negotiation with a crucial sup-
port of the G7, and especially of the US2. While the entry of China 
and Russia in 1980 and 1992 partially rebalances a traditional do-
minance by G7 countries (five of which hold a single country 
chairs), it will not be until the 2010 reform that more clear rebalan-
cing in favor of emerging countries, takes place at the Board. 
Country Year 2010 voting power 
    USA Since 1945 16,479
    United Kingdom Since 1945 4,024
    France Since 1945 4,024
    Germany
Since 1960 (between 1945 and 1960, China occupied the single 
country constituency)
5,308
    Japan
Since 1970 (between 1945 and 1970, India occupied the single 
country constituency after the USSR renounced to be a member of 
the IMF; in 1970 Japan’s quota surpassed that of India)
6,138
    Saudi Arabia 
Since 1978. Saudi Arabia is compensated because the riyal was the 
second most used currency after the dollar in IMF transactions 
2,010
    China 
Since 1980. Linked to the ofjcial incorporation of People’s Republic 
of China in the Fund (China was previously represented through 
Taiwan)
6,071
    Russia 
Since 1992. Russia negotiated a single country constituency and 
later joined the G8 
2,587
TOTAL 46,641
Countries with the right to occupy a “chair” 
(those with the highest quota, following Art. XII section 3.b)
Countries under the election procedure but with single-country constituency 
SOURCE: IMF, Momani (2007). 
SINGLE COUNTRY CONSTITUENCIES AT THE IMF BOARD 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
1  In a Board with 24 chairs, by simple aritmetic, any country with at least 
4.2% (≈ 100/24) has a sufficient majority to elect Director.
 2  Nomani (2007, 2008) describes the political process of Russia and Swit-
zerland to get a seat in the Board.
100
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 101 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
As seen in Figure 4.12, it is not clear that advanced economies are over-represent-
ed, rather the opposite when considering quota. Even in the case where they occupy 13 
seats (when Spain and Australia take the position of director in their mixed constituencies), 
the percentage of seats occupied by advanced economies is lower than the quota of the 
advanced economies in the Board (and vice versa, emerging and developing economies 
percentage of Directors exceeds their quota weight). However, there are other considera-
tions at play given, as we have seen, the relevance of holding the position of director, 
which goes beyond the quota weight. For instance, if we consider the ratio of number of 
countries by chair, advanced economies are in a clear position of advantage.  
By region, Europe holds the highest number of Executive Directors at the IMF 
(Figure 4.13). After the rearrangement of European constituencies in 2012, the region 
holds  eight permanent directors of which four correspond to countries with  permanent 
Director (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom), and four rotate among European 
countries (Switzerland/Poland, Netherlands/Belgium, Nordic countries, Eastern Europe/
Turkey). In addition, when Spain takes the chair that shares with Mexico and Venezuela 
(two out of six years), Europe can have up to nine directors, i.e. 37.5% of the total of 24 
seats. In other words, Europe has 8 1/3 (or 34.7%) of the chairs of the Board; in the case 
of the EU and the euro area, these figures are respectively 7 1/3 (30.5%) and 5 1/3 (22.2%). 
Europe is also the region with the best ratios of number of countries per chair. The two 
regions infra represented (by comparing weight in number of directors per quota post-
2010) are Asia-Pacific and America, albeit in the latter is mainly due to the high weight of 
the US. Africa, even with low quotas, is facing the problem of excessive number of coun-
tries per chair.
Interestingly, if the goal was to seek a regional realignment of the Board, following 
a post-2010 quota criteria, with Europe weighing 32% of the total voting power, it should 
concede only about two thirds of chair and go from 8 1/3 to 7 2/3, (just as the EU should 
descend from 7 1/3 to 7 and the euro area remain on 5 1/3). A large part of this concession 
would have already been achieved when considering that Turkey will rotate as director half 
of the years in its constituency (every eight years).  
B A GOOD SOLUTION: A G20 STRUCTURE OF THE BOARD
As we have seen, since the 2008 Summit, the G20 has been exerting increasing power 
over the IMF. In these years there have been situations where during the spring or Annual 
SOURCE: IMF.
a In brackets, situation when Spain and Australia lead their constituencies, without them, when it is Mexico/Venezuela and South Korea, respectively, that lead them.
b Starting in 2014, the constituencies to be lead by Poland and Turkey would also increase the emerging countries group. 
Country leading the constituency 
# of countries
(country/
chairs ratio) 
% of
directors
pre-2006 post-2010
Advanced
economies
11 [13] (a): G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, 
US) + Netherlands/Belgium, Nordics, Switzerland/Poland (b), 
Austria/Turkey (b), [Spain], [[Australia]]
63
(5.7)
45.8
[54.2]
62.06
[70.08]
58.22
[67.06]
Emerging
economies
11 [9] (a): BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) + Argentina, 
Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, [Mexico/Venezuela], 
[[South Korea]]
78
(7.1)
45.8
[37.5]
33.35
[25.33]
36.46
[27.62]
Low income
countries
2 Sub-Saharan African constituencies: mostly English and 
mostly French speaking constituencies
43
(21.5)
8.4 4.44 5.12
Voting powerExecutive Directors 
IMF BOARD: ADVANCED-EMERGING DIVIDE (2010-2012) FIGURE 4.12
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 102 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
Fund meetings, the G20 ministers have met twice, once in the G20 and other as members 
of the IMFC. The non G20 members of the IMFC have been complaining about the G20 
preponderance and are requesting regaining a higher role for the Committee. In practice it 
makes little sense a Board that endorses the decisions in the G20 (as the governance re-
form of October 2010). Therefore, the most efficient would be a composition of the Board 
and the IMFC parallel to the G20. Some authoritative voices have already proposed to 
advance in this line (Camdessus et al. 2011).
 Other authors have recovered the proposed unification of the chairs of the EU, or 
at least the euro area, in a single chair (see Bini Smaghi, 2004). This is the view taken by 
the Commission and the European Central Bank, however, it does not have the backing of 
large EU countries. Further, it is not clear either whether a single European chair would 
keep the sum of the individual countries voting power. For example, it has been raised in 
the past the option of eliminating intra community trade in the openness and variability 
variables of the quota formula in case of a single EU (or euro area) constituency. 
Among these proposals, the approximation of the Board to the G20 seems like a 
good long term solution. The IMF remains an institution representing countries, and the 
management of the global financial crisis has demonstrated the relevance of the nation 
state in the international economic order (Moreno, 2010). Albeit with a mixed (and probably 
declining) coordination success since 2008 (see Chapter 1), the G20 is configured as the 
central body for economic strategic direction and coordination. In a context of economic 
globalization, there is a need for international decision making bodies, and while the G20 
is still far from it, it does make sense to try to approximate the composition of the different 
bodies (i.e. IMFC and G20) at least to avoid costly duplication and inter body coordination 
procedures. 
Figure 4.14 shows the differences between the composition of the Board of the 
IMF and the G20 linking the nineteen countries within the G20 and those who have an 
Executive Director (ED)  – permanent or rotating – in the IMF Board.
SOURCE: IMF.
a In brackets the situation when Mexico, Spain or Venezuela join their shared constituency.
Country leading the constituency 
# of countries
(country/chairs
ratio) 
% of
directors
pre-2006 post-2010
Europe
8 [9] (a): Germany, [Spain], France, Italy, Nordics, Belgium, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and Switzerland
50
(6)
33.3
[37.5]
35.68
[40.12]
32.22
[35.81]
    EU
7 [8] (a): Germany, [Spain], France, Italy, Nordics, Belgium, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom
42
(5.7)
29.2
[33.3]
32.86
[37.3]
29.43
[33.02]
    Euro zone
5 [6] (a): Germany, [Spain], France, Italy, Nordics, Belgium, 
Netherlands
33
(6.2)
20.8
[25]
24.58
[29.02]
22.13
[25.72]
America 5 [4] (a): Argentina, Brazil, Canada, USA, [Mexico/Venezuela]
35
(6.25)
20.8
[16.6]
29.17
[24.73]
29.75
[24.8]
Asia and Oceania 5: China, India, Thailand, Japan, South Korea/Australia
34
(6.8)
20.8 19.1 22.79
Middle East 3: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt 21 (7) 12.5 8.77 7.33
Sub-Saharan Africa 2: English speaking Africa, Francophone Africa 
43
(21.5)
8.3 4.44 5.12
Euro-Asia 1: Russia 1 4.1 2.69 2.59
Voting powerExecutive Directors 
IMF BOARD: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORS (2010-2012) FIGURE 4.13
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In the relation between the G20 and the Board we may underlie the following aspects:
— 12 countries are represented in the G20 and have permanent director: Brazil, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Saudi 
Arabia and Russia. 
— 8 countries are represented in the G20, but do not have a permanent director. 
All of them have a rotating director – Argentina, Australia, South Korea, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, Spain and South Africa, and Turkey (in this case only after 2012, 
previously, Turkey never rotated in the ED position). In some cases, the rotation 
is established with other G20 members, such is the case of South Korea with 
Australia, and Mexico with Spain (Spain has the status of permanent guest at 
the G20). 
— 5 groups of advanced and emerging countries, have director at the Board but 
they are not part of the G20. Of these, three have a rotating ED (Belgium/Neth-
erlands, Switzerland/Poland, and Nordic constituencies) and two a permanent 
Director (Egypt and Iran). 32
— The two sub-Saharan Africa constituencies group the largest number of coun-
tries of the Board. Other than South Africa, they are not part of the G20. 
— In the G20 there is no representation of developing countries and there is a low 
representation of African and Middle Eastern countries.
SOURCE: Own elaboration based on IMF and G20 information.
a Number of G20 member countries – Number of IMF member countries, in the region.
G20 country Non G20 country G20 country Non G20 country
France Nordic constituency
Germany Netherlands/Belgium
Italy Switzerland/Poland
UK (Turkey) Austria/ Eastern Europe
(Russia) Spain (invitee)/México Venezuela
Brazil México/Spain (invitee) Venezuela
Canada
USA
Argentina Chile/ Peru/ Uruguay
China Indonesia Thailand and Singapore
India South Korea/Australia
Japan
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Iran
South Africa Rotates with 20 countries 
Region (a)
America
[5-35]
Asia and
Oceania
[6-34]
Middle East
[1-21]
Sub Saharan Africa
[1-43] 22 countries rotate 
(francophone 
constituency)
Europe
[60-50]
(Euro-Asia)
[2-2]
Permanent ED 
IMF Executive Directors (ED)
Rotating EDs 
COMPARED COMPOSITION OF THE G20 AND THE IMF´S EXECUTIVE BOARD FIGURE 4.14
32  Egypt and Iran have been maintaining permanent Executive Director for the past 20 years, although the rotation 
agreement in their chairs is likely to vary.
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Considering these aspects, and based on the European commitment to give up 
two seats of advanced countries on the Board, a rapprochement could be reached be-
tween Board and G20 from the following changes to the Board: (i) the transfer of the least 
the equivalent of a chair to be led by emerging European countries (Turkey being a natural 
candidate to be benefited because its membership in the G20 and its traditional under-
representation in the IMF); ( ii) giving the equivalent to a second chair to be led by develop-
ing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and (iii) adapting the compositions and rotations of the 
chairs, especially the European ones, to better reflect the new quota structure following 
the 2010 reform and the structure of the G20. 
In parallel, the G20 should correct the under-representation of developing coun-
tries incorporating at least two additional countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This type of 
mechanism has already been introduced with the ad hoc invitations to developing coun-
tries to the summits. Finally, approaching the Board and G20 structures would dilute the 
debate on raising the IMFC range to Council whenever IMFC and G20 would have equiva-
lent and no competitive structures in the strategic direction of the IMF. 33 
33  It should be noted that the 19 countries belonging to the G20 have a voting power of 64.8%, which would reach 
83.6% when taking into account the aggregate voting power of their constituencies (85% when Indonesia holds 
the director position in its constituency). Therefore, the G20 would have, de facto, the political pulse and voting 
power necessary to make the changes in the Board.
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Futurology is more science fiction than it is economic science … 
But my time was well spent if it persuades you to adjure the big picture of proph-
ecy, and instead calculate the probabilistic odds … (Samuelson, 1994, p. 195-197)
On March 24, 2009, the IMF initiated a major review of its lending policy. As in previous 
crisis episodes, the Fund responded quickly to the global financial crisis by easing its lend-
ing conditions. The changes introduced have articulated a lending policy around the two 
basic functions of the Fund: crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Traditionally, crisis pre-
vention was a task that corresponded to the surveillance function of the IMF;1 from 2009, 
the Fund introduces a new insurance line directly aimed at preventing crisis.
In the previous chapters, we have analyzed the main determinants of IMF lending 
policy designed from 2009. This new policy, as we saw in Chapter 1, is part of the international 
response to the global financial crisis. Its specific elements are inheritors of the historical chang-
es in the lending policy and the new policy is accompanied by the necessary increase in Fund 
resources, which constitute its budget constraint (aspects discussed in Chapter 2). Moreover, a 
central element of the new lending policy is the development of the insurance function that is 
part of the GFSN discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, the reform is made possible by new political 
determinants in the IMF, both of formal and informal nature (developed in Chapter 4).
These antecedents place in the year 2009 a turning point in the IMF lending 
policy. We develop these aspects in sections 5.1 and 5.2, where the main characteristics 
of the crisis resolution and insurance facilities are analyzed, and in 5.3, the challenges 
facing the lending policy. Figure 5.1 summarizes the main design elements of the lines 
under the General Resources Account (GRA).
5.1 More realistic crisis resolution programs
In late 2008, with frozen international financial markets, many of the IMF member countries 
were venturing into of balance of payments crisis. The facilities at the Fund’s disposal were 
not sufficient to address a global crisis. Large volumes of short-term resources were need-
ed and adjustment programs that would allow to implement rescue policies and to boost 
demand, and there was also a need to boost confidence in markets, which did not distin-
guish among countries. 
The Fund responded by adapting its crisis resolution facilities in three ways: (A) a 
new approach – more realistic – to conditionality, (B) greater and more flexible access to 
Fund resources, and (C) simplification and rationalization of the lending facilities. 
A MORE REALISTIC CONDITIONALITY 
The conditionality is refocused towards a new approach more based on an overall assess-
ment of the program’s progress, rather than in the strict compliance with specific condi-
tions. The country, the staff, and the Board gain flexibility when assessing the program 
effectiveness and viability without being corseted by checking whether or not the country 
meets a list of preset conditions. 
The new approach mainly affects structural performance criteria, which are re-
moved from all programs and replaced by structural benchmarks – which are not of mandatory 
5 A more flexible lending policy
1  The exception was the never used CCL, as we saw in Chapter 2. Also, the CCFF introduced in 1988 a window 
for exogenous contingencies removed in 2000, although of limited time scope, and for a very specific casuistic 
of current account exogenous risks.
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compliance and are evaluated as a whole in the context of the overall review of the pro-
gram. Therefore, the monitoring of structural policies no longer requires that the country 
must meet specific reform conditions to continue receiving disbursements. The condition-
ality does retain the quantitative performance criteria, although some countries had also 
requested its elimination. Figure 5.2 shows the new structure of conditionality. 
Beyond the need to respond to the global financial crisis, the reform of the condi-
tionality cannot be understood without considering the consolidation in the Board of two 
SOURCE: IMF.
a 3NFDSGDQVHSGSGDRDE@BHKHSHDRSGD&1 @KRNjM@MBDRSGD1@OHC%HM@MBHMF(MRSQTLDMS1%(VGHBGOQNUHCDRTQFDMSQDRNTQBDRVHSGNTSSGDMDDCENQ@ETKKkDCFDC
OQNFQ@LHMDLDQFDMBXRHST@SHNMRRTBG@RM@STQ@KCHR@RSDQRONRSBNMkHBSRHST@SHNMRNQBNLLNCHSXOQHBDRGNBJR(SR@BBDRRHRKHLHSDC@MMT@KKXSNNE
PTNS@@MCSNHMSNS@K(SG@RSGDR@LDjM@MBHMFBNMCHSHNMR@RSGDQDRSNESGDE@BHKHSHDR@MCSGDR@LDQDO@XLDMSODQHNC@RSGD2! 
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IMF FACILITIES UNDER THE GENERAL RESOURCES ACCOUNT (2011) (GRA) (a) FIGURE 5.1
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principles that were gaining weight in the late 1990s: the ownership of the program by the 
country, and the parsimony (criticality) of the conditions.
In 2002, following an extensive consultation process, the IMF updated its guide-
lines on conditionality, which dated back to 1979.2 This revision recognized a set of princi-
ples that are considered central to the success of a program, including: the principle of 
ownership of the program by the country; the criticality and parsimony in implementing the 
conditions of the program; the adjustment of the program to the country circumstances; 
the clarity and specificity of the conditions; and the effective coordination with other mul-
tilateral institutions (IMF, 2002b).
The principle of ownership of the program results in a shift in the burden of program 
design from the staff to the country authorities. The program can only be effective to the ex-
tent that the authorities assume politically its execution and are able to transmit its necessity 
to the public opinion. The IMF must take an advisory role, but must not be perceived as im-
posing the program on the country − although as noted James Vreeland (2004), in many 
cases, the authorities would prefer to keep the IMF as the scapegoat for the reforms.
In practical terms, the development of this principle largely depends on the ca-
pacity of the mission chief and the authorities to negotiate a sustainable and politically vi-
able program.3 The institutional impregnation of the ownership criteria is reflected in high-
er negotiating leverage by the country authorities. It is also reflected in the deliberations of 
the Board, which since the 2000s, has recurrently debated on the level of ownership in the 
programs. 
In relation to the principle of parsimony, the 2002 Guidelines state that the condi-
tions of the program should be of central importance to achieve the program objectives, 
and must relate to macroeconomic and structural measures within the scope of IMF com-
petences, including: macroeconomic stabilization, monetary fiscal and exchange rate 
policies, and domestic and international financial markets and institutions and structural 
measures needed to implement these policies. It also required a greater justification for 
conditions outside these areas (IMF, 2002b).
In 2007, the IEO conducted an analysis of IMF structural conditionality that was 
particularly devastating and had a great institutional impact (IEO, 2008). After the analysis 
of 216 programs in 94 countries between 1995 and 2004 (with a more detailed analysis of 43 
of them and 13 case studies), it was concluded that structural conditionality was ineffec-
Prior actions are the measures a country adopts before the loan is approved. These are necessary conditions for the implementation 
NESGDOQNFQ@LDFSGDQDLNU@KNEOQHBDBNMSQNKRNQENQL@K@OOQNU@KNESGDFNUDQMLDMSATCFDSHM@BBNQC@MBDVHSGSGDjRB@K
framework of the program).   
Quantitative performance criteria@QDRODBHjBBNMCHSHNMRTRT@KKXQDF@QCHMFL@BQNDBNMNLHBU@QH@AKDRSG@SG@UDSNADETKjKKDCENQRTBBDRRHUD
disbursements to take place (e.g. a minimum level of net international reserves, a maximum level of Central Bank net domestic assets, or a maximum 
level of government borrowing). These criteria may be supplemented with indicative targets, usually set for the end of the program period and are 
reconverted into performance criteria, as the country economic situation becomes more solid.  
Structural benchmarks: measures that are considered central to achieving the objectives of the program and will depend on each case. It may 
include measures such as improvements in the jnancial sector or in public jnancial management, or construction of social safety nets. They do not 
condition the support from the Fund. 
Program reviews: regular reviews by the Board to analyze the progress of the program and  possible changes in light of new economic developments.  
SOURCE: IMF (2010l).  
CONDITIONALITY OF IMF PROGRAMS FIGURE 5.2 
2  For a discussion of the implications of the new 2002 guidelines see Serra (2003).
3  The political ability of the mission chief should not be taken for granted. It is important that they develop good 
communication skills and a good understanding of the country’s idiosyncrasy.
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tive and needed major reform. The average performance of the structural conditions was 
just over 50% (compared with 85% compliance with macroeconomic conditionality), and 
the efforts to reduce it, initiated since 2000, had not fructified (the programs were still 
maintaining an average of 17 conditions per program).4 Moreover, in many cases, the con-
ditions were neither clearly linked nor necessary to ensure the program’s success. The 
report concluded with the need for a change in institutional incentives of the Fund so that 
the programs were better suited to the technical and political realities of the countries, and 
proposed to set fewer conditions and more focused on their criticality to the program and 
the IMF expertise (it was proposed a limit up to 4 or 5 conditions as a guide to force a 
change in attitude of staff in negotiating programs). 
In 2008 the Fund has took another step by adopting a plan to strengthen the im-
plementation of the Guidelines. The plan called for better justification of the critical nature 
of the conditions and explicit linkages between goals, strategies and conditionality (IMF, 
2008b). The 2009 reform represents a definite step by directly eliminating structural perfor-
mance criteria. Later, in September 2012 the Guidelines have been reviewed taking into 
account the new type of program design after 2009, and the Fund has concluded that they 
were better applied and that remain broadly appropriate, placing again the emphasis on 
focused conditionality and ownership. 
B LARGER AND MORE FLEXIBLE ACCESS TO FUND RESOURCES
The policy of the IMF access limits had remained unchanged since 1994. The annual limit 
was set at 100% of the quota and cumulatively for the program at 300%. In 2008 it was 
clear that these limits did not allow sufficient resources to address the needs of a balance 
of payments crisis, much less in situations of capital account crisis, where countries should 
dispose of a high volume of short-term resources to appease mistrust in the markets.
The rapid process of economic globalization since the 1990s had increased the 
foreign exposure of the countries and therefore the potential needs for resources. The 
overall quota increase in 1998 (45%) had temporarily managed to correct the problem, and 
the ad hoc quota increases for 2006 and 2008 (11.5%) only marginally improved the ac-
cess for those countries that received a quota increase. The IMF estimated that, to re-
cover the relative level of access with respect to global GDP in 1998, the limits should be 
at [155% per year, and 464% cumulative] levels. The limits should even be higher when 
compared with the relative levels of 1998 with respect to other variables such as: world 
trade or international capital flows: [221%, 663%] and [215%, 645%] respectively (IMF, 
2008c).
In this context, in order to instill confidence on the availability of resources, the 
IMF modified its policy on access, expanding the limits and rationalizing the disbursement 
and cost structures. The following major changes were introduced:
(i) Duplication of the normal access limits. Finally, closer to the criterion regard-
ing capital flows and international trade, the IMF chooses doubling the ac-
cess limits, by placing them at 200% of quota for annual disbursements, and 
at 600% as the cumulative program limit.5 
(ii) Review of the exceptional access policy.  The exceptional access framework 
is extended, and now becomes active from the new ordinary limits. The 
4  The Board may approve the continuation of the program by granting waivers (exemptions) to the performance 
criteria. A waiver must be based on the good performance of the remainder of criteria and that the authorities are 
taking steps to address compliance. In practice, many programs accumulated several waivers that were re-
peated in successive revisions of the program, under guarantees on future compliance limited to mere declara-
tions of intent by the authorities.
5  On the other hand, it also doubles the outstanding credit threshold – up to 200% – that is required for the activa-
tion of the post-program monitoring (carried out once a program ends). 
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framework becomes applicable to any balance of payments difficulties (not 
just capital account), and incorporates a precautionary element: it may be 
activated in case of potential balance of payments needs (not only real). The 
criteria are reformulated as follows (IMF, 2009e): 
(a) The member is experiencing or has the potential to experience excep-
tional balance of payments pressures on the current account or the 
capital account, resulting in a need for Fund financing that cannot be 
met within the normal limits.
(b) A rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that there is a high proba-
bility that the member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term. 
However, in instances where there are significant uncertainties that 
make it difficult to state categorically that there is a high probability that 
the debt is sustainable over this period, exceptional access would be 
justified if there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers.6 Debt 
sustainability for these purposes will be evaluated on a forward-looking 
basis and may take into account, inter alia, the intended restructuring of 
debt to restore sustainability. This criterion applies only to public (do-
mestic and external) debt. However, the analysis of such public debt 
sustainability will incorporate any potential contingent liabilities of the 
government, including those potentially arising from private external in-
debtedness. 
(c) The member has prospects of gaining or regaining access to private capi-
tal markets within the timeframe when Fund resources are outstanding.
(d) The policy program of the member provides a reasonably strong pros-
pect of success, including not only the member’s adjustment plans but 
also its institutional and political capacity to deliver that adjustment.
(iii) Phasing in purchases and repurchases. The phasing in and frequency of dis-
bursements is adjusted to the nature of the balance of payments problem, 
and the evolution of the political and economic situation in the country. Even 
the possibility of a single disbursement at the approval of the agreement is 
opened, including elevated access levels with a preventive character, the so 
called HAPA.7 Furthermore, the rules on “expected repurchases” governing 
program repayments are repealed.8 
(iv) New interest rates and maturities. A new tiered rate system is introduced, 
with higher surcharges depending on the amounts drawn and the time 
elapsed. There is a fixed surcharge of 200 basis points (bp) to credit volumes 
above 300% of quota and additional 100 bp when live credit exceeds this 
percentage for more than three years. The fee for freezing funds (in the case 
of precautionary loans) also increases with the volume of guaranteed re-
sources (15 bp for an access level up to 200% of quota, 30 basis points up 
to 1,000%, and 60 bp above this amount).
C SIMPLIFICATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE FACILITIES TOOLKIT 
In parallel to the easing of conditionality and access, the IMF made  an adjustment in the 
financial facilities toolkit of the General Resources Account (GRA), leaving only two facili-
ties: the Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The EFF is 
6  This second sentence is added in 2011, due to the Greek program.
7  As we shall see in the next section, the HAPA is established as the alternative insurance offered by the Fund to 
countries that do not qualify for access to FCL or PCL.
8  The Fund had a complex system, which provided two dates for the repayment of loans (so-called repurchases): 
expected and obligation schedule of repurchases.  
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kept for cases in which the balance of payments crisis is structural in nature and requires 
further adjustment period (Figure 5.1). On the other hand, the concessional financing fa-
cilities for low-income countries are also reorganized (see Figure 5.3).
The goal is to maintain a single flexible framework that can be adapted to any bal-
ance of payments needs and to avoid the confusion and arbitration that may occur be-
tween facilities with different features, and designed for different types of balance of pay-
ments crises. In 2009 the following services – on the other hand in disuse – were eliminated: 
the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF, created in 1997), the Compensatory Financing 
Facility (CFF, 1963), and the newly created Short-term Liquidity Facility (SLF, 2008), which 
is replaced by the FCL. The cancellation of these facilities continues the simplification 
process that had already begun in 2000 and 2005, as we saw in Chapter 2.9
5.2 New insurance function without conditionality
At the turning point of the crisis with the collapse of Lehman on September 15, 2008, and 
the subsequent freezing of the capital markets, the IMF did not have any insurance instru-
ment that would allow countries a fast access to great volume resources in case of conta-
gion. The Fund reacted very quickly with the creation of the Short-term Liquidity Facility 
(SLF) on October 29. It was a service that offered fast and high finance to countries with 
sound economic policies, facing temporary liquidity problems in global capital markets. 
The SLF was the IMF’s contribution alongside with other international initiatives, such as 
the lines of credit opened by central banks in domestic markets or bilateral swaps between 
central banks. 
Soon, however, it will be revealed that the SLF was insufficient  – low access limits, 
short term and without possibility of precautionary use –. Further, it was overcome by the 
reforms of March 24, 2009, with the introduction of a new facility, the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL), the expansion of the access limits of the SBA,10 and the possibility that the SBA agree-
ments were used as precautionary instruments and with high access, the so-called HAPA. 
The FCL is constituted as a precautionary facility to ease the risk of illiquidity, 
without conditionality, and formally with unlimited access − although initially it was estab-
lished an implicit limit of 1,000% of the quota − for countries with good economic funda-
mentals and a history of implementing sound economic policies. Countries may access it 
if they meet pre qualification criteria.11 The HAPAs was left for countries with worse funda-
mentals that could sign a precautionary high-access program (without a specified limit), 
with the possibility of a single initial disbursement in case of liquidity problems.
In practice, because of the design of the qualification criteria, but also by an im-
plicit understanding, an asymmetry in the Funds facilities had been introduced so that: the 
advanced and emerging countries with large and strong economies, had access to pre-
cautionary funding without conditionality (FCL), while for other countries, a program was 
required (HAPA). In this context, the G20 pushed for further reform of insurance facilities to 
give a greater coverage to all member countries.
Thus, the initial framework was reformed in August 2010 by creating the Precau-
tionary Credit Line (PCL), to insure against risks of liquidity to countries with moderate 
balance of payments vulnerabilities. The PCL is halfway between the FCL and the HAPA. 
As the FCL maintains qualification criteria, but remains, like the HAPA, with ex post condi-
tionality, although smaller and focused on the vulnerabilities of balance of payments 
(therefore less strict in principle). The PCL limits access to an initial 500% during the first 
 9  For a detailed analysis of the simplification of the IMF financial facilities see Casas and Serra (2008).
10  Extending the ordinary limit of 600% SBA far exceeded the limit of the SLF, which offered only up to 500% of 
quota, with a maturity of three months and renewable up to twice a year.
11  This will save one of the main drawbacks of the former CCL, which required a new authorization from the Board 
to access resources once approved (see Chapter 2).
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On July 23, 2009, the IMF Board approved the reform of financing 
instruments for low-income countries. The reform will follow the 
same guidelines of the March 24 reform for the facilities financed 
with the GRA: easing of conditionality, expanding access limit, 
simplification of facilities and establishment of a line of insurance. 
It also increases the concessionality component. 
Simplification of concessional financing facilities. Existing facilities 
are replaced by three new credit lines (see table below). 
Flexibilization of conditionality. Structural performance criteria are 
eliminated and reinforced the emphasis on growth and poverty re-
duction. Programs should explain how these objectives are to be 
achieved and shall include, as far as possible, those that are spe-
cific to protect priority social expenditures. In the case of the RCF 
(shocks facility), it eliminates the requirement of having a PRSP, 
and conditionality should focus on correcting the shock in ques-
tion with less emphasis on structural adjustment.
Greater concessionality. The ECF and SCF provide for a variable 
interest rate indexed to the SDRs rate, which ensures greater con-
cessionality that the prior scheme of fixed interest rates (the PRGF 
and ESF rates were at 0.5%). Temporarily until January 2012, and 
as attention to the impact of the global financial crisis on low-inco-
me countries, it is set up a zero rate interest to the payments for 
the RCF (and thereafter 0.25). Repayment periods are held in 10 
years, with a grace period of 5 years and a half, except SCF line, 
whose term was cut to eight years, with a grace period of four.
FIGURE 5.3REFORM OF FACILITIES FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
Facility Characteristics Access
Extended Credit Facility, 
ECF (2009)
Replaces the PRGF, conjgured as the main instrument of 
concessional jnancing of low-income countries. Provides jnancial 
medium term support to low-income countries with balance of 
payments problems.
Standby Credit Facility, 
SCF (2009)
It becomes a specijc SBA for low-income countries with
the advantage that it includes a grant element (smaller than the 
ECF). It differs from the ECF because it is short-term oriented to 
correct balance of payments imbalances and not medium term 
problems related to development and poverty reduction. As SBA 
has the possibility to be used as precautionary instrument. 
Rapid Credit Facility (2009) Line designed for emergency and transitory funding needs
or in response to shocks, replacing the various facilities that
the IMF had to that effect. Therefore, it combines into a single
and kexible facility, the assistance to shocks without distinguishing 
the origin. This facility eliminates the requirement of a PRSP. 
Replaces the ESF.
Provides quick jnancial support to low-income countries with 
urgent balance of payments needs. Direct disbursements without 
conditionality  or evaluations.
Annual: 12.5% quota.
Total: 50% quota. (a)
In case of an answer to shocks, expandable to
Annual: 25% quota.
Total: 62,5% quota.
Annual: 50% quota.
Total: 150% quota. (a) 
Extended in exceptional circumstances.
Bi-annual evaluation (or quarterly in periods of 
high volatility). 
SOURCE: IMF.
NOTE: The IMF maintains an additional program with no jnancial support, the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) that acts as a seal of approval on the country´s 
policies.
a The inicial reference access limits approved in 2009 at 100 and 300 percent of cuota (25% and 75% for the RCI), were reduced in 2013 in line with the relative 
reduction in resources of the PRGT subsidy account.
year, plus an additional 500% after one year and subject to good progress in the program. In parallel, the FCL conditions 
were also improved in two ways: extending the concession period from one to two years (with review of eligibility criteria 
in twelve months), and a deletion of the implicit access limit of 1,000% of quota.
Again at the initiative of the G20, on November 21, 2011, the framework is newly reformed by creating a window 
of liquidity in the PCL, which is now called the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). The PLL maintains its precautionary 
function and opens the option of providing short-term liquidity in a modality of six months and limiting access to 250% of 
quota, which could reach up to 500% in a situation of extreme systemic crisis.
The PLL has been linked to the need of a facility for the debt crisis in Europe. However, its introduction had more 
to do with the will of the G20 and IMF to provide short-term liquidity of the type offered by central banks with bilateral 
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swaps. The Fund had been trying it since 2010 with the rejected proposal to create multi-
country swaps,12 within a broader framework that also intended to coordinate the con-
certed actions of central banks. In 2011, the French presidency of the G20 reopens this 
debate. The decision to open the liquidity window of the PLL comes as an easier solution 
than activating a new facility that could be identified directly as a foreign currency liquidity 
swap, although it comes very close to it in practice (with the exception of fixing  explicit 
qualification criteria).
The introduction of the FCL and the PLL has two implications which represent 
a turning point in the lending policy of the Fund: (i) the introduction of eligibility criteria 
or ex ante conditionality, and (ii) the reinterpretation of the balance of payments (BoP) 
need test. 
(i) The introduction of eligibility criteria or ex ante conditionality.
The FCL eliminates the traditional ex post conditionality structured around a pro-
gram that dominated all the facilities of the IMF since its inception in the 1950s, and re-
places it by ex ante eligibility criteria as a condition to access the program. In practice, the 
same applies to the PLL for the first tranche of 500% of quota (for the second tranche of 
500%, it will have to demonstrate progress with the program). Access in both cases is 
established from a series of preset eligibility criteria, focused on five areas: external sector, 
fiscal and monetary policies, financial system and quality of economic information (see 
Figure 5.1). In the case of the FCL the country must show good performance on all the 
criteria, and at least on three of them in the case of PLL.
(ii) Extending the test of balance of payments (BoP) need.
Article I of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides that one of the objectives of the 
IMF, is to make resources available to the members “…temporarily available to them under 
adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in 
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or interna-
tional prosperity”. Equally, Article V Section 3 (b) (ii) “the member represents that it has a 
need to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or 
developments in its reserves” (IMF, 1993). Therefore, the doctrine of the loans is based on 
the existence of a need or declared balance of payments imbalance, and in the condition-
ality to ensure the country’s capacity to repay the loan.
Over time, the concept of balance of payments need has evolved from shortages 
of reserves or current account deficit, to the assessment of the factors that determine the 
balance of payments crisis, and the external debt servicing capacity. So normally the staff 
evaluates aspects such as public or private debt, prospects for direct investment, portfolio 
investment developments (domestic and foreign), foreign exchange framework, risk of 
capital flight, financial system stability, or level of reserves.
The insurance facilities introduce a new variant, enabling resources as a precau-
tionary measure for a country, which expressly is recognized as being in a good balance 
of payments situation – before an imbalance occurs –.13 Legally, this change is based on 
the criterion that the balance of payments need is circumscribed to the “access” to the 
resources, and not to the signing of the agreement. Thus a precautionary agreement can 
be signed, as long as access to resources will only occur if the country has a liquidity 
problem, that is, when the necessity arises (IMF, 2009a).
Beyond the legal aspect, precautionary arrangements are based on the high cost 
of capital account crisis, both for the country and for the world, via contagion. The best 
12  They were unilateral offers of parallel swap lines to the affected countries with risk of illiquidity for a period of 3 
to 6 months (see Chapter 3).
13  The extinct and never used CCL tried to offer a facility in those terms: allocation of resources without a context 
of crisis, and for countries with strong fundamentals (see Chapter 2).
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way to address them is the containment before they occur, via signaling and giving confi-
dence to the markets, so that the IMF plays a catalytic role to maintain the country’s ac-
cess to capital markets, thereby avoiding the appearance of a BoP need. This is the kind 
of argument built at the end of 1990s after the Asian crisis (see Chapter 1).
In short, with the two new precautionary facilities, the IMF provides insurance 
without conditionality against an exogenous liquidity shock. And it does so in a double 
way: by providing resources when needed, and with the implicit guarantee to the markets 
that the country is in good health and has the explicit support of the Fund. As an example, 
the first FCL and PCL loans granted, have allowed extensive coverage of about 15% of the 
potential balance of payments risks, 60% in the case of Mexico (using as proxy the short-
term debt, see Figure 5.4).
The FCL and PLL are the type of insurance facilities that had traditionally been 
demanded by emerging economies. The new governance structure of the IMF, discussed 
in Chapter 4, with a greater weight of emerging economies, allowed the development of 
this insurance function. In fact, the creation of the PCL and the relaxation of the FCL in 
2010 are largely driven by South Korea, which placed the GFSN reform as a priority of its 
G20 presidency that year. As seen in Chapter 3, the insurance function of the IMF is part 
of the GFSN, with swaps, bilateral agreements, regional funds, and accumulation of re-
serves (self-insurance).
In November 2011, the Fund anticipates the revision of the FCL and the PLL, 
which was scheduled for 2013,14 and brings back to 2013-14 the next revision, or ear-
lier if loans under these facilities exceed SDR 150,000 million (instead of the normal five 
years for reviews). This cautious revision policy responds to the lack of consensus in 
the Board on the insurance function of the Fund. The FCL has been subject of signifi-
cant discussion and there has been reluctance to its approval, especially by some ad-
vanced economies of continental Europe concerned with the high moral hazard posed 
by a lending window without conditionality (the next section assesses the continuity of 
the Fund’s insurance function). Figure 5.5 reviews the use of the new insurance and 
crisis resolution facilities since they were activated in 2009 (see also Figure 2.7 in 
Chapter 2).
SOURCE: IMF.
a US $ millions.
b Short term public and private debt with maturity in 2011 and 2012 of foreign and domestic creditors.
c Level of reserves at the moment of granting the credit. 
d "NKNLAH@RTARBQHADC@jQRS%"+HMENQNEPTNS@@MC@SGHQCNMDHM,@XENQ
e ,DWHBN@MC/NK@MCQDMDVDCSGDOQDUHNTRSGD%"+RTARBQHADCHMENQ@MCNESGDPTNS@QDRODBSHUDKX3GDSGQDDBNTMSQHDRG@UD@F@HMQDMDVDC
FCLs in 2012/2013. 
 Puota P (a) P/ std
Colombia (d) -May-10 (1 year)  3,00 1 22, ,00
Mexico (e) 10-Jan-11 (2 years) 1,30 2,100 6 , 123,
Poland (e) 21-Jan-11 (2 years) 1,13 2,200 1 ,000 ,100
PCL Macedonia 1-Jan-11 (2 years)  630 1 ,000 2,100
Reserves (a) (c)
Loan Amount
FCL
Approval Date  
(duration)
CountryLine
Short term
debt (std) (b)
  
FCL AND PCL GRANTED BY THE IMF (2009 TO 1 FEBRUARY 2011) FIGURE 5.4
14  The FCL is born with a review clause in August 2013, or sooner if the loans exceed 100,000 million SDR (IMF, 
2010m). The review is advanced to November 2011 to coincide with the conversion of the PCL into the PLL and 
taking into account that loans under these facilities had already reached 70,000 million SDRs. It is important to 
note that unlike the CCL sunset clause, now the burden of proof in the reviews is to establish that these facilities 
are unnecessary (for the CCL, its utility had to be demonstrated and it ended up expiring without renewal be-
cause it was never used).
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FIGURE 5.5PROGRAMS UNDER THE NEW LENDING POLICY (2009-2011)
BenejBHary Bountry
Type
of agreement (a)
US$ MHll. (b) % quota % GDP Length (months)
Date of approval
or last renewal
Europe (c) 230,122.2 892.3% 9.9% 27.7
    GrDDBe SBA 41,641.3 2,398.6% 13.6% 36.5 9-May-2010
    Portugal EFF 37,402.2 2,305.0% 16.3% 36.5 20-May-2011
    Ireland EFF 30,665.6 1,547.4% 14.8% 36.5 16-DDB-2010
    Poland (d) FCL 30,193.3 1,135.4% 6.4% 24.3 21-Jan-2011
    RomanHa (e) SBA 18,026.8 1,111.0% 11.2% 23.2 4-May-2009
    UkraHne (e) SBA 17,328.9 801.7% 12.6% 24.3 5-Nov-2008
    Hungary SBA 16,600.3 1,015.2% 12.7% 23.3 6-Nov-2008
    UkraHne (e) SBA 15,753.6 728.9% 11.4% 29.4 28-Jul-2010
    RomanHa (e) SBA 4,868.8 300.1% 3.0% 24.3 31-Mar-2011
    SerbHa (e) SBA 4,126.1 559.6% 10.9% 27.3 16-Jan-2009
    Belarus SBA 3,575.3 588.0% 6.5% 15.1 12-Jan-2009
    LatvHa SBA 2,397.1 1,071.6% 10.0% 24.3 23-DDB-2008
    IBDK@nd SBA 2,205.5 1,186.4% 17.5% 33.5 29-Nov-2008
    BosnH@&Herz. SBA 1,598.4 600.4% 12.9% 36.3 8-Jul-2009
    SerbHa (e) SBA 1,473.6 199.9% 3.9% 18.2 29-Sep-2011
    GeorgHa SBA 1,177.0 498.1% 10.1% 33.4 15-Sep-2008
    MaBedonHa PCL 651.3 599.1% 7.1% 24.3 19-Jan-2011
    Moldova EFF 291.1 150.2% 5.0% 36.5 29-Jan-2010
    Kosovo SBA 146.0 157.0% 2.6% 18.3 21-Jul-2010
LatinAmerica (c) 84,737.2 514.5% 6.2% 30.7
    MexHBo (d) FCL 74,501.9 1,304.2% 7.2% 24.3 10-Jan-2011
    ColombHa (d) FCL 6,096.6 500.0% 2.1% 24.3 6-May-2011
    DomHnHB@n Rep. SBA 1,724.2 499.8% 3.3% 28.3 9-Nov-2009
    Jam@HBa SBA 1,292.6 299.5% 9.7% 27.3 4-Feb-2010
    El Salvador SBA 809.6 300.5% 3.8% 50.3 26-Jan-2009
    AntHg.&Barbuda SBA 127.6 578.6% 10.2% 36.5 7-Jun-2010
    Honduras SBA 102.0 49.8% 0.7% 18.2 1-OBt-2010
    St.KHtts & NevHs SBA 82.7 583.4% 12.2% 36.5 27-Jul-2011
Asia (c) 19,118.2 402.5% 5.0% 30.4
    PakHstan SBA 11,399.1 699.8% 6.4% 34.7 24-Nov-2008
    Iraq SBA 3,744.3 200.1% 4.6% 24.3 24-Feb-2010
    SrH Lanka SBA 2,605.0 400.4% 5.3% 34.5 24-Jul-2009
    ArmenHan (e) SBA 840.6 580.0% 9.0% 28.4 6-Mar-2009
    MongolHa SBA 241.5 300.6% 3.9% 18.3 1-Apr-2009
    ArmenHan (e) EFF 210.2 145.0% 2.2% 36.5 28-Jun-2010
    MaldHves SBA 77.5 492.0% 3.6% 36.5 4-DeB-2009
ÁfrHBa (B 1,412.0 213.4% 2.6% 29.4
    Angola SBA 1,353.1 300.3% 1.6% 27.4 23-Nov-2009
    SeyBhelles (e) EFF 31.2 180.0% 3.3% 36.5 23-DDB-2009
    SeyBhelles (e) SBA 27.7 160.0% 3.0% 24.3 14-Nov-2008
TOTAL (c) 335,389.6 662.9% 7.6% 29.0
  
LOANS GRANTED UNDER GRA (FALL 2008 TO 30 NOVEMBER 2011)
SOURCE: Based on IMF data.
a 2S@MCAX FQDDLDMS2! $WSDMCDC%TMC%@BHKHSX$%%%KDWHAKD"QDCHS+HMD%"+/QDB@TSHNM@QX@MC+HPTHCHSX+HMD/++
b $WBG@MFD1@SD¨2#1
c 1DFHNM@K@MCSNS@KjFTQDR@QD@M@UDQ@FDENQ@KKBNTMSQHDRHMSGDQDFHNM
d #TQHMFSGDODQHNC"NKNLAH@,DWHBN@MC/NK@MCQDMDVDCSGDHQ%"+SGDjFTQDQDEDQRSNSGDK@SDRSQDMDV@K
e "NTMSQHDRSG@SRHFMLNQDSG@MNMDOQNFQ@LCTQHMFSGDODQHNCSGDjFTQDRTLRSGDU@QHNTROQNFQ@LRRHFMDCTMCDQSGD&1 
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The table above includes loans from the IMF between the fall of 
2008 (after the deepening crisis with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers) and the end of 2011, most of them approved under the 
new lending policy framework approved in March 2009. During 
these years the IMF has provided loans worth US$ 335,000 mi-
llion. Several trends are observed:
Access. On average, the access in crisis resolution programs, SBA 
and EFF, is approximately at 607% (663% including the FCL and 
PLL precautionary arrangements), on the border of the new limits 
of ordinary lending policy, indicating the opportunity of the increa-
se given the larger need for resources in the global financial crisis. 
In fact, in nine countries the limit has been exceeded and the ex-
ceptional access activated. In several European countries there is 
also the additional contribution of the EU, which in the case of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal is on average 200% of additional re-
sources. The program with Greece is a historical record in quota 
percentage (2,400%) previously held by the program with South 
Korea in 1997 totaling SDR 15,500 million, which represented 
1,938% of the quota (but then South Korea was under-represen-
ted by quota in the IMF). Finally, on average, there are large initial 
disbursements (necessary in confidence-boosted crisis), with the 
first tranche of payment exceeding 25% of the total program, 
compared to 15% during the Asian crisis (IMF, 2011f)
Regional concentration. The programs with European countries 
account for about 68.6%. The percentage rises to 87% when con-
sidering only crisis resolution programs (excluding FCL and PLL). 
Here, there is a high weight of the programs with Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, but also with the countries of Eastern Europe. By 
volume of resources, 8 of the top 10 programs are awarded to 
European countries. It should be noted that in the case of Africa, 
the majority of programs are granted under concessional financing 
through PRGT account, with an approximate value of US$ 18,000 
million.
Type of facility. The FCL to Mexico for about US$ 74,500 million is 
the greatest facility granted, and the sum of the three FCL to Mexico, 
Poland and Colombia in the amount of US$ 110,800 million repre-
sents 33% of total loans.
FIGURE 5.5PROGRAMS UNDER THE NEW LENDING POLICY (2009-2011) (cont’d)
5.3 The lending policy challenges 
The new framework of the Fund lending policy has allowed giving response to the global 
financial crisis. Now, the question is its stability in the future. As we have seen, although 
the reform can be framed in the historical process of the Fund’s lending policy, its central 
elements are articulated in a few months from October 2008 to March 2009, marked by the 
need for a rapid response to the crisis. In this sense, there is no general consensus on the 
Board, or the G20, on the opportunity to maintain a more flexible lending policy once a 
stable growth path has been recovered. 
The future path of the lending policy will depend on historical, budgetary, eco-
nomic, and political factors that we have analyzed in Chapters 1-4. This section analyzes 
the main challenges to the new IMF lending policy. To present them in a systematic way, 
notwithstanding the high interrelation between the different challenges and elements and 
the difficult compartmentalization, Figure 5.6 relates various elements of the lending policy 
and the key challenges, classified into three broad principles: sufficiency, sustainability, 
and predictability.
— Sufficiency. Member countries should have access to the resources needed to 
solve balance of payments problems. This would require a Fund with sufficient 
resources to meet demand and that the country quota reflects the country’s 
weight in the global economy (and thus the volume of loan resources they may 
have access to).
— Sustainability. There must be safeguards to ensure that the policy can be main-
tained over time. This will require effective programs to resolve the country’s 
crisis, and ensure the return of the loans to the Fund so that it may continue 
lending to other members. It also requires addressing moral hazard problems 
that may encourage unsustainable behavior of countries and investors in the 
expectation of an IMF bailout.
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— Predictability. Clear and transparent rules, so that countries and markets can 
interpret the different facilities and the signals transmitted avoiding problems 
of stigmatization. In addition, countries should have access to the various re-
sources on an equal basis, that is, equal lending lines under similar economic 
circumstances. 
A SUFFICIENCY
The IMF should have sufficient resources to support member countries with balance of 
payments imbalances and to fulfill its mandate in overseen global economic stability. Fur-
ther, the new lending policy framework is an important challenge, because access limits of 
crisis resolution facilities are doubled, exceptional access criteria relaxed, and new insur-
ance tools allow access without predetermined quota limit (such is the case of the FCL). 
Furthermore, the quota increase will also raise the volume of resources that each country 
can access. Moreover, to the extent that the insurance facilities are intended as a substi-
tute to the accumulation of reserves, they should have a quasi-permanent character.
As we saw in Chapter 2, with the NAB and the doubling of quotas, approved in 
October 2010 (ratification scheduled for 2013/14), the volume of IMF quota and NAB re-
sources stands at about US$ 1 trillion (see Figure 2.8), additionally, the G20 has committed 
throughout 2012/13 another US$ 460,000 millions in bilateral temporary contributions. Tak-
ing 2010 as reference, this volume allows placing the permanent resources of the IMF in 
1998 levels, relative to world GDP, but far from the relative levels in terms of capital flows. 
Further, the expectation in the medium and long term should be further growth of the world 
economy and therefore ceteris paribus a decline in the Fund resources relative weight. 
Principles Elements Challenge
a.1. Regular adjustment of resources:
quotas and bilateral / NAB.
Ensure availability of resources to the Fund and that 
countries have access according to their relative weight 
in the world economy.
a.2. Strengthening cooperation with Regional
Financial Arrangements (RFAs).
Coordinate programs with RFAs, and projting of 
comparative advantages.
a.3. Creating liquidity by the IMF. It is inserted into the broader discussion of International 
Monetary System and the IMF as a lender of last resort. 
It includes aspects such as leveraging by the IMF or the 
issuance of SDRs (the alternative less viable, with 
opposition by the main member countries).
b.1. Surveillance and coordination
of economic policies.
Effective surveillance and coordination of macroeconomic 
policies as a precondition to granting programs, to avoid 
country moral hazard.
b.2. Conditionality. Maintain compliance standards and eligibility criteria
in insurance facilities, to ensure repayment of the loan
and avoid country moral hazard. 
b.3. Private sector involvement. Avoiding investor moral hazard through private sector 
involvement in the resolution of the crisis.
b.4. Exit strategies. Limit moral hazard problems because continued access 
to the facilities (except in the case of insurance facilities).
c.1. Transparency. Transparency on the nature of the various facilities
to avoid stigma.
c.2. Institutional balance of power. Ensure equal treatment between countries in access
to various facilities and the future changes are made
in the interests of its members. 
A. Sufjciency
B. Sustainability
C. Predictability
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
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While the international community has taken a number of initiatives that should in 
theory reduce the need for Fund resources in the future, including, enhanced IMF surveil-
lance – more focused on an early identification of crisis –; strengthened sovereign debt 
management (the IMF and the World bank are revisiting their guidelines on public debt 
management and revising their analysis on debt sustainability and debt limits); and efforts 
to improve the resilience of financial markets through strengthened financial and macro-
financial regulation, and improved banking resolution mechanisms (see Chapter 1); the 
increasing global economic interconnectedness calls for caution. Further, there is uncer-
tainty on the outcome of the exit strategies of the unprecedented expansionary monetary 
policies, and over sovereign risk and the medium-term public debt reduction strategies in 
advanced economies. 
Therefore, the Fund faces the challenge of adapting its resources to the growing 
and more interconnected world economy. In this respect, we may consider three main al-
ternatives: (A.1) regular adjustment of resources; (A.2) strengthen cooperation with RFAs; 
(A.3) the creation of liquidity by the IMF.
A.1 Regular adjustment of resources: quotas, NAB and bilateral loans (and market lending)
One first option is to update regularly the stable resources of the Fund, either the quotas 
or the NAB (quotas and NAB are in practice quasi-permanent IMF resources). As we saw 
in Chapter 2, the funding for the period 2008-2011 has been covered mainly with bilateral 
loans and the NAB, and it will continue this way until the ratification of the doubling of 
quotas (expected in 2013/2014). However, the Fund should sustain its character of quota 
based institution, as explicitly recognized in the NAB reform. Therefore, the aim should be 
a regular update of quotas.
The IMF normally conducts a five-year general review of quotas, but the 2010 
quota reform included a commitment to review the quota formula in 2013 and advance to 
2014 the XVth General Review. As we saw in Chapter 4, after the reforms of 2006-2008 
and 2010, the criteria of selective general increases supplemented by ad hoc quota in-
creases has settled down (compared to the previous equiproportional criteria), ensuring 
that any future increases will go in the direction of bringing the share of each country to its 
relative weight in the world economy (measured by the formula).
However, traditionally there has been reluctance to regular increases of IMF quo-
tas, both because of governance considerations, and out of caution against giving more 
financial leeway to the Fund. This reluctance is still very much alive and very likely to con-
tinue in the future, even more so once it has been reached the psychological threshold of a 
trillion dollars in quotas and NAB resources. Therefore, it is unlikely to see significant quota 
increases in the next GRQs, beyond small increments to correct misalignments between 
calculated and actual quotas in favor of the most under-represented countries, along the 
lines of the 2006-2008 ad hoc increases. The requirement of an 85% qualified majority rule 
(including veto power by the US) to decide the increases, will continue slowing this route. 
The exception could be another major global crisis to facilitate a political agree-
ment to promote a new escalation in the IMF resources, as happened in the last general 
quota increases in 1998 and 2010, respectively linked to the Asian and global financial 
crisis.15 However, even if the need for additional resources arises, it is likely that the first 
step would be financing them through official bilateral loans of a temporary nature. This is 
the kind of initiative that we have seen in 2012 with the G20 committing almost half a billion 
US$ in temporary bilateral loans and Note Purchase Agreements. 
15  For 2010, the main determinant of the duplication of quotas has been the governance reform. In any case, the 
quota increase will absorb most of the bilateral loans granted in 2009 and the NAB increase approved in April 
2010, which are determined by the need for resources to the global financial crisis.
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Finally, it should be noted that the Articles of Agreement also allow access to pri-
vate sector loans. This is however an option that has never been used, mainly due to po-
litical difficulties and the reluctance of countries to a Fund financially dependent on the 
markets. It would be worthwhile to reopen this debate, particularly in the case of insurance 
facilities (FCL, PLL), which by design are much less likely to be used by the country.
A.2 Strengthening cooperation with RFAs 
A second option is to strengthen the co-financing of programs with RFAs, which allows the 
sharing of resources and giving more financial support to the country. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, this cooperation allows to exploit comparative advantages of the Fund (exper-
tise in the design and program implementation) and of the regional arrangement  (greater 
proximity to the problems of the region). It also allows for a stronger link between the 
source of the resources and the risk of contagion, focused especially on the region, be-
cause the economic integration of the country at risk with its neighbors. 
So far, the regional agreement with a greater capacity for active cooperation with 
the IMF is the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM). The EU has a framework of super-
vision and monitoring of European economies through the Commission and the European 
Central Bank that is a prerequisite to the articulation of an effective lending policy, and a 
necessary condition to perform the monitoring and implementation of the program when 
activated. Furthermore, the mechanism is adequately resourced (the ESM will have 
€ 500,000 millions for loans) to sufficiently cope with crises of its member countries.
In Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative also has the potential for further cooperation with 
the IMF, but still has to develop a strong regional monitoring structure. In the current frame-
work, Chiang Mai does not have sufficient institutional resources, and delegates in the IMF 
the program design and implementation. Outside the EU and Asia, there are no agree-
ments of entity that could allow for more active cooperation with the Fund and it remains 
to be seen that can be developed.16 
Future collaboration with regional agreements will depend, therefore, on the im-
pulse that these agreements receive. So far, with respect to this collaboration, the G20 has 
identified a set of general principles to limit inconsistencies, including aspects such as: 
permanent dialogue, early cooperation, compatible conditionality, coordinated oversight 
depending on the comparative advantages of each institution, respect for the rules and 
procedures of each of the parties involved and the preferred creditor status of the IMF.17 
From the experience of cooperation with Europe some considerations may be drawn both 
in coordinating the bailouts and in the surveillance.
Regarding the coordination of programs, a particularly interesting develop-
ment is the joint announcement of the program and its strategy. The Fund has unsuc-
cessfully tried to promote a joint mechanism called Global Stabilization Mechanism 
(GSM), that in future scenarios of global or regional systemic crisis, would issue a 
signal of the international institutions reporting on their ability and willingness to meet 
the needs of its member countries.18 Any such mechanism would generate confidence 
16  In Latin America has been notorious the failure of Bank of the Americas and initiatives such as the 1988 FLAR 
have concentrated very little resources (see Chapter 3). More recently, in 2013 the BRICs have announced a 
joint Contingency Reserves Arrangement (CRA) with an initial size of US$ 100 bn, which nonetheless remains 
on the low size of resources.
17  The debt with the IMF is senior with respect to contracts with the regional agreement. Again the IMF-EU coop-
eration is setting a precedent for maintaining the preferred creditor status of the IMF. 
18  The IMF proposal includes offering all the policies that have actually been implemented at various times since 
2009, including: the announcement on the mechanisms to ensure the adequacy of financial resources and li-
quidity of the IMF (NAB activation and Fund bilateral borrowing); the menu of facilities for affected countries 
(from FCL to SBA), with the possibility of a general invitation to avoid possible stigma problems associated with 
being the first applicant, and coordination mechanisms with other institutions and the private sector (Vienna 
initiative type). IMF (2010n).
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in the markets mitigating the effects of a crisis. The difficulty lies deciding when it will 
be activated, because the activation itself may have a reverse effect on the markets 
fueling a possible situation of growing distrust. 
Another important aspect is the coordination of program design. The programs 
with Greece, Ireland and Portugal are setting a precedent. These are programs coordi-
nated among the three mission chiefs: from the IMF, the ECB and the Commission, so that 
the IMF (and EU institutions) loses autonomy in program design. There is also the principle 
of ownership of the program by the authorities as an element to improve the chances of 
successful implementation. This is a negotiating structure that inevitably will generate in-
ternal disputes that will need to be sorted out. In the future, it seems plausible to consider 
unifying the negotiating team under one head of mission. Here, the Fund has greater ex-
pertise, albeit the EU is committing larger amount of resources.  
Beyond program coordination, it will also be important the consistency in the sur-
veillance and diagnosis of the country. This will be especially relevant in the case of FCL-
type precautionary funding, which requires monitoring and coordinating the eligibility cri-
teria. It remains to be seen whether regional agreements will or not incorporate insurance 
facilities. For now, only Europe contemplates this possibility, after a long internal political 
debate.19 For example, in this case, the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
and the new pact for the euro, represent a de facto requirement that exceeds the eligibility 
criteria of the FCL.20
A.3 Creating liquidity by the IMF 
The IMF could also guarantee sufficient resources through the creation of its own liquidity. 
This is an option that has been discussed repeatedly, especially regarding its potential role 
as a lender of last resort, and can be traced back to the very origins of the Fund, with the 
proposal of Keynes’s bancor as an international monetary unit. In practice, this function 
has run into opposition from key partner countries, not interested in a Fund with suprana-
tional central bank functions. There seems not to be a viable option in the medium term, at 
least not in the classic sense attributed to Bagehot.21
More recently, the debate is being posed in terms of the reform of the international 
monetary system, which has been a priority of the French Presidency of the G20 in 2011. In 
this sense, it can be thought of gradual changes in the direction of a greater weight to the 
Fund in the IMS. An important element is the role to be played by the SDR. Thus, the G20 
London Summit in April 2009 passed an issuance of SDR 250,000 million, distributed among 
member countries in terms of the quota. The Fund urged the signing of voluntary agreements 
of purchase and sale of SDR, between institutional agents to promote its use.
However, the SDR is not a currency of international use, and their utilization 
would require the conversion to a market quoted currency. It also presents important le-
gal restrictions because the IMF Agreement requires a 85% qualified majority to approve 
or cancel the emissions, which also must be based on the existence of a global need for 
reserves. The Fund is trying to promote a greater role for the SDR with pragmatic propos-
als such as allowing its use by the private sector, expand the basket of currencies, or use 
it as a reference in international economic data (see Chapter 3). However, there is quite a 
reluctance within the Board to promote a greater role for the SDR, whenever not a clear 
19  The EFSF does not incorporate initially precautionary funding. After several European Councils throughout 
2011, eventually, in the July 2011 it was agreed to incorporate it to the ESM. 
20  Poland requested the FCL to the Fund without previous consultation with the European institutions creating 
some discomfort in Brussels and gave way to a process of consultation and prior information within the ECOFIN 
for future programs with the IMF.
21  The traditional functions of Walter Bagehot (1826-1877) established that “in a crisis, the lender of last resort 
should lend freely, with a penalization rate and with good collateral” (quoting from Fisher, 1999). For a discus-
sion of the main elements of the debate on the IMF as lender of last resort see Fisher (1999).
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opposition.22 It does not seem likely to see a significant increase in the role of the SDR, 
beyond specific reforms to improve its usability and, in the medium term, the inclusion of 
the renminbi in the basket of currencies that compose it.
An interesting variant is the ability of leveraging by the IMF. Loans from the IMF are 
supported in a 1:1 ratio between the committed resources under the program and the re-
sources of the GRA that are immobilized.23 Alternatively, the Fund could approach the op-
erations of a private bank, and leverage its loans. This is a possibility especially important 
in the case of precautionary facilities, in particular the FCL. As we saw, the three FCL 
granted to Mexico, Poland and Colombia accounted for 33% of total resources allocated 
between 2008 and 2011. Therefore they pose a high burden on the resources of the Fund 
because, even if the resources are not used, the IMF must immobilize the total amount, and 
cannot be used for other loans. However, the FCL are precautionary loans to countries with 
good behavior in which there is a high expectation that the resources will not be used. In 
this context, a 1:1 ratio seems excessive and could be considered to be risen, especially in 
cases of FCLs granted simultaneously to several countries with different regional risks. 
If the intention is to consolidate the FCL as a substitutive for reserve accumula-
tion, the countries must be confident it will be readily available (given the quasi-absolute 
availability of reserves)24 with the simple fulfillment of eligibility criteria. At the limit, we will 
have a situation of indefinite renewal of the FCL, which will make it a perfect substitute of 
reserves. It is, in any case, difficult to implement such an option for the foreseeable politi-
cal resistance from the same countries that have been against the FCL.
B SUSTAINABILITY
The lending policy should be financially sustainable and should also avoid introducing ineffi-
ciencies in the international economic system. Financial sustainability requires effective pro-
grams to resolve the country’s crisis and ensure that the Fund recovers the resources to 
continue lending to other members. It also will require preventing a lending bubble in the Fund 
that could question the viability of all programs jointly granted. Such systemic inefficiency 
problems stem mainly from the moral hazard that the programs may introduce in terms of less 
sound economic policy behavior by the countries (country moral hazard) or higher risk taking 
and less demand for quality by international investors (investor moral hazard), because they 
have the security provided by the IMF rescue. A third type of moral hazard is the IMF itself, for 
its dual role as supervisor and lender, and the conflict of interest of the first to determine the 
objectives of the second, acting on behalf of and justifying the program (see Chapter 3).
The easing of the crisis resolution facilities and the introduction of insurance fa-
cilities intensifies this debate, as they introduce greater access to IMF facilities. Notwith-
standing the caveats seen in Chapter 3 about the relevance of moral hazard (in decline), 
the concerns about it can be tackled through four main channels: (B.1) surveillance, and 
coordination of economic policies; (B.2) conditionality; (B.3) private sector involvement in 
crisis resolution, and (B.4) exit strategies.
B.1 Surveillance and coordination of economic policies
Effective surveillance is a necessary precondition to the lending policy, as it reduces coun-
try moral hazard and the possibility of a crisis. The Fund should in time alert of the risks 
22  Especially on the part of central banks, because the threat it poses in the design of domestic monetary policies.
23  As for the burden sharing between the various sources – quotas, NAB and bilateral loans – the IMF has handled 
various ratios depending on the availability at each moment. It have been handled ratios between 1:1 (bilateral 
loans: quotas) and 2:1 (IMF, 2009f). With the activation of the new NAB in 2011 until the ratification of the quota 
increase in 2013/14, provides for a temporary 3:1 ratio (bilateral loans/NAB: quotas).  
24  Subject to legal restrictions that each country may establish regarding the use of reserves, and to the calcula-
tion of the effects that the recourse to reserves may have in the capital markets confidence. 
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that the countries or the global economy as a whole are incurring in, and should have an 
influence on the ability to take corrective measures. However, the Fund surveillance has 
demonstrated important drawbacks that have limited its effectiveness. In this field, the IEO 
has carried several reports warning about critical shortcomings.
Regarding the IMF surveillance of advanced and large emerging economies the 
IEO points out that have been less effective than with other countries, which is especially 
serious given their systemic character. The Fund has paid little attention to strategies to 
seek a greater influence of its diagnoses and recommendations and even to the manage-
ment of the pressures on the staff to present overly cautious assessments. The IEO recom-
mends replacing bilateral surveillance under the Article IV reports with strategic programs 
with specific goals to better assess accountability, and to enhance communication strate-
gies with the authorities and markets (IEO, 2010).
On multilateral surveillance, the IEO has noted the absence of a strategic line for 
the whole institution. The main products – the WEO, the GFSR and Regional Reports – are 
elaborated by different departments25 working as compartments with little coordination 
between them. The result is a loss of interconnection among the products and potential 
inconsistencies, such that the joint monitoring product is less than the sum of the parts. 
Moreover, multilateral surveillance is too focused on the analysis of economic situation 
and outlook – something which is already done by many private analysts – and relies too 
much on a bottom up process, explaining the global behavior from the analysis of coun-
tries, faced to an increasingly horizontal and global markets reality. The IEO recommends 
to focus more on the economic policy linkages and their overall impact and to place the 
IMF within a peer supervision scheme within groups with capacity to influence decisions 
(Gs), and reinforce the IMFC’s role in this respect in order to gain traction (IEO, 2006).
Along this line, the IMF has strengthened its surveillance mechanisms, and in 
2011 carried out its triennial surveillance review, which confirms the reforms that have 
been introduced since 2009 in two main directions (in line with the recommendations of the 
IEO): integration between multilateral and bilateral surveillance, and the strengthening of 
financial surveillance (see Figure 1.8). All these initiatives have yet to be evaluated, espe-
cially in light of their ability to influence the policies of systemic economies;26 the 2014 
Triennial Surveillance Review will be a good opportunity to assess them. To ensure their 
effectiveness they will require interdepartmental coordination within the Fund to avoid du-
plication and inconsistencies between multiple products, and not to fall into overproduc-
tion, and surveillance fatigue in the countries. In this coordination, it is particularly impor-
tant the role of the Strategy, Policy and Review (SPR) Department which should ensure 
consistency of reports and a common and global strategy of the IMF.
In parallel, it will also be important to seek coordination with third international agen-
cies to avoid duplication. Thus, to the new IMF surveillance initiatives must be added those 
of the OECD or the FSB, or new regional measures, especially intense in the EU countries,27 
which are creating a supranational supervisory structure. For example, systemic economies 
will have a dual supervision of financial systems through the FSAP of the IMF, and the country 
examination of the FSB. This is a case in which at a minimum, there should be flow of infor-
mation between supervisory teams, and in time, joint reports could be an option.
Finally, on traction, Chapter 1 analyzes how the G20 is driving a new global sur-
veillance scheme in which the IMF is playing a central role, along with the FSB. Probably 
25  Research department (WEO), monetary and capital markets department (GFSR), and the respective geograph-
ical departments.
26  L´Hotellerie-Fallois (2011) notes the importance of tracking the recommendations of the Fund, not only to de-
termine whether actions have resulted in economic policy, but also to analyze the quality of these recommenda-
tions and its consistency over time. 
27  See Chapter 1, footnote 53.
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the most important, is the exercise of economic policy coordination through the Frame-
work for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, and its main instrument, the Mutual 
Assessment Process (MAP). The IMF plays a central role in the MAP by preparing the 
technical reference report for the joint analysis of the policies of the G20.28 Being a process 
directly involving those responsible for the economic policies (Prime Ministers, Ministers of 
Economy, and central bank Governors), it is the instrument with more potential to influence 
policy. However, it will need to strengthen its mechanisms of persuasion, even more so 
when the focus is now turning to exit strategies. For example, an option could be to for-
malize the MAP, giving the IMF a role as independent reviewer of the policies of the coun-
tries (beyond its current role of technical analysis of the policies set out by the G20 coun-
tries themselves).29 
B.2 Conditionality 
Conditionality is the main instrument available to the Fund to try to shore up the program’s 
effectiveness. It is also a deterrent of country moral hazard because it will require harsh 
measures if the country incurs in crisis. However, the new scheme of lending policy allows 
access to more resources, with larger upfront payments, and a much more flexible condi-
tionality (absent in the case of the FCL). In short, in pure theory the new conditionality 
framework reduces the lever on the country and raises the country moral hazard. There are 
nonetheless a number of elements that limit the extent of moral hazard.
First, in practice, the crisis resolution facilities maintain a relevant conditionality. 
Thus, the quantitative performance criteria continue to impose strict conditions for fiscal and 
monetary policy. On the other hand, we have seen how structural conditionality begins to 
become important from the 1980s and starts its fall 20 years later, when their effectiveness 
and criticality to the program success is put into question. In any case the structural bench-
marks are retained to guide possible reforms. Large down payments are also necessary in a 
context in which the balance of payments crises has a high component of confidence. 
Second, regarding precautionary facilities, an option could be to limit their use by 
linking them to specific contingencies reaffirming their insurance role; for example, limit 
them to a menu of exogenous shocks such as price volatility of raw materials, or to the 
investor type or the capital flow covered (e.g. discriminate between domestic and foreign 
investors,30 or between portfolio vs. direct investment flows). However, for large econo-
mies with ability to influence international markets, it is difficult to discriminate which one 
is an exogenous shock. Furthermore, excessive casuistic would eliminate the insurance 
function via signaling complexity to markets. Agency risks associated with precautionary 
lines should be monitored through surveillance, the annual review of strict compliance with 
the eligibility criteria.
Finally, in general, the Fund’s lending experience has demonstrated the need for 
ownership of the program by the authorities as a necessary condition to ensure its suc-
cess. It is therefore more important to work on the persuasion and influence of the IMF, 
rather than in imposing conditions. To use an analogy, there is a shift in the strategic ap-
proach to programs from an authoritarian teacher governed by the motto “spare the rod 
and spoil the child”, to a teacher who provides the tools, resources and technical support 
28  Although it draws from contributions of the G20 countries.
29  Legally, the surveillance policy is based on Article IV of the Agreement, which develops the obligations of mem-
ber countries, and in the monitoring the decision 2007 (updated 1977), which guides the responsibilities of IMF 
member countries in supervision. Formally, the monitoring of spillover effects is contemplated only when trans-
mitted through the balance of payments of the country and not necessarily, as in the current crisis, when the 
channel has been financial.
30  Alberola, Erce and Serena (2011) observed as foreign capital acts independently the level of reserves of the 
country, while the domestic capital does flow positively to the country the higher the level of reserves. Therefore 
a more effective FCL would attract domestic capital.
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for the country to develop its own policies. It is a strategy more in line with the new reality 
of globalization and of instant economic, financial and information flows. Time will tell if it 
is effective.
B.3 Private sector involvement 
The main instrument to contain investor moral hazard is the involvement of the private sec-
tor in the resolution of the crisis. To the extent that the investor is aware that it will be part 
of the solution, he would calibrate better the risk taken in their investment decisions.
In 2002 the IMF tried to articulate a mechanism for the involvement of the private 
sector through the so called Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), whose 
main promoter was the then first Deputy Managing Director, Anne Krueger.31 It was based 
on the intermediation of the IMF in situations of unsustainable debt, a sort of international 
mechanism of sovereign bankruptcy resolution (avoiding litigation subject to different laws 
in each country). The exit package of this mechanism would include: an adjustment pro-
gram, debt restructuring and financial support from the IMF. The SDRM failed, mainly be-
cause of the US refusal despite their initial support.32
Since then, the international community has pressed for market solutions through 
mechanisms such as collective action clauses in bonds emission or secondary bond mar-
kets33 or more recently, through contingent convertible bonds. Along the same lines, in the 
context of the resolution of the effects of the crisis in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, the EBRD launched in January 2009 the European Initiative for Banking Coordi-
nation or Vienna Initiative. This is an informal, non-binding dialogue framework among 
authorities, international institutions that contribute to the rescue (EBRD, IMF, European 
Commission), and the private banking sector, which discuss adjustment scenarios and fi-
nancing commitments of the various parts.
The result of the dialogue has led to a commitment made in a joint public declara-
tion of private banks, to maintain their exposures and capital levels in the countries, above 
agreed thresholds. This initiative has been very useful, because it has allowed that foreign 
private banks keep their funding commitments in countries such as Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania, resolving the prisoner’s dilemma that arose from not knowing the competitor’s 
strategy, and the incentive to be the first to leave the country to avoid further losses.
But, probably, the involvement of the private sector should go further and include 
the possibility of debt restructuring in the event of serious solvency crisis for which it is no 
sufficient the combination of domestic adjustment with private and official financing. The 
success of the exercise will depend on the ability to articulate a framework for effective 
dialogue between authorities, official financing and private creditors, a sort of SDRM-II to 
recover the simultaneous determination of financial support, internal adjustment and re-
structuring.34
B.4 Exit strategies 
Finally, another element that can help the sustainability of the lending policy is the articula-
tion of clear exit strategies of IMF programs to avoid situations of continued exposure to 
certain countries that limit access to resources to third parties. The exit strategy reduces 
moral hazard by eliminating the expectation of a continued rescue.
In the case of crisis resolution programs, the IMF has been implementing since 
2000 a stricter policy of monitoring the programs once expired, establishing a post pro-
31  For a detailed analysis of the SDRM see Krueger, 2002. Anne Krueger has recently recovered SDRM proposal 
type along with other authors, to apply to the European Regional Funds (Gianviti et al., 2010).
32  For an analysis of the political economy of the rise and fall of the SDRM proposal see Setser, 2008.
33  The ESM contemplates buying bonds in the secondary market of member countries in sovereign debt.
34  In 2013, the Fund is expected to review its framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 124 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS, N.º 78 THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE IMF (2009-2011)
gram evaluation when the country still has a debt of over 100% of the quota. Moreover, 
since 2003 the Fund conducts ex post analysis of long-term programs (situations in which 
the country has a loan with the IMF in at least 7, out of a 10-year period), in which the staff 
has to make an evaluation of previous programs and justify the need for renewal.35
The case of the precautionary facilities is different, in so far as they do not neces-
sarily involve release of funds, they are not subject to ex post analysis. Their nature is dif-
ferent, they insure against exogenous shocks and, in case of use, the guarantees are 
higher because they are granted only to economically sound countries. Implicit in their 
design it is to limit the demand of crisis resolution programs by bolstering market confi-
dence and limiting contagion. Further, to the extent that facilities such as FCL should 
represent a substitute of excessive reserve stocktaking −undesired by its global destabiliz-
ing effects − they may have a permanent character, to ensure its availability to the country 
(thus securing the same type of availability than reserves).
Therefore, the FCL probably should not have an exit strategy and rather have a 
more permanent use, although again, through strict compliance of qualification criteria to 
control for moral hazard. This debate will be taken strongly from 2013, in view of possible 
renewals of existing FCL with Mexico, Colombia and Poland, and with the review of the 
FCL projected for 2013/14. 
C PREDICTABILITY
The loan policy should provide a predictable framework, so that member countries and 
markets can interpret the various facilities and signals they entail to avoid stigmatization of 
programs. Otherwise, you lose the effectiveness of programs and incur the risk of disuse. 
Similarly, there must be some clear rules, a certain stability of lending policy, and equal 
treatment among member countries in the provision of access to the various facilities, i.e., 
equal access under similar economic circumstances.
In pursuit of a predictable framework, two main elements are involved: (C.1) trans-
parency about the nature of the various facilities and their consistent implementation, and 
(C.2) institutional balance of power, as a guarantee that the changes in lending policy will 
be made in the interests of its members.
C.1 Transparency: nature and application of lending facilities 
The nature of the various lending facilities is established in the very design of each facility. 
As we saw in Figure 5.4 the different facilities of the GRA are designed for different types 
of contingencies, which materialize in different types of conditionality (ex ante in the case 
of the FCL and the PLL). The current framework is theoretically a continuum of  facilities, 
represented in Figure 5.7.
In principle, there is a continuum in which the facilities are organized according to 
the type of balance of payments risk, – which is linked to the economic situation and poli-
cies –, and conditionality is modulated accordingly. On the far left, the country has a “green 
light”, their situation is solid, but faces a possible liquidity risk in the balance of payments 
as a result of exogenous factors. For these countries the FCL provides unlimited access 
which does not require conventional ex post conditionality (only ex ante eligibility criteria). 
At the other end, the country is in “red light”, is facing a crisis and an insolvency problem 
of balance of payments. These countries are offered either an SBA or an EFF (the main 
difference is the higher repayment period of the EFF), with a 600% quota access, expand-
able through exceptional access, and subjected to an adjustment program with ex post 
35  This policy is implemented after the first report of the IEO 2002, where the long-term programs are analyzed. 
The IEO found that, compared to the other programs, long-term programs have more optimistic projections, 
minor fiscal adjustment targets, and insufficient emphasis on key institutional reforms (IEO, 2002). 
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conditionality. Using a crude analogy, the continuous would go from platinum countries 
(FCL), to silver countries (PCL, HAPA), to brass countries (SBA, EFF).
The lines are much less clear in the “orange” part, the precautionary window of the 
PLL and the precautionary SBA (identified as HAPA if access is high). In both cases, the 
country has vulnerabilities and is offered a precautionary agreement, HAPA or PLL de-
pending on what authorities request and the judgment call made  by the staff and the 
Board. The degree of ex post conditionality is also diffuse, although it is defined as more 
focused and limited in the case of the PLL. On access, paradoxically the HAPA (presum-
ably applicable to the worst economy) could theoretically have superior access than a PLL 
via the exceptional window access.
In both cases the IMF provides a seal of approval that may catalyze private sector 
resources. There is, however, a strong difference between the PLL and the HAPA in terms 
of signal to the markets. The PLL indicates that the country is fine, but not good enough to 
obtain a FCL, so the access is limited, and ex post conditionality is added. In the HAPA, 
the signal is more positive: the country is facing balance of payments problems, but signal-
ing to the markets its capacity to solve them with a program supported by the IMF, and in 
principle, without accessing the resources it provides.
Nor is it clear the line between the FCL and the PLL. In theory, the FCL is for coun-
tries in better economic situation, but there is a dependence on the judgment made  by the 
staff on the strong or moderate implementation of the eligibility criteria. In practice, the eligi-
bility criteria favor that the PLL be granted to small closed economies, and the FCL to large 
open economies. The confusion is even greater after the introduction in November 2011 of 
the liquidity window of the PLL, which was originally aimed at any country with solid funda-
mentals but with a material need of short-term liquidity (probably closer to the fundamentals 
required for an FCL, but channeling it through the PLL). Arguably, there are two separate 
categories of continuous access to the facilities: (i) one for advanced and large emerging 
economies with access to FCL, PLL (liquidity window), HAPA and SBA, (ii) and another, for all 
other countries with access to PLL (precautionary window), HAPA and SBA.36
The creation of the PLL in August 2010 answers largely the demand for a precau-
tionary facility for emerging and developing economies that, in fact, did not have access to 
the FCL. However, the result has been that the theoretical continuum among the four fa-
cilities is vague and could lead to problems of stigmatization. These difficulties could be 
solved by integrating the PLL (precautionary window) and HAPA, maintaining an independ-
ent liquidity window and establishing a genuine insurance access through an FCL to any 
economy with a strong economic situation.
SOURCE: Based on IMF information.  
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36  The programs granted seem to corroborate it. Of the four precautionary lines granted up to 2011, the three FCL 
have been awarded to Mexico, Poland and Colombia, and the only PCL to Macedonia.
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C.2 Institutional balance of power
Finally, predictability is achieved by ensuring the stability of the lending policy, and pro-
moting access to resources under the same conditions for all member countries. To the 
extent that the IMF decision mechanisms reflect the diverse interests of its member coun-
tries, and they are a good reflection of the relative economic weight of the countries, the 
greater the safeguards to ensure that future lending policy reforms will be made taking into 
account the interests of all its members.
As we saw in Chapter 4, as of 2009, in line with the establishment of the G20 as 
the premier forum for international economic coordination, there has been a profound re-
form of IMF governance to be ratified in 2013/14. The result will be a stronger link between 
quotas – and voting power –  with the countries relative weight in the world economy, and 
a reform of the Board with a better balance among advanced, emerging and developing 
countries. Furthermore, informally, the G20 itself has had a growing influence on the poli-
cies of the Fund. One way forward would be to adapt the structure of the Board and the 
G20, which means changes in the Board, but also in the G20 (incorporating developing 
economies now absent).
In short, the Fund is now an institution much more balanced in its decision-making 
structure, thereby offering greater guarantees so that any change in lending policy will 
necessarily consider the interests of advanced, emerging, and developing countries.
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You can’t always get what you want
But if you try sometimes well you just might find
You get what you need
(The Rolling Stones, 1968)
In response to the global financial crisis, the G20 has launched a series of far-reaching 
initiatives laying the foundations of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on 
three main elements: the configuration of the G20 as the forum for economic coordination 
(replacing the G7), the strengthening of the institutional pillars of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem – IMF, World Bank and WTO –, and the establishment of a new pillar of financial regu-
lation and supervision, the FSB.
However, the nature of financial crises and the institutional framework needed to 
contain it are issues still far from being settled. As noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 
292), financial crises can hardly be avoided however perfect the system of regulation. In 
this scenario, agile and flexible tools are needed to address crisis situations, and nobody 
discusses the role to be played by the IMF as a central economic institution of the NIEO in 
a context of economic globalization, which requires global solutions.
The purpose of this work was to analyze the transformation of the Fund between 
2009 and 2011 in response to the global financial crisis. This analysis shows that there 
have been very substantial changes in all of its major fronts – governance and institutional 
culture, surveillance and lending policies, and resources – which represent the beginning 
of a metamorphosis in the operations and functions of the Fund that introduce new chal-
lenges and will determine its future role.
The reforms have been developed in a short period of time, under the pressure of 
events and under the urgency to respond to the crisis. Looking ahead, the challenge is to 
consolidate and to address the problems that these reforms could introduce. The ultimate 
goal is to achieve a more solid Fund and qualified to be the guarantor of the new IEO. In 
other words, the IMF must complete the process of metamorphosis and spread the wings.
Starting the Metamorphosis
The changes in IMF governance acquire historical character, affecting the formal and infor-
mal decision making structure. The reform of the formal structure means a more balanced 
weight between advanced and emerging economies. Between 2006 and 2008 the Fund 
has changed the formula of the quota after over 60 years of maintaining the statu quo, and 
has advanced ad hoc increases in quotas in favor of the more underrepresented countries. 
The new formula benefits emerging economies by introducing a high component of GDP 
valued at purchasing power parity (ppp).
In 2010, this reform is completed with the doubling of the quotas and their distri-
bution in favor of the most under-represented countries (under the new 2008 formula), and 
the most dynamic emerging countries. Once ratified (expected in 2013/14), it will result in 
a historical correction of a misalignment inherited from the very foundation of the Fund, 
because the quotas did not properly account for the differences in the countries relative 
economic growth over the years. Therefore, quotas were not a reflection of the weight of 
countries in the world economy, affecting mainly to the emerging economies. Also in 2010, 
the Board approved an amendment to reduce by two the number of directors of advanced 
European countries, again balancing it in favor of emerging countries, and reducing the 
European “rolling pin” in the Board meetings.
Final notes: displaying the IMF wings
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On the other hand, there have been profound changes in the informal decision-
making structure, most notably the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the premier forum 
for strategic direction of the Fund, and a shift in the institutional culture. The so called 
Washington Consensus – that dominated the doctrine of the Fund from the 1980s – has 
given way to a new approach of which the contours are still not clearly defined, but closer 
to the new Keynesian economics, that advocates the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
policy and regulation in certain circumstances, and advises to adapt policies to the spe-
cific circumstances of each case.
The crisis has revealed significant weaknesses in the surveillance exercised by the 
Fund, that has quickly reacted in two main directions: the integration between multilateral 
and bilateral surveillance (from a perspective that has traditionally been country-based), 
and the strengthening of financial supervision, including strengthening the expertise of the 
Fund (traditionally macroeconomic rather than financial). These new scope is formalized in 
2013 with the approval of the Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD), but previously, since 
2009, a number of new measures and products have been launched: a new Global Policy 
Agenda report (integrating the key findings and recommendations of the WEO, the GFSR 
and the Fiscal Monitor), an early warning exercise (EWE), new cross-country thematic re-
ports, reinforcement of articles IV of systemic countries with an additional report on spillo-
ver effects (spillover reports), or the introduction of regular Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) for countries with systemic financial systems. The Fund is also playing an 
important role as external referee in the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), the main in-
strument of the new framework for international coordination of economic policies devel-
oped by the G20. 
More significant are the changes in the lending policy. The new policy is charac-
terized by two main components: a more flexible policy for crisis resolution, and a new 
insurance function. The lines under the General Resources Account (GRA) are simplified 
by reducing them to two lines – the Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) – to cover balance of payments difficulties regardless of its origin, thereby 
eliminating the Fund’s casuistic of the different types of distortions. These facilities are 
now more flexible, both because of the lower conditionality, and of a larger and more flex-
ible access to resources.
Under the principles of ownership of the program by the country authorities and 
criticality of the measures, the ex post conditionality of the programs has been reduced 
and limited to quantitative macroeconomic performance criteria and structural bench-
marks. While this is a change that had been brewing for a decade, it was not until 2009 
when it is given a definitive step to eliminating structural performance criteria, removing 
the Fund from the criticism of intrusion. Thus, the Fund changes the course of a 50-year 
history of programs loaded with conditions and the subsequent disbursements of the 
loans will be based more on an overall assessment of the program.
On the other hand, the access to resources is made more flexible in three ways: 
doubling normal access limits (up to 200% of annual quota and 600% for the total pro-
gram), simplifying the criteria for exceptional access above these limits, and the staggering 
(in a staircase pattern) of disbursements in function of the country’s needs, including front-
loading of disbursements. As was evidenced in the second half of the 1990s, the capital ac-
count crises spread quickly and have a sudden character, requiring quick access to a large 
amount of resources to restore confidence of international markets. Here again, the 2009 
reform is redirecting the trend of lending policy, which was historical based on staggered 
and limited loan disbursements, as a guarantee that the country could repay the loan.
Along with the new framework for crisis resolution, the Fund activates a new in-
surance function based on two new instruments: the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Pre-
cautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). The scheme is completed with the so-called HAPA 
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(SBA precautionary programs with high access), also with preventive functions. Although 
the former CCL (1999-2003) pointed out in this direction, it was never used because of 
stigma problems. The rapid spread of the global financial crisis makes it necessary to retry 
establishing an insurance function in the IMF, this time redesigned to ensure its use and 
effectiveness.
The PLL and the FCL introduced two changes especially significant in the Fund’s 
lending policy: (i) elimination of ex post conditionality (substantial loss of weight in the case 
of the PLL) and replacing it with eligibility criteria (or ex ante conditionality) as a require-
ment for access to resources, and (ii) reinterpretation of the balance of payments need 
test, so as to enable preventive resources for a country in which, not only there are no 
balance of payments needs, but there is an explicit recognition about good economic situ-
ation. In that way, two criteria that had dominated IMF loans since its inception in the 
1950s, are reversed.
In short, the change in lending policy confirms the conventional view of the crisis 
as an opportunity. The global financial crisis has made way for a new lending policy, details 
of which had already been outlined before, but not approved until the crisis demanded 
immediate attention to the financing needs of member countries.
Unfolding the wings (the challenges)
The transformation of the NIEO started in 2009 must now consolidate. After the intense 
start in 2009 and 2010, the reform momentum has been decreasing, partly because ad-
vances in the first two years have been very significant, but also because there seems to 
appear some reform fatigue in the G20 and a desire to refocus the work on the more fun-
damental issues. It is likely that in the coming years, new initiatives will be reduced and the 
emphasis will be placed on the implementation of those already ongoing specially on fi-
nancial regulation and supervision, and international economic policy coordination (MAP); 
and in shaping them as their effectiveness is assessed once they are implemented.
The same type of scenario arises with respect to the Fund. It will be important to 
test the effectiveness of the new lending, surveillance, and resource policies, and its gov-
ernance, to adapt them accordingly. Taking an approach of principles, we may consider 
the challenges faced by these policies and to evaluate possible alternatives to address 
them. To sum up – and notwithstanding the risk of simplification and the difficulties of 
partitioning a reality of high-interaction between policies –, we can pose the major chal-
lenges in terms of five broad principles associated with the different policies: legitimacy 
(especially associated with governance), effectiveness (surveillance), sufficiency (resourc-
es), sustainability and predictability (both associated with the lending policy).
The challenge of institutional legitimacy primarily affects governance and institu-
tional culture. The reform of 2010 should be completed in 2013/14, and a new Board will 
be born more balanced between advanced and emerging countries, both in quotas and 
composition of the directors. The quota weight of the advanced economies will stay 
around 60%, and in the number of directors, the emerging and developing countries will 
have about fourteen out of twenty-four. It remains to be seen who will get the two chairs 
lost by advanced European countries; so far, in the 2012-1014 rotation, emerging Europe 
has benefited of 1.6 chairs (mainly because of the access to the position of Director of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, within their respective constituencies). It 
would be good to take advantage of these changes to seek a rapprochement between the 
compositions of the Board and the G20 to ensure consistency between the two forums.
However, after more than 60 years of the G7 preponderance (especially the US 
and Europe), the tensions on governance are not yet closed, and emerging economies are 
demanding even more weight. The G20 has already anticipated the mechanisms to ad-
dress this challenge: to review the formula in January 2013, to advance the XV General 
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Review of Quotas to January 2014, and formally reconsider the Board composition every 
eight years. From this exercise we can expect a new adjustment in calculated quotas fol-
lowing the trend of approaching the weight between advanced and emerging economies 
towards a more balanced share, probably by way of an adjustment in the weights of the 
variables (probably linked to the elimination of the variability variable), rather than a revolu-
tion in the formula.
In order to prevent the recurrence of under-representation, it is more likely (and 
necessary) to see adjustments in time between actual and calculated quotas (i.e. between 
actual quotas and the economic weight of the country) – probably including a new ad hoc 
quota increase already in the XVth Review –, rather than through a general quota increase. 
These successive corrections should be reflected in time on the composition of the Board, 
for which it would be necessary to adopt less politicized and more automatic Board re-
forms, linking the positions of Executive Director to the quota-weight of the country. It can 
also be expected (and necessary) that sooner than later, and for the first time, the position 
of the Managing Director of the Fund shall be filled by a non-European (and from an emerg-
ing country), and thus complete the transition from the G7 to G20 in the strategic direction 
of the Fund.
Legitimacy also requires an institutional culture with more internal debate and a 
new theoretical paradigm fleeing from monochromatic recommendations. The path is al-
ready made, macroeconomic policies must balance multiple objectives and have to adapt 
to the circumstances of each country; and the importance of regulating the markets to 
correct failures and modulate incentives is recognized. On fiscal policy, the challenge is to 
strengthen the counter-cyclical component, so that the current consolidation process 
should set an adjustment path designed with budget allocations that minimize the nega-
tive impact on growth. Monetary policy will have to pursue the objectives of growth and 
employment, and price and financial stability, against the traditional orthodoxy centered on 
inflation targeting.
On the effectiveness of supervision, the lines are also plotted, the strengthening of 
financial supervision will continue and also the link between multilateral, regional and bilat-
eral levels; thus reflecting a global economic reality that is less country-based and more 
complex and interconnected. The challenges arise especially in terms of the impact of the 
messages and appear on several fronts:
(i) Most incisive messages focused on policy recommendations. Messages 
should be more incisive so that they do not become lost within the reports. 
Further, while the IMF should clearly alert of a risk, the emphasis should be 
placed on policy recommendations to prevent negative signaling in the mar-
kets. In this respect, after failing in predicting outspokenly the global financial 
crisis, the Fund seems to be focusing excessively on the risks, following a 
sort of risk aversion to being accused of not having predicted the next one 
either. 
(ii) Intra-institutional coordination. Reports have proliferated within the Fund, as 
a result of the crisis; which raises the risk of duplication and inconsistency in 
the messages. It will be necessary to improve coordination between depart-
ments (regional and horizontal) avoiding silo behavior. 
(iii) Inter-institutional cooperation. International monitoring initiatives (FSB, 
OECD, G20) and regional (mainly EU) have also proliferated, creating an in-
ternational supervisory labyrinth. Without prejudice to the institutional inde-
pendence and usefulness of evaluations from different sources, there is a risk 
of mixed messages to be lost in a “haystack” of recommendations. It will be 
important to develop adequate institutional cooperation, with at a minimum, 
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exchange of information flows and assessments, even at the technical level. 
In some cases, to redefine or unify reports considering comparative advan-
tages, especially with the G20 MAP and the FSB. 
(iv) IMF accountability. The Fund also makes mistakes, and they should be rec-
ognized. Here the IEO has played and will continue to play a central role, re-
viewing independently and with the perspective that gives the course a few 
years the Fund policies (this is certainly a good institutional practice lacking 
for example in the EU). But recommendations of each year must also be 
monitored by the staff itself, evaluating in subsequent Article IV or multilat-
eral reports if previous recommendations have been met or not and whether 
they remain valid, or are no longer accurate. 
With respect to the sufficiency, it will be important to ensure that the IMF has suf-
ficient resources to meet the needs of its members. The crisis and the new lending policy 
have exerted strong pressure on the resources of the Fund in the period between late 2008 
and 2009. In recent years, bilateral loans (mainly from Japan and European countries) have 
maintained the Fund’s resources. From 2011, the budgetary burden has been transferred 
into the expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), which transiently multiply their 
resources almost eleven times (from US$ 54,500 million to almost US$ 590,000 million). 
And, starting in 2013/14, resources will again be supported by quotas, once the agreed 
duplication is ratified. The Fund has risen resources from quotas and NAB to SDR 660,000 
million (approximately US$ 1 trillion), from the 270,000, which it counted in 2008.
Ideally, the quotas should be adjusted over time to keep them stable in relative 
terms to key global economic indicators (GDP, trade, and capital flows). However, although 
they are periodically reviewed, experience shows that their increases occur abruptly in 
response to extraordinary situations, as happened in 1998 with the Asian crisis, and in 
2010 with global financial crisis. Once reached the threshold of a trillion US dollars and 
taking into account the procedural difficulties – increasing quotas requires a 85% majority 
and parliamentary procedure in most countries – is likely to have resistance to increasing 
the quotas, beyond small size increases linked to under-representation. On the other hand, 
the chances that the Fund evolves into an entity with capacity to generate liquidity through 
issuing SDR are remote because there is no political support for a Fund working as a cen-
tral bank.
It is more likely that, in case of need for additional resources, to resort to the tem-
porary funding that provide bilateral loans or the issuance of notes to official creditors. This 
is the kind of initiative that was launched in December 2011 by the euro area with addi-
tional contribution of € 150,000 millions, later strengthened by other G20 countries at Los 
Cabos Summit in 2012, raising resources up to US$ 460,000 million. Other alternatives 
would be to borrow from the private sector – allowed by the IMF Articles of Agreement – or 
especially, the leverage of the loans in the case of lines like the FCL, which detract 100% 
of the value of the program from the usable resources of the Fund, even though there is an 
expectation that the resources will not be used. However, these are options that will re-
quire a shift in the Board aversion to rely on private creditors.
With regard to sustainability, the main challenge is the moral hazard associated 
with the Fund programs. While moral hazard is no longer the primary concern in the design 
of the lending policy, it is the main argument of the opponents to the reform. The new pro-
gram framework with more flexible crisis resolution lines and the absence of ex post con-
ditionality in precautionary lines theoretically increases the risk of unsustainable or reck-
less behavior in the countries benefiting from the programs and on international investors.
However, in general, a strategy based on the ownership of the program by the 
authorities and on monitoring its overall effectiveness has become more important to the 
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success of a program than the old control of fixed conditions (often not met and waived). 
Furthermore, the Fund’s insurance function compares favorably with other GFSN alterna-
tives such as the excessive buildup of reserves, which introduce inefficiencies in the inter-
national allocation of resources; the central banks swaps, subject to uncertainty; or RFAs, 
which are not consolidated enough (even an integration process as advanced as the Euro-
pean Union has not been able to give a completely satisfactory answer). It is a necessary 
function that at least complements the rest of insurance alternatives.
In any case, several elements will be important to contain country moral hazard, 
including a close monitoring of programs and strict compliance with the eligibility criteria 
of the insurance lines to avoid “lowering the bar”. A more effective surveillance and better 
international coordination of economic policies within the G20 will also be important to 
contain the risk of crises and unsustainable economic policies. The investor moral hazard 
will require greater private sector involvement in crisis resolution through a joint dialogue 
with authorities and institutions of the type of the Vienna Initiative and, in severe cases, the 
assumption of a restructuring process, ideally articulated together in an SDRM-type mech-
anism.
Finally, predictability will require transparent application of the lending instruments 
and their stability over time. Here, among the new facilities, the FCL, the PLL and HAPA do 
not have clearly defined boundaries and incorporate the risk of sending the wrong signals 
to the markets. These signals may eventually be clarified in time through their use, al-
though here, the possibility of integrating the PLL and the HAPA has been raised, maintain-
ing in parallel an independent liquidity window, and providing genuine access to FCL for 
any economy with solid fundamentals. On the stability over time, it is to be expected that 
the new instruments will be maintained in the medium term, in any case, the new govern-
ance structure of the IMF, with a better balance between advanced and emerging econo-
mies, guarantees that future policy reforms will properly take into account the interests of 
all member countries.
…
Between 2009 and 2011, the IMF has undertaken major reforms on all of its main fronts 
– its governance and institutional culture, its lending and surveillance policies, and its re-
sources – that have relocated it at a central place in the International Economic Order. In 
this sense, the terms of a not so distant debate that reached up to 2008 on the loss of 
relevance by the IMF, have been reversed. Then, in the middle of a process of staff reduc-
tion, ironic hallway conversations circulated at the Fund, which questioned the end of the 
economic cycle thesis and hence of the role of the Fund: it was said that, the “most opti-
mistic” among the staff argued that “a crisis would come”, and boy, did it. The cycles are 
here to stay, and a strong multilateral institution is needed to support countries in their 
recovery path.
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